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When project managers consider risks that may affect a project, they rarely consider 
risks associated with the use of information systems. The Federal Information 
Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 recognizes the importance of 
information security to the economic and national security of the Unites States. The 
requirements of FISMA are addressed using the NIST Special Publication 800-53 
Rev 3, which has improved the way organizations practice information assurance.  
 
The NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 takes a hierarchical approach to information assurance, 
which has resulted in the duplication and subsequent withdrawal and merging of 
fifteen security controls. In addition, the security controls are not associated with the 
  
appropriate information systems. The current security assessment model often results 
in a waste of resources, since controls that are not applicable to an information system 
have to be addressed.  
 
This research developed and tested the value of using an information system 
breakdown structure (ISBS) model for identification of project information system 
resources. It also assessed the value of using an e-Government Relational Technical 
Security Controls Model for mapping the ISBS to the applicable relational technical 
security controls.  
 
A questionnaire containing ninety-five items was developed and emailed to twenty-
four information security contractors of which twenty-two efficiently completed 
questionnaires were received. The questionnaire assessed the value of using the ISBS, 
and the relationships of the e-Government Relational Technical Security Controls 
model. Literature review and industry experts opinion was used to triangulate the 
research results and establish their validity. Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for the four 
sections of the questionnaire established its reliability. 
 
The results of the research indicated that the ISBS model is an invaluable, 
customizable, living tool that should be used for identification of information system 
resources on projects. It can also be used for assigning responsibility for the different 
information systems and for security classification. The study also indicated that 
using the e-Government Relational Technical Security Controls provides a relational 
  
and fully integrated approach to information assurance while reducing the likelihood 
of duplicating security controls. This study could help project managers identify and 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.0 Background and Problem Statement   
The events of September 11th, 2001 established the need for the United States 
Government to revaluate its approach to all aspects of security. A commonly held 
belief in the Information Security industry is that the outcome of future wars will be 
determined by the United States Government’s ability to keep hackers and other 
intruders out and ensure the confidentiality, availability and integrity of data, 
information, information systems and assets.  
 
The Office of Management and Budget Fiscal Year 2008 Report on the 
implementation of the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 states 
that “In fiscal year 2008, Federal agencies spent $6.2 billion securing the 
government’s total IT investment of approximately $68 billion for the fiscal year of 
2008 enacted level, equating to approximately 9.2 percent of the total IT portfolio.” 
Information Technology funds were spent in the following sectors: certification and 
accreditation of systems, testing of security controls and user awareness training. 
 
Disrupting information systems that support the United States energy, health care, 
commercial or other critical infrastructure can cause mayhem to the United State’s 
ability to deliver services and products to its citizens and stakeholders. It can also 
have drastic effects on the financial markets and the ability of the United States to 
trade with its international trading partners. This can result in marked fluctuations in 
the value of the US dollar vis-à-vis other currencies, which can affect the US 
economy, depending on the debt structure. The threat to maintain the US critical 
infrastructure and ensure the commercial viability of financial markets underscores 
the importance of information assurance to the US Government.  
 
The ease and low cost required to initiate attacks on the US critical infrastructure, 
makes this threat a reality. To abate this threat, the United States Government has 




critical infrastructure are assessed annually, mitigated, accepted, transferred, managed 
and reported to the United States Congress. In 2002, the US Congress enacted the E-
Government Act, which is a requirement for all US Federal Agencies and Federal 
Government Contractors.  
 
Whitman (2008) summarizes the problem facing the US Government as “The race to 
keep up with new, more complex and aggressive ways for compromising systems is 
identified daily.” Whitman (2008) maintains that, “The importance of information 
security is such that it cannot be left exclusively to the hands of the information 
technology department.” I suggest that project managers take an active role in 
identifying project management best practices for identifying, mitigating and 
managing the risks posed to the systems that make up the US critical infrastructure. 
 
Operations research teaches us that to minimize the threats posed to the critical 
infrastructure due to the use of information systems; we must first observe the 
systems.  Determine the risk factors, cost, resources, etc and then develop a verifiable 
model that can be used to predict the risk behavior and use analytical methods to 
identify an optimal solution to mitigate the problem. 
  
Project management ensures a project’s schedule variances, cost variances and risks 
are calculated and tracked using Gantt charts, network diagrams, critical path 
analysis, earned value management and other risk management methodologies. 
Current project management methodologies identify, assess and mitigating risks to 
time, quality, cost and customer satisfaction but they do not assess the risk posed by 
the use of information systems in achieving the goals and objectives of the project.  
 
The National Institute of Science and Technology has developed a three-tiered (High, 
Moderate and Low) hierarchical security assessment framework for assessing the risk 





 The security control families are not fully integrated and this result in duplication 
of control families as is evident from the fifteen security controls that were 
withdrawn and merged into existing controls for NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 released 
on August 2009. To have a robust information system, all the security controls for 
applications, infrastructure, data, information, information systems and assets 
should be fully integrated and functioning harmoniously to protect the 
organization, as an information system is only as robust as its weakest link. 
 The NIST security controls assume a one-size-fits-all approach to security 
assessment, which is not representative of organizational and project security 
assessment practices. When performing a security assessment of network devices 
like routers and switches, controls that may not be applicable on to Email Servers 
still have to be addressed. This often results in extended security assessment and 
the unnecessary waste of resources by the Federal Government and Contractors.  
 Organizations need to wrap project management methodologies around security 
assessment processes and ensure they are fully integrated with organizational 
processes, customizable and repeatable.  
 
Information systems are used in the five project management processes yet very little 
or no attempt has been made to develop a project management methodology that can 
help with identifying, assessing, mitigating, transferring and managing the risks 
associated with using information systems on a project. 
 
Keyes (2009) recognizes that “The earlier a risk is identified and dealt with, the less 
likely it is to negatively affect project outcomes.” Keyes also states that risks are 
probably more easily addressed early on in a project lifecycle. It is much cheaper to 
make changes to the project in the earlier stages than much later on after most of the 
funds have been committed. All these conditions indicate that there is a need for early 






1.1 Research Objective 
The objectives for this research include the following: 
1. To identify the different information systems that makes up a project 
environment. 
2. To develop an e-Government Technical Controls taxonomy for Federal 
Government information assurance contractors. 
3. To identify effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
identification and authentication controls.   
4. To develop a cost model for security assessment of identification and 
authentication controls.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
The questions that this research shall address include the following: 
1. Can we develop an e-Government Technical Controls Relational taxonomy for 
Federal Government Information Assurance Contractors? 
2. What are the effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
Identification and Authentication Security Control Family? 
3. What are the associated cost calculations for performing security assessment of 
the Identification and Authentication Security Control Family?  
 
1.3 The Research Scope 
Project management tends to concentrate on the risks associated with cost, quality, 
timely delivery of the project and customer satisfaction. Yet on most projects, we find 
that information systems are used to facilitate the initiating, planning, executing, 
tracking, management and control of project. Very little or no research has been 
conducted on the risks posed by the use of information systems in project. The risks 
associated with the use of information systems on a project can cause a project to fail 






A common belief in the field of project management is that ‘risks that are identified 
much later in the project timeline are more difficult to address and likelier to have 
significant undesirable impact to a project’. A trend is developing wherein the ease of 
managing risks on projects appears to have some relationship to the time of 
identification, where the time of identification is measured from the start time of the 
project. Thus the sooner we start looking at the threats posed by the use of 
information systems in projects, the sooner we can identify and implement risk 
mitigation and management strategies that ensure the risk posed by the use of 
information systems on projects is sufficiently mitigated and managed. 
 
The goal of this research is to develop a relational e-Government Technical Controls 
taxonomy that can be used to systematically identify, classify, mitigate and manage 
information systems risks. Early identification and management of information 
system project threats reduces the likelihood of these risks negatively affecting the 
project much later in the project life cycle when the costs of the impact can be higher. 
 
Project management research for information systems shows the typical cost model to 
be a J-shaped chart, which indicates that earlier in the project, there is more flexibility 
in planning and adjusting project metrics than it is much later in the project cycle. In 
addition, in the later stages of the project, most of the funds would have been 
committed and expectations are set. 
 
Project management e-Government Technical Controls taxonomy is a major first step 
towards developing an invaluable tool for identifying, classifying, mitigating, 
transferring, accepting and managing information systems risks. This research shall 
develop an e-Government Technical Controls taxonomy for Federal Government 
Information Assurance Contractors.  This taxonomy will assist information security 
contractors, project managers, network engineers/administrators and pertinent 
stakeholders to discuss information systems risk as further emphasized in PMBOK 
Fourth Edition:  “The format of the risk statement should be consistent to ensure the 





This research will develop, validate and document a fundamental information systems 
breakdown structure for information systems projects. It will also develop and 
validate the relationships between the entities of the e-Government Relational 
Technical Controls and identify effective risks mitigation and management strategies 
for the identification and authentication control family. It will develop a cost model 
for performing security assessment for the identification and authentication control 
family. This taxonomy will facilitate the effective identification and categorization of 
information system risks so that information security contractors, project managers, 
network engineers/administrators and pertinent stakeholders can easily reuse them to 
identifying risks that may affect a project based on its information system 
components. 
 
This research shall be limited to developing an e-Government Relational Technical 
Controls taxonomy for project information systems as they relate to the e-
Government Technical Controls of the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 released in August 
2009. It will not develop an e-Government Relational Management taxonomy or an e-
Government Relational Operational Controls taxonomy. It will not address the risks 
posed to virtual machines or associated with ransom-ware, sub-standard 
organizational processes, information warfare and policy-based security management. 
The assessment of the current risk mitigation and management strategies is limited to 
the Identification and Authentication Control Family.  
 
1.4 The Research Methodology 
The research effort was partitioned into three phases and executed according to the 
research methodology depicted in Figure 1.1. Detailed descriptions of the processes 






1.5 PHASE 1: Research Model Development 
The researcher conducted an exhaustive literature review in the area of project 
management for Federal Information Systems Management Act 2002, E-Government 
Act, information security, information technology, information systems, information 
assurance, risk management, organizational theory, operations research, statistical 
tools and prior academic research related to project management of information 
assurance contracts.  
 
Searches were done on the following online library catalogs; UMCP Library, 
Montgomery County Library, Project Management Institute (PMI), American Society 
of Civil Engineers (ASCE), CIO Magazine and Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers. The searches included the following words: Taxonomy, vulnerability, risk 
assessment, security assessment, risk management, risk mitigation, FISMA 2002, e-
Government, information assurance, breakdown structure NIST SP, operations 
management and project risk management. The researcher reviewed publication 
abstracts and table of contents of textbooks to ensure they are applicable to the 
research and appropriate for inclusion in the literature review. 
 
Due to the dynamic nature of Information Security, the majority of the books and 
publications included in this research are those published or written on or after 2006. 
Materials published prior to 2006 that may have been included in this research were 
screened for their currency prior to inclusion in this literature review. The researcher 
continued to review publications in information security and project management 
magazines to ensure the currency of the research. 
 
The literature was categorized based on the year of publication and its relevance to 
the research topic. The researcher rejected, or sparingly included material that 
addressed information security theory but had no relevant associations to project 
management. These papers also proved to be of very little interest to the researcher 





Information security contractors, network engineers/administrators and project 
managers with over four years of expertise performing security assessments were 
interviewed to identify the current challenges when managing information assurance 
projects. The researcher also utilized his extensive experience and expertise in 
information assurance supporting Federal Government contracts, as a Certified 
Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) and a Project Management 
Institute (PMI) Project Management Professional (PMP) to screen and ask 
appropriate questions that will facilitate the development of a model. 
 
The literature review and interviews provided insight into the risk management issues 
for information assurance contracts and a problem statement was developed that 
guided the development of research questions and objectives for the research. The 
proposal for this research was presented to the dissertation committee with nine 
research questions, which were scaled back to three questions. 
 
The dissertation committee also recommended that a data collection model with a 
minimum of ten industry experts be interviewed and their responses be used to 
answer questions based on the taxonomy developed, as opposed to performing an 
online survey of 40 plus participants. This was recommended as the preferred method 
to improve the validity of the research.   
 
Industry experts and academia ascertained the value and possible contributions of this 
model to the field of information assurance and project management. 
 
1.6 PHASE 2: Taxonomy Model Instrument Development 
The researcher then developed an information system breakdowns structure model 
and an e-Government Relational Technical Control model that consisted of entities 
and relationships and develop risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
identification and authentication control family that are base on the NIST SP 800-53 
Rev 3.  A data collection questionnaire was also developed to assess the components 




Government Relational Technical Control Model and the identification and 
authentication risk mitigation and management strategies for improving the security 
posture of information systems.  
 
Prior to the use of the data collection questionnaire, the researcher assessed the value 
of the questionnaire by soliciting feedback from the dissertation committee, select 
industry representatives and performing a pilot test. Based on the feedback received, 
the questionnaire was modified to improve its readability, enhance its data collection, 
clarify some questions and minimize ambiguity. Recommendations and suggestions 
from industry experts and members of the dissertation committee for improving and 
validity, structure, content and coherency of the data collection questionnaire and 
process were incorporated in the final design of the questionnaire. 
 
To ensure the validity of the data collection questionnaire, the researcher identified 
information security contractors, network engineers/administrator and project 
managers working on information assurance Federal Government projects, that have 
a minimum of four years of experience performing security assessments. The 
questionnaires were emailed to pre-selected respondents because it allowed the 
respondents the liberty to select the best time to complete the questionnaire. It also 
allowed the researcher to reach a diverse group of respondents that would have been 
impossible to reach due to their diverse locations and security clearance requirements. 
Survey development literature reviewed indicated that this method tends to be the 
most suitable method to reach the survey respondents.  
 
The gains in the validity and reliability of data obtained by using this method 
outweigh the possible validity and reliability that may be obtained by selecting 
respondents from a centralized location (the Washington DC Metropolitan Area) or 
by using an online survey of respondents. In addition, the respondents had extensive 
experience working on diverse US Federal Government information assurance 





The data for the pilot test of five respondents was collected in Microsoft Word 2007 
and 2003 documents for validation of the questionnaire. For the field data collection 
the questionnaire was emailed to the respondents. The researcher decided against the 
use of a web-based form to ensure that web-form timeouts do not affect the response 
rate. The data was transferred to SPSS Version 18 (also called PASW Statistics 18.0) 
for ease of analyzing and reporting on the data.  
 
1.7 PHASE 3: Field Data Collection, Analysis & Validation 
The primary respondents selected for data collection are information security 
contractors, network engineers/administrators and project managers working on 
Federal Government information assurance projects that have over four years of 
experience performing security assessments using the NISTSP 800-53 Security 
Controls.    
 
The researcher invited the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
Computer Security Department and the International Information Systems Security 
Certification Consortium (ISC)2 Inc. to participate in the survey development and 
research process. The International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium (ISC)2 Inc provided access to information security contractors with the 
industry recognized Certified Information Systems Security Professional credential. 
The researcher encouraged the National Institute of Standards and Technology to 
participate in the taxonomy model development, as they are primarily responsible for 
developing risk mitigation and management strategies for the Federal Government 
and Federal Government Contractors. 
 
The researcher reviewed the expertise of prospective respondents as they relate to 
information assurance and project management and selected a group of fifty-five 
respondents to invite to participate in the data collection exercise. An introductory 
email was sent to the prospective respondents.  It highlighted the purpose of the 
study, risks, and expected duration to complete the questionnaire and asked if the 




responded in the affirmative were emailed an electronic copy of the UMD 
Information Assurance Research questionnaire and asked for a date that the 
researcher could expect to receive the completed questionnaire. The framework for 
answering the questions was based on fifty percent of the information assurance 
projects the respondents completed within the last year. 
 
The data collected from the interviews was analyzed using statistical methods that 
included descriptive statistics, factor analysis, bivariate correlation analysis and 
Bayesian Probability. The statistical analysis revealed trends in managing information 
assurance for Federal Government agencies. In addition, a case study was used to 
validate the research results. The case study was analyzed to identify supported 
hypothesis, unsupported hypothesis and the reasons for the inconsistencies. Finally, 
the researcher drew conclusions and discussed the results of the study. 
 
1.8 Expected Outcomes of the Research 
The research will provide structure in the following areas of project management for 
Federal Government information assurance contractors: 
 
 Enumerate the information systems that are typically found on Federal 
Government information assurance projects. 
 Provide an e-Government Relational Technical Controls taxonomy that 
can be utilized to identify the relationships between information systems, 
users and the e-Government Technical Security Controls. 
 Identify effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
identification and authentication control family 
 Develop an identification and authentication control family security 
assessment cost model. 
 Provide a common lingua for information security contractors, network 
engineers/administrators, project managers and pertinent stakeholders to 









1.9 Application Scenarios for this Research 
Information security contractors, network engineers/administrators, project managers 
and pertinent stakeholders can use the information system breakdown structure 
(ISBS) model to enumerate projects physical resources during a security assessment. 
 
The e-Government Relational Technical Controls taxonomy can help information 
security contractors, network engineers/administrators, project managers and 
pertinent stakeholders develop a framework for discussing information assurance 
security control entities and their corresponding attributes. The identification and 
authentication risk management strategies will highlight the NIST risk management 
strategies that information security contractors believe are effective for managing 
risks. It will delineate the risks management strategies and their corresponding 
relationships to users and information systems for information assurance projects. 
This approach will allow for the effective identification and categorization of 
information systems risks so a project manager or information security contractor can 
easily reuse them after identifying those that are applicable to the project and 
prioritizing their application on a project-by-project basis. 
 
To mitigate the risk to a project without looking at the potential risks to information 
and assets is to assume that by ignoring those risks, we can prevent their impact on a 
project. Scientific research has repeatedly shown that tasks that are not monitored and 
controlled have a higher probability of causing a negative impact on a project. This 
results in a trend wherein ignored tasks become showstoppers that can derail 
information assurance projects. 
 
The future of project management lies in its capability to not only mitigate risks 
associated with project tasks but also to mitigate risks associated with the use of 
information systems. Information systems are not only a tool to achieve the goals and 
objectives of the project but also as a major contributor in determining the success or 





The taxonomy framework that will serve the following major objectives: 
 Sensitize project managers to risks facing information assurance projects. 
 Provide a basis for project managers to develop project management methods for 
identifying vulnerabilities and managing risks to information assurance projects. 
 Allow project managers to develop a fulsome solution for meeting project goals in 
their project plans and consequently take the mystery out of information 
assurance projects. 
 Improve forecasting of information assurance threats on projects. 
 Perform cost/benefit analysis for eliminating information assurance risks. 
 Determine to what extent the cost of compliance starts to affect the bottom-line to 
the organization and, where possible, define a break-even point where the costs of 
compliance can become a direct project cost that can be passed on to the customer 







Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.0 Information Security for Organizations and Projects 
Information technology is an extensive and dynamic industry and is a critical factor in 
determining the outcome of a project. Information technology when used efficiently 
helps organizations decrease the time to market and provide solutions for meeting the 
dynamic requirements of different stakeholders. Information technology helps 
projects to recognize and implement catalytic responses to changes in the business 
environment. 
 
Whitman (2008) observes that the role of information technology serving just a 
centralized group of stakeholders has changed to one where it now serves globally 
dispersed stakeholders. As a result, the problem of computer security for a small-scale 
installation has morphed into one of information security for all the systems that 
support the organization. The result is that the responsibility for information security 
should not be the onus on the information technology group. It should be the 
responsibility of employees, managers and other stakeholders involved in the 
business of the organization. A fitting question to pose is “how can research help in 
reducing the knowledge gap between information security experts and key 
stakeholders within organizations and projects?” 
 
Whitman et al (2008) provide a general definition of security as the quality or state of 
being secure: to be free from danger. To be secure is to be protected from adversaries 
or other hazards. He maintains that information security must be properly planned, 
organized, staffed, directed and controlled. His stance on information security being 
properly planned, organized, staffed, directed and controlled in an organization 
alludes to the fact that information security is a good candidate for project 
management methodologies. In addition, the dynamic and evolving characteristic of 




iteration of the five-project management process facilitates information security 
processes. 
 
2.1 IA Government Contractors Organizational Structure 
The Project Management Body of Knowledge recognizes the following 
organizational structures as the typical configuration of most organization: 
 
 Projectized Organizational Structure 
 Composite Organizational Structure 
 Balanced Matrix Organizational Structure 
 Strong Matrix Organizational Structure 
 Weak Matrix Organizational Structure 
 Functional Organizational Structure 
 
The configuration of the organization structure for information security departments 
of Federal Government contractors depend on the perception of upper management 
on the services delivered by the information security program.  This typically dictates 
the existence of a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO), their authority, resource 
availability, budget control responsibility and administrative staff availability to 
support the departments or project goals and objective. The organizational structures 
listed above have their inherent advantages and disadvantages, which directly affects 
the delivery of Information Assurance services to Federal Agencies. These 
advantages and disadvantages are discussed in the current PMBOK guide and are not 
elaborated in this research. 
 
Whitman (2008) recognizes that an organization’s size and available resources 
directly affects the size and structure of the information security program. 
Organizations with complex IT infrastructure and sophisticated users usually require 
more information security support than those that are smaller and have less complex 




information security program. For smaller organizations, it is common to find an 
entire organization supported by a single security administrator. Smaller 
organizations tend to relegate the duties of the security administrator to the network 
or systems administrator. 
 
The article “Does Size Matter” by Briney (2002) has the following to say about the 
size of the information security program in reference to the size of the organization 
“as organization get larger in size, their security departments are not keeping up with 
the demands of increasing complex organization infrastructures. Security spending 
per user and per machine declines exponentially as organizations grow, leaving most 
handcuffed when it comes to implementing effective security procedures.” 
 
The position proposed by Briney (2002) has changed because of multiple reported 
information security breaches that have resulted in negative publicity, loss of jobs, 
market share and extensive fines imputed to negligent organizations. Information 
security is viewed as a critical function for the existence of an organization. Even 
though the change process is already in place, its pace is restricted by economic 
limitations plaguing the US economy.  Table 2.1 shows a synthesis of the results of 
the research conducted by Briney (2002) showing how the size of the organization 
and its corresponding expenditure on its information security program. Information 
discussions with information security contractors indicated that not much has changed 
since 2002 except that the programs now have to do extensive documentation, which 
in most cases does not improve the security posture of the organizations. 
 
The size of the organization typically influences the configuration of the information 
security program yet every organization should be capable of performing certain 
basic business functions. Whitman (2008) maintains that all organizations should be 
capable of performing the following security business functions: 
 
 Risk assessments and management 




 Policy and Procedures development 
 Legal assessment 




 Centralized authentication 
 Systems security administration 
 Training 
 Network security administration 




Table 2.1 the Information Security Budget Percentages for Different Organizations 
Size Computers IS Management IS Budget Comments 
Small 10 – 100 Centralized – 
usually assigned to 




security issues.  
20% of the 
IT Budget 
 Usually one person  
 Spend more per user than medium and large-sized organizations 
 More than two-thirds of these organizations say all/most of their security 
decisions are guided by management-approved policies 
 57% said that all or most of their responses are guided by a predefined IR 
plan 
 Does not have a CISO. May have one full-time individual assigned to 
security and possibly a part-time support staff member 
Medium 100 – 1000 Security staff 
usually relies on IT 
staff to assist with 
implementing 
security plans and 
practices.  
11% of the 
IT Budget 
 Their ability to set policy, handle incidents in a regular manner and 
effectively allocate resources is worse than any other group 
 For their size, the number of security incidents recognized is skyrocketing 
 Seventy percent of them had damages that were imposed from security 
breaches. This was 48% higher than for small organizations 
 May or may not have a CISO, but usually has one full-time individual 
assigned to security with three part-time individuals supporting the 
information security effort 
Large 1000 – 
10,000 
Usually has a 
decentralized 
security program 
for the different 
projects within the 
organization. 
5% of the 
IT Budget 
 Generally have integrated planning and policy within their organizational 
culture. Eight of ten organizations claim that their security decisions are 
guided by their policy and plans. 
 Information security approaches appear to be as diverse as the 
organizations.  
 Has a CISO, 1-2 full-time administrators, 3-4 full-time 
administrators/technicians and as many as 16 part-time staff members who 
have security duties in addition to duties in other areas. 
Very 
Large 
>10,000 Usually have an 
internal dedicated 
entity that deals 
with information 
challenges for the 
organization 
6% of the 
IT Budget 
 Large information security budgets that grow faster than their information 
technology budgets. 
 Due to the economies of scale, very large organizations tend to do a better 
job on policy and resource management. 
 About only a third of these organizations handled incidents according to 
their incident response plan 
 These organizations are usually staffed and funded at a level where they can 
effectively manage information security. 
 May have multiple CISOs that are responsible for the security of the 
different branches of the organization. May have more than 20 full-time 





2.2 Information Security Management vs General Management 
Whitman (2008) observes that as the Internet continues to grow, the interconnections 
between networks become vital to the smooth operation of commerce. Organizational 
reliance on information systems has increased over the years and there has been a 
corresponding increase in the number of incidents of information security breach. The 
increasing attacks on information systems and the success of criminal attacks indicate 
there is a need for increased information security. We must mitigate and manage 
these risks as their potential to disrupt organizational operations, change 
organizational equity and precipitate organizational structure changes in the chief 
cadre makes them critical. 
 
Project managers must be proficient in recognizing the threats and vulnerabilities 
associated with the use of information systems and strive to become efficient at 
managing information security risks that are associated with the design, development 
and use of information systems. They need to identify repeatable project management 
strategies that can address the threats posed by organizational information systems. 
Whitman (2008) also propose that the management of information systems is a 
management problem and not one that technology alone can answer, as the problem 
has important economic consequences for which management is accountable. 
 
Whitman (2008) maintains, “There is a general trend for management not to take 
information security seriously. This may be in part because information security is 
still a relatively new field and there are still lots of gray areas. It may also be because 
generally management doesn't have enough knowledge or care to be educated about 
information systems technology.” Information security usually finds itself competing 
with known and proven objectives like lowering cost, return of investment, increasing 
speed, increasing user-friendliness, reducing time to market of new products etc. 
Information security has a tough time winning against these proven methodologies 
and we are not trying to make a case that information security should win. We are 
suggesting that the parties should work toward a fair ground wherein information 




weighted decision analysis that integrates management concerns with those of 
information security. 
 
Information security is very dynamic and top management has not been able to 
appreciate the changes taking place within information security. The destruction of 
the Enron and Arthur Andersen documents by Arthur Andersen can be seen as a case 
wherein information security failed. In as much as the destruction of information 
technology documents are a part of the information life cycle. The management of the 
destruction of documents must follow specific statutory, organizational and business 
policies in a controlled manner for it to be acceptable in the information security 
field. We can say that the lack of training or proper practice of information security 
contributed to the downfall of one of the world's finest accounting firms. We need to 
move information security to a position wherein top management can appreciate its 
contribution to the organizational goals. 
 
There is a general trend for the public not to believe in the government or businesses 
in the handling of their private information. This may be because news media is rife 
with cases wherein either government data is stolen or some organization loses its 
laptops, hard drives or tapes in transit. Whitman (2008) stresses that “There is a 
general belief in information technology security that the adoption rate of electronic 
transactions will more than double if business and the government can convince 
consumers that their private information will be adequately safeguarded.”  
 
With all these scenarios, top management still does not appear to appreciate the 
importance of information security or its role as a competitive advantage. The ability 
to be able to double sales should be very important to management yet we observe 
that information security suffers from insufficient resource allocation. Most 
organizations do not have an established Chief Privacy Officer. Whitman (2008) 
proposes that “Top management doesn't appreciate how doing a good job in the 
information security realm will lead to a variety of tangible business benefits” like 





Job descriptions, department mission statement and outsourcing contracts should 
reflect an organization’s position on information security. Yet we see several 
organizational cases where this is not the case. In the assessment of Federal 
Government contracts, a review of the rating assigned for including security in job 
descriptions, department mission statements and possible outsourcing contracts will 
provide some insight into the importance of security to organizations.  Some typical 
examples would include security for personal computers that specifies that all 
personal computers must have virus detection software that performs daily updates, 
hard drive that is encrypted and must be unlocked before the operating system loads, 
personal firewall that performs port and application filtering, email filters and other 
related security software. In addition, users need training on how information security 
and social engineering affects their computer, the projects they work on, the 
organization and their business partners.  
 
Sometimes when we refer to users, we fail to identify the unforeseen stakeholders like 
the janitors that have an equally important stake in information security for in most 
cases they are the primary building custodians and have access to the entire building. 
For most small organizations, the storage closet of the janitors also doubles as switch 
storage that has data flowing through, thus the importance of having security training 
at all levels of the organization cannot be underestimated.  
 
All stakeholders with access to sensitive, valuable or critical information must receive 
information security sensitivity training. The number of stakeholders has increased 
not only with E-Commerce but also with the identification of new ways to hack 
systems. Janitors for example must know that they should not allow personnel they 
know to piggyback on their physical access rights. They may have been terminated 
earlier in the day and are trying to gain access to restricted locations. Their training 
should include sensitizing them to the effects of moisture and chemicals on 





The question that comes to mind is “Do current Federal Government contracts for 
cleaning services require proper security screening and due diligence training for all 
personnel?” We know that a security infrastructure is only as strong as its weakest 
link. Is it possible that this is one of the weakest links in Federal Government 
Contracts? Given that a network or security environment is only as strong as the 
weakest link, we need to do more in security training to ensure that assets are 
secure. There is also a need for training on how to handle confidential information. 
What information can or cannot be divulge to outsiders? How much of these tasks 
should be the responsibility of the project risk manager and if so is it supposed to be 
a one-person role? No component in the NIST security controls addresses cleaning 
staff. This research cannot address all these questions but they are good issues and 
concerns that should be elucidated for future research. 
 
Organizations must encourage their stakeholders to question, understand and 
approach security from a holistic approach and put in place blanket policies of 
security that apply to all stakeholders and specialized security policies for entities 
and individuals based on their security access level and their need-to-know. An 
entity’s need-to-now is one of the primary metrics for granting access to 
information. When will organizations commence the development of an 
implementation strategy for ensuring need-to-know compliance for applications and 
information systems? When we start to assess the facets that needs to be coalesce to 
build a fully integrated security program. It is clear that the approach needs to be 
relational, customizable and nimble to meet the ever-changing security needs of 
organizations. The current hierarchical approach would not suffice. 
 
Organizations also need to establish policies for security incidence escalation. 
Project managers need to understand the Federal Government contractual 
requirements for incidence response and escalation. These policies should specify 
what an entity or individual needs to do when they identify/observe a security 
breach. The policy should also dictate how the breach is to be addressed. What 




escalation policy and procedures? What factors of these metrics lie on the critical 
path of the implementation and what is the best method for controlling them? 
Whitman (2008) maintains that the first step in resolving an organization’s security 
posture is to identify the weaknesses. How can we begin to resolve the weaknesses 
if we are failing in the threat identification process? Would the e-Government 
Relational Technical Control taxonomy for information systems improve our ability 
to identify project and organizational threats? What are some of the project 
management challenges facing the identification process? Will a study of our 
current incidence response techniques help us improve our information systems risk 
management methods?   
 
2.3 Characteristics of Organization Risks 
Abkowitz M. D. (2008) studied well-publicized potentially preventable cases that 
include natural disasters, man-made accidents and terrorist acts that either occurred 
in the US or abroad.  Some of the cases studied include the Hyatt Regency 
Walkway Collapse, Attack on USS Cole, September 11: The World Trade Center 
and United Airlines Flight 232. He studied the cases under ten risk factors that 
contributed and consequently resulted in either disastrous or mitigated events. His 
study included the causes, impact and ripple effects of the events. From the study of 
the cases, he developed a summary of lessons learned and provided a summary of 
risk characteristics typical in the cases studied. 
 
A summary of the Abkowitz research findings include the following:  
1. We need to develop a methodology for decoupling risk factors 
2. We need to ensure efficient communications between all stakeholders 
3. We need to do a better job at project planning and risk management 
4. There is a need for us to pay attention to details when dealing with man-made 
projects.  
5. We need to ensure we have sufficient resources assigned to projects and be 
aware of how political agendas or personal biases might affect our judgment 




6. We need to institute and ensure utilization of standard operating procedures as 
far as possible while ensuring that we have a contingency plan for undesirable 
events.  
7. We should utilize probability to estimate risks that may affect projects and be 
willing to acknowledge that even with the best of our efforts, ‘to err is 
human’.  
 
Abkowitz (2009) proposed that the goal should be one that is to be oriented towards 
becoming an organized master of risk management instead of becoming a victim of 
risk and accepting the fact that unfortunate events will sometimes occur no matter 
how well we plan. The products of this research will address all aspects of 
Abkowitz’s recommendations. 
 
A study by Bazaz (2007) also found that factors contributing to the vulnerability of 
software applications include: the complexity of the application because of its size 
in reference to lines of code and multiple services provided by other applications, 
the number of potential vulnerabilities and the complexity of the vulnerabilities. He 
also noted that some of the vulnerabilities “involve multiple software components 
interacting to produce a vulnerable system state.” These factors combine to increase 
the level of complexity of the vulnerabilities associated with applications. Can we 
develop some form of artificial intelligence that can help with decision-making for 
information security and if so, what are some of the risks associated with using such 
a tool and how can we mitigate and manage them to acceptable levels? 
 
Tom Davis, Chairman of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina Hearing on Preparedness and 
Response in Louisiana, questioned the Governor of Louisiana, the Louisiana Office 
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the Mayor of New Orleans, the 
Mayor’s Director of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA), in an attempt to understand the success and failure to the 




were federal, state, and local governments coordinating their response effectively? 
Who was responsible for getting people food, water, and medical assistance while 
they waited? How much did telecommunications problems impede effective 
response? It is common knowledge that one of the major problems between first 
responders was that communication devices were communicating on different 
frequencies so relief efforts could not be effectively coordinated. How much of the 
compounding problems of this disaster was a result of the inefficient use of 
information systems? 
 
Again, we see the request for an assessment of our incidence response efforts that 
attempts to see how telecommunications challenges, among other factors, may have 
compounded the problem. How effective would Abkowitz’s suggestion of 
decoupling the risk factors contributed to alleviating some of the problems 
experienced during the aftermath of the hurricane? Did the inability to effectively 
storyboard or test risk mitigation and management plans contribute to us becoming a 
victim to risk? 
 
Per Charette (1989) risk can be categorized into the following three categories: 
 Known risks: These risks can be identified by careful review of the project plan 
and the environment in which the project is developed 
 Predictable risks: These risks can be identified from experiences with similar 
projects. 
 Unpredictable risks: These risks are hard or impossible to predict. 
 
Not ignoring the fourth category recently introduced by Dick Chaney as the 
unknown unknowns. How well can we use Charette’s model to decompose the risks 
encountered in information systems and will it help us understand the information 
assurance risks? Of those that are known and predictable, what have we done to 





2.4 Information Assurance 
Information assurance is a dynamic industry and the trend is that new technologies 
for information assurance are always playing catch-up with hackers. Perrow (2007) 
alerts us to the fact that several Department of Defense (DOD) computers were 
hacked in February 1998. The culprits were able to obtain ‘root access’ to the 
computer, which could allow them to alter or steal information on the computers or 
damage the DOD network. The attacks went on for a month and were initially 
believed to be a case of ‘information warfare’ by the Iraqi Government but computer 
forensics later tracked the attacks back to two California teenagers assisted by an 
Israeli teenager. This was the state of Internet security in 1998 and much has not 
changed since. 
 
We have historic records of several incidents wherein hackers obtained unauthorized 
access to nuclear plants, power stations, financial institutions, intelligence agencies 
as well as the DOD. Perrow (2007) argues that the Internet presents the largest target 
for fraud and terrorism. This is because terrorists can exploit flaws in operating 
systems, computers, software and firmware that control our critical infrastructure, to 
launch information warfare on the US. Terrorists could also obtain access to read, 
modify or destroy plans of the Department of Homeland Security and DOD, 
especially since most of these plans reside on information systems.  
 
The vulnerability of our critical infrastructure is well publicized but we have no 
proof of whether these vulnerabilities have been exploited or compromised. Most of 
the US critical infrastructure runs on a Microsoft Windows platform, known for its 
bugs and unceremonious crashes. Yet no method has been developed that can 
accurately measure how much risk the US critical infrastructure is exposed to due to 
a concentration of technologies. In addition, no repeatable project management 
processes have been developed to mitigate and mange the risks posed to the US 





The article titled “Inside the Chinese Hack Attack”, published in the Time Magazine 
dated August 25, 2005 by Nathan Thornburgh, provides additional evidence of the 
vulnerability of the US critical infrastructure. Thornburgh affirms that the hackers 
breaking into official US networks were not only using Chinese systems to launch 
their attack but they are based in China. The systems hacked during this period 
include: The US Army Information Systems Engineering Command at Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona, computers at the military's Defense Information Systems 
Agency in Arlington, Virginia, the Defense Department of the Naval Ocean Systems 
Center at San Diego, California and the United States Army Space and Strategic 
Defense installation in Huntsville, Alabama.  
 
The US Government still does not know what information was compromised or the 
full impact of the attack on unclassified systems that store sensitive information and 
provide logistics support to the armed forces. Government analysts that worked on 
this case believe these attacks are ongoing with increased frequency but we have no 
knowledge of the purpose of the attacks. This problem is not peculiar to the United 
States alone. 
 
In 2007, hackers believed to be residing in Russia attacked Estonia with a series of 
denial of services attacks as reported by the BBC News article of May 17, 2007. The 
attacks lasted for three weeks during which government websites, banks, 
newspapers, and several institutions were compromised. The NATO spokesperson, 
Mr. James Appathurai, in a conversation with the BBC reporter, stated that NATO 
sent experts to help Estonia defend its organizations. Russia also has a history of 
attacking the US and Ukraine. 
 
A March 2005 Government Accountability Office report stated that security 
contractors within the electric industry reported that hackers were targeting the US 
electric power grid and had actually gained access to US utilities electronic control 




report entitled ‘Internet Security Review’ of December 2005, that an Internet worm 
almost shut down FBI Internet access.  
 
A coalition of Chinese hackers successfully launched a denial of service attack on 
the CIA and White House websites, in response to the collision of a US surveillance 
aircraft and Chinese fighter jet in 2001. Yet no one could say with certainty what the 
security breach cost the US government or its impact on our operations. The 
question research needs to answer is: when will we develop a system or method that 
we could use to measure the impact of a security breach to our critical infrastructure? 
Only then can we actually begin to assess and effectively manage the risks therein.  
 
Some other questions we may want to address include: what systems can we run in 
manual mode without computer interaction? Have the fail-safe modes of the 
different systems that make up the US Critical Infrastructure been defined and 
tested? What percentage of these systems can self-correct? What is their self-correct 
time-line? What is the criticality of these systems and are they suitable for self-
correcting applications? What percentage of the vulnerabilities associated with the 
Internet are a result of a concentration of technology? 
 
A recent 2008 global survey by the PMI Market Research Department that was 
published in the PM network of May 2009, found that thirty-nine percent of 
respondents worked in an Information Technology Function with fifty percent of the 
respondents claiming that their projects utilized virtual teams. With the increasing 
use of virtual teams, we need to understand how introducing new technologies 
affects our risk profile and changes the dynamics at play as it relates to managing 
risks to our critical infrastructure. The information security industry is rife with war 
stories wherein video conferencing equipment is configured to be in promiscuous 
mode (always listening) to accept incoming calls. How many closed-door meetings 





To provide a holistic solution in an attempt to protect the US critical infrastructure, 
stakeholders need to make decisions among alternative courses of actions. 
Information security decisions usually involve multiple interrelated factors. A study 
by Frank (2008) notes, “complicated situations usually involve more difficult 
decisions and many interrelated factors to consider.” Hammond (1999) showed that 
"The only way to raise the odds of making good decision is to learn to use good 
decision-making processes". Frank (2008) also highlights the fact that not all good 
decisions require the maximum safety solutions as this may make the solution cost-
prohibitive or drastically increase the time to market. Probabilistic risk assessment 
can be effectively used to provide quantitative methods for analyzing risks.  
 
Frank (2008) recognizes a complicated system as one that is difficult to analyze or 
understand, and that may have multiple interrelated factors or numerous internal 
and/or external interdependencies for which we do not understand how changes in 
one of the system variables affect the overall system. For example, increasing the 
level of safety can coincide with increase in overall cost and decreased product 
reliability.  
 
This is an organizational research problem that is similar to our experience with 
project management tools wherein an appreciable delay of a task that was not on the 
critical path can cause undesired effects in the project plan, like creating multiple 
critical paths or changing the critical path of the project plan. We need to find ways 
to identify these changes in real-time and account for them when performing 
probabilistic risk analysis for projects. 
 
The process of choosing between multiple alternatives also provides the advantage, 
in that it increases the decision maker’s understanding of the interrelationships of the 
attributes and alternatives of the system. It may also present unknown opportunities 






Frank (2008) notes that ‘the time involved in the process of making potentially 
dangerous and expensive systems safer needs to be addressed to see how we can 
control the shortening of the time while managing the risks posed.’ Information 
systems risk management can benefit from the process of controlling competing 
variables to ensure the safety of our systems and consequently ensuring we can meet 
our targeted return of investment on projects. 
 
Risk management has heavily affected the information technology profession. 
Simpson (2008) in his book on Managing Project Risk Best Practices for Architects 
and Related Professionals claims that ‘only in the last 30 years have we had to worry 
about risks. It all began about the time the request for information (RFI) appeared on 
the scene.’ The result is that we are observing a large increase in the number of 
claims against insurance companies and litigations among the parties. This increase 
in claims against insurance companies has threatened the existence of many 
insurance providers, and premiums and deductibles have risen as they attempt to 
compensate for the risks associated with the projects while trying to keep their 
organizational bids competitive.  
 
Most insurance companies and in-house lawyers are recommending risk 
management strategies and are warning against projects of higher risk. Thus if we 
don’t address the issue of information system risk management on projects, we 
might experience a situation wherein it will be next to impossible to purchase 
insurance coverage for these projects and still break even. In addition, Bonham 
(2008) states it more judiciously succinct that “business continuity insurance can be 
complex and lead to scenarios in which those who thought they would get 
compensated don’t.” 
 
A study by Besner & Hobbs (2006) on various project management tools and 
techniques showed that of the seventy techniques assessed, risk tools ranked very 
low in everyday use. The order of usage was identified as follows: risk management 




of risks. The paper also identified risk tools as being the least exploited area for 
increasing project performance. They can easily be one of the areas that can generate 
the highest return for project performance measures.  The question that comes to 
mind is “How can we improve the low adoption rate of risk management tools?” Can 
the e-Government Relational Technical Controls taxonomy increase the awareness 
of information assurance based risks on projects?  
 
2.5 Project Management vs. Information Assurance 
Jen (2009) maintains that “Poor risk management usually results in a higher 
probability for project failure”. Jen (2009) also highlights the need for “better and 
simpler risk management to ensure higher adoption rates and continuous utilization 
throughout the project, thereby increasing the chances for project success.” It is 
insufficient for project managers to understand project management technologies 
like project risk management; they must also understand how to apply them to 
information assurance projects and the impact of unmitigated information system 
risks to the success of projects.   
 
Shore’s (2008) paper on “Systematic Biases and Culture in Project Failures” 
underscores the likelihood of engineering problems having less visibility when 
compared to project schedules and budgets. Thus, the more project managers 
become efficient at understanding the engineering problems and risks, the less likely 
they are to make decision based on selective perceptions. Project Managers need to 
understand the information system threats and vulnerabilities most likely to impact 
the project schedule, quality and budget and start identifying risk management 
strategies for them.  
 
A May 2008 online survey of 7,079 security and IT professionals in 100 countries by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers showed that 59% of the companies reported having an 
overall information security strategy. It is a common belief the greatest threats to a 





Wheatley M. (2009) paper title ‘an inside job’ alludes to the fact that “security 
breaches are shown to be ‘inside jobs,’ rather than machines or ill-intended humans 
breaking in.” He maintains that the project teams are the true threat to projects 
because of human error, laziness or negligence. He also provides convincing evidence 
that the organization’s security policy should suffice except in cases where in the 
project calls for tighter controls. The one-size-fits-all approach for risk management 
is unsuitable for project risk management, as the risk management policy should be 
streamlined with the statutory, stakeholder expectations and organizational 
requirements of the project.  
 
When a project manager observes something untoward, they should not assume that 
the security team would show up and take care of things. Project managers should 
take a proactive approach to addressing security requirements and ensure that security 
vulnerabilities that may affect the project are mitigated to levels where they may have 
little or no effect on the project schedule, customer satisfaction, cost and quality. 
 
What project assets do organizations need to secure? Wheatley (2009) proposed, 
“Everything connected to a project should be secure – not just data that might be used 
as part of the development or testing processes.” Some of the entities that his paper 
recommends protecting include the following: the privacy of source documents, 
planning documents, team communications, test strategies algorithms and knowledge. 
Protection of assets should not be limited to personally identifiable data like credit 
card numbers, social security numbers, driver’s licenses and medical records. 
Wheatley M (2009) observes that, “too often, companies don’t build security into 
their IT project plan and as such it is usually tacked on as an afterthought.” He also 
maintains that making a project secure does not have to be expensive or complicated. 
This research cannot attempt to address all the domains highlighted by Wheatley 
(2009) that needs to be secure within organizations. It shall only address issues raised 





Whitman (2005) described information security in terms of confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, privacy, identification, authorization and accountability of information. 
We acknowledge that information security involves more than just the technical 
solution.  
 
The US Federal Government enacted a Federal Information Security Management 
Act (FISMA) of 2002 also called the E-Government Act that requires all Federal 
Agencies and contractors establish and maintain certain security controls for 
assessing the security of their information systems.  Whitman & Mattord (2005) 
states that ‘the US has not established any mandatory standard.’ Yet in the 
information security circles, the fight is on between the government and industry of 
whether to regulate or not to regulate. Currently, it is a requirement for all Federal 
Agencies and Federal Government Contractors to meet the FISMA requirements. 
Organizations that want to remain competitive while adhering to regulations would be 
well advised to plan accordingly.  
 
Organizations rely on a combination of security guidelines from NIST (like the 
Special Publication 800 series documents), ISO 17799 and other industry 
consortiums. Other information security standards include: Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Sarbanes-Oxley, the California 
Database Security Breach Act (Certification and Accreditation SB 1386). The general 
rule of thumb in deciding what information security standard to follow is that the 
standard should align with the organizational objectives. How does this apply to 
projects that may span multiple locations or incorporate multiple domains? If we are 
developing an application for a health care facility, what amount of reciprocity exits 
between the HIPAA and the NIST standards? Suppose our project spans multiple 
countries including the UK and the US. What standard takes precedence? What role 
does jurisdiction play in the selection of the appropriate standard to implement? How 
much do we need to invest on documentation and security assessment of information 
security program to show due diligence in the case of a security breach? We cannot 





D’Arcy (2009) maintains that most of the current research on standards for 
information security management is limited to critical analyses of these standards, 
prescriptive advice on standard implementation and assessments of standard 
compliance. Very little research has been performed on assessing the post 
implementation effectiveness of many of these standards. As a result, we have no 
measure of the effectiveness of these standards, to reduce number of security 
breaches. This research shall address this concern by looking at the NIST SP 800-53 
Rev 3 security assessment strategy for the identification and authentication control 
family. What are the effects of the industry, culture, size or geopolitical differences in 
the effectiveness of these standards?  
 
Tejay (2005) maintains that it is not feasible to adopt every standard or every single 
facet of a particular standard. Thus, we need to study the effectiveness of the different 
standards in the different organizational contexts. This will provide managers with 
effective implementation guidelines for the different standards vis-à-vis their 
organizational profile. For this research, we are assessing the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 
against Federal Government Information Assurance Contractor organizations. 
 
D’Arcy (2009) maintains that some regulations have been developed that require 
organizations that do business with the public to abide by these standards, yet there is 
very little research on the impact of these standards on organizational security 
policies and practices. How do these regulations affect multinational organizations 
that span several countries? Hovav (2005) maintains that the costs associated with 
meeting regulatory compliance could become prohibitive and the cost for non-
compliance can be substantial. What are substantial non-compliance costs? 
 
The Federal Trade Commission Report of January 26 2006 notes that ChoicePoint, a 
consumer data broker, was ordered to pay $10 Million in Civil Penalties and $5 
Million for Consumer redress after they acknowledged that personal financial records 




charged that ChoicePoint violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) by 
furnishing consumer reports – credit histories – to subscribers who did not have a 
permissible purpose to obtain them, and by failing to maintain reasonable procedures 
to verify both their identities and how they intended to use the information.” 
ChoicePoint security and record-handling procedures violated consumers’ privacy 
rights and federal laws. The settlement called for annual audits by an independent 
third-party security professional every year until 2026, the establishment and 
maintenance of a comprehensive information security program and a cease and 
desists of their current data sharing practices. 
 
A recent case of data breach by three HSBC firms happened in the UK and reported 
on the Financial Authority Services (FSA) web site on July 22, 2009. The opening 
statement to the publication at the website read as follows, “The Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) has fined three HSBC firms over £3 million (approximately $4.7 
million) for not having adequate systems and controls in place to protect their 
customers' confidential details from being lost or stolen. These failings contributed to 
customer data being lost in the post on two occasions.”   
 
www.pillsburylaw.com published a statement on July 1, 2009 surrounding the 
settlement arrived at on June 23, 2009 between TJX (commonly known as TJ Maxx) 
and forty-one state Attorneys for the sum of $9.75 million. The lawsuit arose from a 
security breach that occurred in 2006 that affected millions of credit card customers. 
This lawsuit also creates a precedence where in states are beginning to look to future 
security breaches as a sustainable source of funds.  
 
2.6 Project Risk Management 
One of the primary goals in managing projects is to meet or exceed the customer’s 
expectations while managing cost, time and quality. It is a common belief in the field 
of project management that exchange of ideas is the best way to mitigate risks on 
projects. How do we begin to communicate with the customer and pertinent 




without agreeing on taxonomy of common terms? Let us not forget that “conflict 
thrives in confusing situations”.  
 
A research paper by Susan Ladika (2009) on “The Incredible Shrinking Team” 
identifies that a major advantage of lean teams is that “it’s easier to communicate 
with five or six people versus 50 or 60.” Also with the current market dynamics, we 
see a trend towards leaner teams that are more efficient and tend to benefit better 
from enhanced communication because of their smaller size.  
 
Even as teams become smaller and have the advantage of being nimble, there is a 
need for them to ensure that they are communicating on the same terms and 
understand the client requirements so that their deliverables meets the expectations of 
the customer. The need for extensive teams of support staff to support smaller teams 
is reduced. Teams in the construction industry cannot be this small because of the 
diverse nature and they are very dynamic because of the ever-changing team 
configurations. These team have a need to effectively communicate and mitigate risks 
to the projects. The use of information systems to facilitate communications also 
introduces a different set of risks to a project.  
 
It is a generally accepted fact that a project has a better chance of being successful if 
it develops and utilizes a taxonomy that specifies the terms of the contract even 
before a contract is signed. This will provide the stakeholders with common, accepted 
terms that could help not only with communication but also in the development of 
design requirements instead of waiting for the design phase to address problems for 
improperly defined terms, which usually results in scope creep, change requests, 
increased costs and reduced customer satisfaction. In addition, the costs associated 
with errors made during the development of taxonomy at the planning phase are 
usually much lower than the costs associated with a product redesign due to 
misunderstood requirements. We must note that even with the best contract vehicles 
there is always some latent risk borne by the contractor and the project sponsor. 





I propose that the e-Government Relational Technical Security Controls taxonomy be 
reviewed prior to the contract award as by the time the project reaches the 
communications-planning phase, the contract is already awarded and the likelihood 
for scope creep increases. The only way it is possible to utilize the e-Government 
Relational Technical Security Controls taxonomy when responding to requests for 
information is if one already exits that can be adapted or customized to the project 
needs and used for proposal development to identify the scope of work. 
 
According to both the S and J curves for the life cycle costs of projects, we know that 
it is always cheaper to make changes to a project design before costs are committed 
as opposed to attempting to make changes in the final design of the product. Trying to 
incorporate changes in the test phase as add-ons, inevitable service patches and 
upgrades has resulted in the birth of the term “software assurance”, which has a 
tendency to increase the total cost of ownership. We must not forget the losses due to 
the opportunity costs in the time spent developing service patches for an application, 
as well as the opportunity cost and missing the opportunity to seize first mover 
advantage if we choose not to develop the e-Government Relational Technical 
Security Controls taxonomy.  
 
Jen (2009) states that ‘Due to “higher” priorities, project managers do not wish to 
spend time on non-value-added activities, which is unfortunately how they often view 
risk management’.  We need to facilitate a culture change towards risk management 
through education of project managers on the importance of managing information 
system risk. Unless we can educate our primary stakeholders on the importance of 
risk by helping them identify the potential threats to the successful completion of the 
project, we cannot expect much change in the attitudes of project managers towards 





For that education to begin, we need to set the stage for speaking about information 
security risk management at the project level by developing this e-Government 
Relational Technical Control taxonomy that will facilitate the discussion.  
 
2.7 Project Risk Manager 
The role of the project manager is not limited to managing the project but also, as 
Keyes (2009) states, “The PM must thoroughly understand the various risks that may 
affect the implementation and must be prepared to manage them. Risks may be 
internal or external.” Keyes identified internal risks as risks that the project team can 
manage, such as staff assignment and cost estimates while external risks are beyond 
the control or influence of the project team. External risks include market shifts or 
failure by outside vendors to perform.  
 
The project manager must be capable of developing a risk management plan as part of 
the project plan that includes information security aspects that can derail a project. 
They must also be able to quantify and assess the impact of the risk identified to the 
successful completion of the project. Jen’s (2009) paper, Visual Ishikawa Risk 
Technique (VIRT) – An approach to Risk Management, has the following to say on 
how PMBOK addresses risk management “Other than Quality Management, Risk 
Management is likely the most misused and underutilized knowledge area of A Guide 
to the Project Management Body of Knowledge.”  
 
Most project managers work in environments that utilize Information Systems to 
facilitate the accomplishment of the project goals. Information Systems can be a 
double-edge sword that can be the project manager’s best servant or their worst 
nightmare and may contribute to the high failure rate of projects. Prior discussions in 
this paper have shown how threats in an application or operating systems may pose 
risk to the project and the viability of the organization. A typical example will be the 
case wherein a project server that is used for responding to requests for proposals 




intellectual property or, worse still, information ending up in the hands of the 
competition and a possible consequence of continued failed bids.  
 
Organizations may have the best caliber of employees using current project 
management methodologies and tools but if they are vulnerable to attack then by 
Moss’s law and the law of probability [Pr (event) = e-λt], given sufficient time, they 
will experience a security breach.  If they are always vulnerable to attack because 
they are not utilizing information assurance best practices the λ value increase and 
this consequently increases the likelihood of an information assurance risk derailing a 
project.  
 
Organizations may find that they not only lose face in the eyes of the public but their 
insurance may refuse to compensate their loss if they can prove that the organization 
was negligent or did not use due diligence to mitigate their potential losses. 
Organizations that do business with the Federal Government have to abide by strict 
regulations, with penalties for negligence being in the millions, as was the case with 
ChoicePoint. No value can be place on the intrinsic loss of ‘good face’ organizations 
may experience with their stakeholders.   
 
Project risks are not limited to information assurance risks. They may also involve 
organization risk, environment risk, business risk, product risk, employee risk, etc. 
Project managers need to identify ways for ensuring that when executing joint 
ventures with external organizational entities, their partners can only see information 
necessary for performance of the project and within the scope of the joint venture. 
They must also be able to discuss potential exploits in software or code that might 
expose classified information to entities that should not have access to them. 
 
A takeaway is that in as much as it is important that we track items on the critical path 
of the project and utilize earned value management to track and control cost and 
schedule of a project. We must also be sensitive to the need for us to understand and 




project. This scenario creates a need for project managers to have an understanding of 
the rudimentary terms of information assurance. Historically, the best way to 
approach new topics is with taxonomy development.  
 
With the dynamic nature of information security, the question then becomes “Can we 
begin to develop information assurance taxonomy for assessing information systems 
based project risk?” The stakes are high and we cannot become overwhelmed by the 
fact that information systems threats and risks are a moving target and thus any effort 
to identify processes for managing information systems based project risks are futile. 
 
2.8 Information Assurance Risk Management  
Information Assurance is defined by the National Security Agency as “The set of 
measures intended to protect and defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality and non-
repudiation.” The goal of information assurance is to assure the quality of 
information, which inspires confidence in the use of information by its stakeholders. 
Whitman (2005) describes information security in terms of the confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, privacy, identification, authentication, authorization and 
accountability of information. 
 
Research in risk management started in the computer science field and as a result, it 
has been largely influence by computer science research. One of the earliest 
researches in computer security started with a security matrix that allowed developers 
to specify the access controls for users of a system (Conway et al 1972). Bell and 
LaPaudula (1976) established a method for segmenting of processes into different 
memory segments and rings to prevent memory over-write or access elevation. Then 
in the eighties’ the US National Security Agency produced a series of security 
documents called The Rainbow Series. These documents included specifications for 
secure computer designs that helped stakeholders meet the US Department of 





Bonham (2008) has the following to say about the current risk landscape, “no risk 
initiatives have shocked corporations into adopting operational risk management 
procedures more thoroughly than the recent passage of such government regulations 
as Sarbanes-Oxley, Basel III, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act, and Gramm-Leach-Bliley.”  
 
Some risk assessment models that deal with specific assessment of risk within a risk 
scenario include the Risk Level Matrix, Business Impact Analysis and the Annualized 
Loss Exposure (ALE) (Krutz 2001; Stonebumer 2002; Tipton 2000). Ng. R (2009) 
maintains, “The ISO 17799 “common information security architecture” and 
Zachman’s information system architecture provide an enterprise level and a 
comprehensive approach to enterprise risk management. 
 
Currently, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) develops 
documentation called the NIST Special Publication 800 series that specifies best 
practices for secure information design, implementation and management in an 
enterprise environment. Several researches on risk analysis methods suggest that the 
security of information systems improved if we incorporate security controls in the 
system life cycle design. A concern posed by Baskerville (1993) to this approach is 
whether we can efficiently assess a different set of information systems using controls 
developed from another type of information system. This e-Government Relational 
Technical Control taxonomy will address a subset of Baskerville’s concern, by 
ensuring that the controls are partitioned for the different types of information 
systems in the enterprise.  
 
Park (2009) states that “It will be difficult for any technology or security mechanism 
to ever be created that will completely secure the risks of the commerce application.” 
Information security professionals and entities involved with e-commerce will always 
be on the defense and developers need to be nimble in developing applications that 
address threats in applications. Park (2009) also alerts us to the fact that society must 




and e-commerce greatly influence the way we live, work and play. He also draws 
attention to the need for legislators to be aware of the issues surrounding technology 
so they know what laws to legislate. 
 
Most of the tools available for risk identification, assessment, mitigation, transferring, 
monitoring and control require ongoing communication between the different 
stakeholders. Excessive communications between information security contractors 
and project sponsors on the finer distinctions of the terms of the contract often 
become an impasse to a project’s success. The information systems breakdown 
structure model and e-Government Relational Technical Security Controls model can 
alleviate this typical problem on information assurance projects. The relationships 
developed in the taxonomy will highlight the relationship between the different 
technical security controls for an information assurance project.  The PMBOK Guide 
states, “frequent discussions about risks make it more likely that people will identify 
risks and opportunities” (PMI, 2008, p.311). 
 
Information in an organization has a life cycle that resembles the normal distribution 
curve per Ng R. (2009). We will expect the performance measures of information 
assurance project to have a correlation to the information life cycle. At different 
stages of the information life cycle, its associated intrinsic value changes, thus it is 
fitting that we use the total cost of protection to optimize the appropriate security 
mechanism to maximize the effects of the security protecting information and 
information systems.  
 
To be effective in our implementation of security programs or implementing security 
on a project we need to be aware that ‘effective security implementation demands a 
holistic and systematic design and implementation’ as Ng R. (2009) puts it. We need 
to move away from a reactive research approach for information assurance to a 
proactive approach. We need to establish security metrics that can be used to measure 




modularized into measurable tasks and we can use Tan’s (2002) methodology for 
assessing the risk to the project. 
 
2.9 Federal Information Security Management Act 2002 
In 2002 the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of American 
Congress and the President of the United States, enacted the Federal Information 
Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) also commonly referred to as the E-
Government Act (Pub. L. No. 107-347). This act emphasizes the importance of 
information security to the economic and national security interest of the United 
States. In summary, the act requires that all federal agencies and federal government 
contractors develop, implement, and document their information security program 
that manages the risk posed to information, information systems, operations and 
assets of the agency, other agencies, contractors and other sources of information. 
 
The burden of implementing and ensuring the success of FISMA lie on agency 
program officials, chief information officers, the inspector general office (IG), the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the Office of Management of 
Budget (OMB) and federal government contractors. Their tasks include ensuring 
agencies conduct an annual review and audits of their information security program, 
develop controls and test standards for information systems, oversee and annually 
reporting on the compliance or non-compliance of federal agencies and contractors to 
the United States Congress.  
 
The OMB uses this information to oversee the different programs and to prepare its 
annual report to Congress on the compliance or non-compliance of organizations to 
the e–Government Act. FISMA requires that the head of each federal agency 
implement policies and procedures that cost-effectively mitigate information security 
risks for their agencies to acceptable levels.  
NIST is also a major player in the annual reporting activities of FISMA as they are 
responsible for developing guidelines, methodology, techniques etc for efficiently 




effort between NIST and federal agencies ensures that the agencies have a proper 
understanding of how the NIST guidelines can help them meet the FISMA 
requirements. NIST publishes these guidelines under the NIST Special Publication 
800 series documents. NIST performs its statutory responsibilities through the 
Computer Security Division of the Information Technology Laboratory. The NIST 
mandate excludes all national security systems.   
 
The security assessment performed on the information systems is to ensure that 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of these systems meet the technical, 
management and operational controls provided by the NIST guidelines. 
Confidentiality of information ensures that only entities (individuals or systems) with 
defined privileges and a need-to-know have access to certain information. Integrity is 
required to ensure the quality or state of the information is whole, completed and 
uncorrupted. Availability ensures that stakeholders and entities that should have 
access do have access to the system when they need information or services. 
 
Annually, agencies and organizations expend extensive effort and resources to meet 
the FISMA 2002 requirements. Yet the controls use a one-size-fits-all approach to 
information assurance and in some cases, all the controls are not applicable to all 
information systems all of the time. An inordinate amount of time, effort and 
resources is expended in performing security assessment of information systems that 
are not applicable to the configuration of the information systems. A typical example 
will be using the controls for Anti-Virus software to assess the security posture of 
Cisco routers that do not run anti-virus applications. There is a need to develop a 
customizable methodology that can effectively assess the risk posture of an enterprise 
or project based on its information systems.  
 
Prior to the release of the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 in August 2009, seventeen security 
controls were used to assess the security posture of information systems. In the recent 
release of the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3, a Program Management (PM) control family 




needs to be assessed for security compliance for all Federal Agencies and Federal 
Government contractors to eighteen. The addition of a Program Management control 
should sensitize us to the fact that NIST has recognized the need to program 
management methodologies for effective risk management. 
 
NIST has made an attempt to identify controls that are systems-specific, common and 
hybrid. Yet no attempt has been made to classify the controls based on their 
application to specific types of information systems that may be used on projects or 
for enterprise networks. This research shall establish a basis for categorizing the 
controls based on their applicability to the different information systems that may be 
used on a project or that may exist in an enterprise. 
 
2.10 Current e-Government Security Assessment Model 
NIST has done extensive work in the development of security controls for assessing 
information systems. The sources of the security controls include defense, audit, 
financial, healthcare, intelligence communities, national organizations and 
international standards organizations. Some of the functions of the current model 
include: 
 Identification of the need for organizations to identify common controls, 
hybrid controls and system specific controls  
 Establishment of the Minimum Security Requirements for Federal 
Information and Information systems documented in the FIPS 200 
 Establishment of Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information 
and Information Systems documented in the FIPS 199 
 Establishment of a security assessment framework for determining the 
effectiveness of  security controls documented in the NIST SP 800-37 
 
The current NIST security assessment controls comprise of the management, 




into the management, operational and technical security controls shown in Figure 2.2, 













Planning (PL) Risk Assessment 
(RA)




1.  Policies & Procedures 
(CA-1)
2.  Security Assessments 
(CA-2)
3.  Information System 
Connections (CA-3)
4.  Plan Of Action & 
Milestones (CA-5)
5.  Security Authorization 
(CA-6)
6.  Continuous Monitoring 
(CA-7)
Withdrawn
- Security Certification 
(CA – 4)
1.  Policy & Procedures 
(PL-1)
2.  System Security Plan 
(PL-2)
3.  Rules Of Behavior 
(PL-4)
4.  Privacy Impact 
Assessment  (PL-5)




- System Security Plan 
Update (PL-3)
1.  Information Security 
Program Plan (PM-1)
2.  Senior Information 
Security Officer (PM-2)
3.  Information Security 
Resources (PM-3)
4.  Plan of Action and 
Milestones Process 
(PM-4)
5.  Information System 
Inventory (PM-5)
6.  Information Security 
Measures of Performance 
(PM-6)
7.  Enterprise Architecture 
(PM-7)
8.  Critical Infrastructure 
Plan (PM-8)
9.  Risk Management
Strategy (PM-9)





1.  Policy & Procedures 
(RA-1)
2.  Security Categorization 
(RA-2)
3.  Risk Assessment (RA-3)
4.  Vulnerability Scanning 
(RA-5)
Withdrawn




1.  Policy & Procedures 
(SA-1)
2.  Allocation of Resources  
(SA-2)
3.  Life Cycle Support (SA-3)
4.  Acquisitions (SA-4)
5.  Information System 
Documentation (SA-5)
6.  Software Usage 
Restrictions (SA-6)
7.  User Installed Software 
(SA-7)
8.  Security Engineering 
Principles (SA-8)
9.  External Information 
Systems Services (SA-9)
10. Developer Configuration 
Management (SA-10)
11. Developer Security 
Testing (SA-11)
12. Supply Chain Protection 
(SA-12)
13. Trustworthiness (SA-13)





















System and Communications 
Protection (SC)
1.  Policy & Procedures (AC-1)
2.  Account Management (AC-2)
3.  Information Flow Enforcement (AC-4)
4.  Separation of Duties (AC-5)
5.  Least Privilege (AC-6)
6.  Unsuccessful Login Attempts (AC-7)
7.  System Use Notification (AC-8)
8.  Previous Logon (Access notification) 
(AC-9)
9. Concurrent Session Control (AC-10)
10. Session Lock (AC-11)
11. Permitted Actions W/O Identification 
or Authentication (AC-14)
12. Security Attributes (AC-16)
13. Remote Access (AC-17)
14. Wireless Access (AC_18)
15. Access Control for Mobile Devices 
(AC-19)
16. Use of External Information Systems 
(AC-20)
17. User-Based Collaboration & 
Information Sharing (AC-21)
18. Publicly Accessible Content (AC_22)
Withdrawn
- Account Enforcement (AC-3(1))
- Session Termination (AC-12)
- Supervision and Review Access Control 
(AC-13)
- Automated Marking (AC-15)
1.  Policy & Procedures (AU-1)
2.  Auditable Events (AU-2)
3.  Content of Audit Records (AU-3)
4.  Audit Storage Capacity (AU-4)
5.  Audit & Accountability (AU-5)
6.  Audit Review, Analysis & Reporting 
(AU-6)
7.  Audit Reduction & Report 
Generation (AU-7)
8.  Time Stamps (AU-8)
9.  Protection of Audit Information 
(AU-9)
10. Non-Repudiation (AU-10)
11. Audit Record Retention (AU-11)
12. Audit Generation (AU-12)
13. Monitoring for Information 
Disclosure (AU-13)
14. Session Audit (AC-14)
Withdrawn
- Auditable Events (AU-2(1))
- Auditable Events (AU-2(2))
- Audit Analysis, Review and Report 
(AU-6(2))
1.  Policy & Procedures (IA-1)
2.  Identification & Authentication 
(organizational users) (IA-2)
3.  Device Identification & 
Authentication (IA-3)
4.  Identifier Management (IA-4)
5.  Authenticator Management (IA-5)
6.  Authenticator Feedback (IA-6)
7.  Cryptographic Module 
Authentication (IA-7)
8.  Identification & Authentication 
(Non-Organizational users) (IA-8)
1.  Policy & Procedures (SC-1)
2.  Application Partitioning (SC-2)
3.  Security Function Isolation (SC-3)
4.  Information in Shared Resources (SC-4)
5.  Denial of Service Protection (SC-5)
6.  Resource Priority (SC-6)
7.  Boundary Protection (SC-7)
8.  Transmission Integrity (SC-8)
9.  Transmission Confidentiality (SC-9) 
10. Network Disconnect (SC-10)
11. Trusted Path (SC-11)
12. Cryptographic Key Establishment & Management (SC-12)
13. Use of Cryptography (SC-13)
14. Public Access Protections (SC-14)
15. Collaborative Computing Devices (SC-15)
16. Transmission of Security Attributes (SC-16)
17. Public Key Infrastructure Certificates (SC-17)
18. Mobile Code (SC-18)
19. Voice Over Internet Protocol (SC-19)
20. Secure Name/Address Resolution Service –
Authoritative Source (SC-20)
21. Secure Name/Address Resolution Service -
Recursive/Caching Resolver (SC-21)
22. Architecture & Provisioning for Name/Address 
Resolutions Service (SC-22)
23. Session Authenticity (SC-23)
24. Fail In Know State(SC-24)
25. Thin Nodes (SC-25)
26. Honey Pots (SC-26)
27. Operating System Independent Applications (SC-28)
28. Protecting of Information at Rest (SC-28)
29. Heterogeneity (SC-29)
30. Virtualization Techniques (SC-30)
31. Covert Channel Analysis (SC-31)
32. Information System Partitioning (SC-32)
33. Transmission Preparation Integrity (SC-33)








The NIST hierarchical approach to security assessment of the controls is shown in 
Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3 and Figure 2.4 for the Management, Operational and Technical 
Controls respectively. NIST uses a hierarchical tree structure approach to identify and 
assess the different security controls. The assessment utilized is not relational and 
resulted in duplication of security controls. This duplication is documented in the 
NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3 that was release on August 2009, by fifteen 
security controls that are withdrawn and merged into other controls. The fifteen 
withdrawn controls include the following: 
 
1. Access Enforcement (AC-3 (1)) 
2. Session Termination (AC-12) 
3. Supervision and Review Access Control (AC-13) 
4. Automated Marking (AC-15) 
5. Auditable Events (AU-2 (1)) 
6. Auditable Events (AU-2 (2)) 
7. Audit Analysis, Review and Report (AU-6 (2)) 
8. Security Certification (CA-4) 
9. Contingency Plan Update (CP-5) 
10. Information System Backup (CP-9 (4)) 
11. Information Systems Recovery and Reconstitution (CP-10 (1)) 
12. Media Transport (MP-5 (1)) 
13. Emergency Shutoff (PE-10 (1)) 
14. System Security Plan Update (PL-3) 
15. Risk Assessment Update (RA-4) 
 
A typical process flow for performing security assessment, based on the current NIST 
Risk Management Framework is shown in Figure 2.5. The second row contains the 
titles of actors that are typically involved in the security assessment process that 
include: 
 




 Information System Security Officer (ISSO) 
 Chief Information Officer (CIO) 
 Senior Information Security Officer (SISO) 
 Information Security Architect 
 Common Control Provider 
 Authorizing Official  
 Security Control Assessor ( also called Information Security Contractor) 
 
The workflow process that supports the risk management framework is manual and 
consequently fraught with errors, delays and lacks transparency. There is no mapping 
of the information systems to their corresponding security controls. Most Federal 
Government enterprise systems are extensive and incorporate a ‘spaghetti-network’ 
of technologies that are obsolete and difficult to integrate. This is combined with the 
fact that the general workforce is aging and the baby-boomers are coming close to 
retirement. There is difficulty in maintaining appropriate staffing levels coupled with 
discontinuity and ineffective transfer of knowledge. This results in complex systems 
being administered and managed by novel personnel that do not have the expertise to 
make judicious decisions for security management. The development of an intelligent 
decision support system will make a difference in helping novice employees with the 
decision-making process required to support such large enterprise environments that 
typically have over five thousand users.  
 
To be effective in performing security assessments, information security contractors 
need readily available current information on how Federal Government enterprises 
map to the appropriate security controls. Without this information, it is difficult to 
develop a test regime that reflects the configuration of an organization’s enterprise.  
Consequently, we encounter several cases wherein performing security assessment 
has become a process of paper-trail documentation with very little or no impact on 





The size and number of applications used by Federal Agencies necessitates the need 
to have multiple organizations performing concurrent security assessments on an 
infrastructure. This often results in cases where the number of personnel involved in 
the security assessment may disrupt Internet access by a denial of service attack due 
to limited or no communications between the security assessments teams. Some 
organizations have started designing and testing dashboards for tracking and 
controlling the multiple risk assessments but this was done without validating the 
security controls. This can result in the case of garbage-in and garbage-out if the 
design is not streamline to the information systems in use within the organization and 
its organizational policy.  
 
A detailed discussion of the tasks for the risk management framework is documented 
in the NIST SP 800-37, as its discussion is beyond the scope of this research. It is 
important that we highlight the swim lane that contains the actor Security Controls 
Assessors. This lane identifies the tasks that information security contractors are 










2.11 Application of the e-Government Relational Model 
In an attempt to address the application of the e-Government Relational Technical Controls 
taxonomy, the researcher provides the list below as a justification for development and 
application of this taxonomy. 
 
1. It will improve communication between the customer, security experts, project 
managers and pertinent stakeholders on information assurance contracts because it will 
provide a common lingo to all participants 
2. It will provide metrics and a methodology for meeting the different information 
assurance statutory requirements for information systems risk management 
3. It can form the basis for establishing standards for performing security assessment of 
different information systems used on projects and found in the enterprise environment 
4. It will assist personnel responsible for managing contracts to efficiently define the 
scope of work by using this e-Government Technical Controls taxonomy in the 
establishment of information assurance contracts and for managing and controlling 
information assurance projects 
5. It can be use as a detailed level glossary of terms as it provides not only the definition 
of terms but also the relationships between information assurance entities. 
6. The analytical model can be used in the process of developing a project management 
plan for managing project organizational risks on Federal Government projects. The 
cost model can be used to calculating the costs for performing security assessments for 
different types of information systems 
7. The risk mitigation and management strategies identified can be used for the different 
information system and then reused in developing industry best practices for 
mitigating and managing risks to the different information systems utilized on projects 
8. The e-Government relational technical controls taxonomy can also be use for teaching 
of information assurance at institutions, universities and on-the-job training. 
9. It can be used to develop a responsibility matrix for information security assessment of 




10. It can form the basis for the development of a decision-support system for security 
assessments 
11. It can be used to develop a dashboard that provides a project status for the different 




Chapter 3 e-Government Relational Taxonomy Model 
Chapter 1discussed the objectives, questions, scope and methodology of the research while 
Chapter 2 provided an overview of the literature reviewed for this research. This chapter will 
review the development of the e-Government Relational Technical Control taxonomy for 
performing of security assessment for Federal Government Information Assurance 
Contractors. 
 
3.0 Definition of Terms for the e-Government Taxonomy 
The website www.pcmag.com defines Information Assurance as “The technical and 
managerial measures designed to ensure the confidentiality, possession or control, integrity, 
authenticity, availability and utility of information and information systems. This term, which 
has spread from government use into common parlance, is sometimes synonymous with 
information security. The Department of Defense Information Assurance Workforce 
Improvement Program (DoD 8570.01-M) defines Information Assurance as “measures that 
protect and defend information and ISs by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. These measures include providing for 
restoration of IS by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.” 
 
Information Security is defined by US Code in [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3502] as the protection of 
information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, 
modification, or destruction in order to provide confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Information security and information assurance are closely related and sometimes the terms 
are used interchangeably in industry but there are subtle distinctions between the two. The 
next section shall identify the subtle distinctions between the terms though this is not the 
focus of this research. This research focuses on the development and validation of the 
information system breakdown structure, its mapping to applicable e-Government relational 





The relationship of information assurance to information security is such that Information 
Assurance is a subset of information security. Figure 3.1 shows the relationship between 
Information Assurance and Information Security. Information Assurance involves ensuring 
the confidentiality, availability and integrity of data and information, which is a subset of 
Information Security. Information security encompasses ensuring the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of data and information plus authentication, authorization, auditing 
and identification for information systems. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Information Assurance and Information Security Relationship 
 
3.1 Information Systems Breakdown Structure (ISBS) Assumptions 
The assumptions for the information systems breakdown structure include: 
1. The environment comprised of computers, directory servers, application servers, 




2. The network infrastructure is comprised of switches, routers, firewall, telephony, storage 
area networks, tape backups, virtual private network devices and intrusion 
detection/prevention devices. 
3. The servers and computers on the network are running Anti-virus software and other 
applications. 
4. A single organization is responsible for policy development, implementation and 
management for all systems that make up the information systems breakdown structure.  
5. The similarity in the physical characteristics of File & Print Servers, Application 
Servers, Database Servers, Web Servers and Directory servers make is possible for them 
to be grouped together as servers.  
6. Personal computers are sufficiently different enough from servers in their functional use, 
though they have similar physical characteristics and security requirements. The 
requirements for personal computers and servers on the network makes then sufficiently 
different to be regarded as separate entities in the ISBS. 
7. Mainframe computers are sufficiently different from servers in their architecture and 
administration for them to be included as a separate entity in the ISBS. 
8. The network infrastructure source of vulnerability is similar enough for them to be 
grouped within the same entity in the ISBS. 
9. Scanners, printers and faxes are similar in the protocols they use (i.e. IP and IP 
telephony) and thus their vulnerability source are similar enough for them to be grouped 
in the ISBS. 
10. Scanners do not require user authentication prior to their use. 
11. Printers are appearing on the market that have operating systems, so we assume that the 
printer group has an operating system as it is easier to include the attribute now than it is 
to add one at a future time. 
 
3.2 e-Government Relational Technical Controls Taxonomy 
Table 3.1 highlights the two models that make up the e-Government Relational Technical 




Table 3.1 e-Government Relational Technical Controls Taxonomy Model 






A hierarchical chart that identifies 
the information systems that may be 
use for a project or that may exist in 
an organizations enterprise. It 
depicts systems at the category level, 
their associated sub-category, 
components and sub-components. 
The questionnaire was used to 
validate the structure and value of 
using this model. 
This ensures that all the sources of 
information systems risk to a project or 
organization are be properly identified with 
a goal of mitigating and managing them. It 
also provides a method to assign 
responsibility and track security assessments 
for the systems. The information systems 
breakdown structure then maps to the 
Systems/Devices entity of the e-Government 








An entity relationship diagram that 
identified the entities and 
relationships between the entities for 
the technical security controls. This 
provides a way to track the controls 
to the information systems identified 
in the ISBS and the users. 
This method uses a relational approach to 
information systems security assessments. It 
assesses the relationships between the 
entities of the Technical control family and 
provides an opportunity to assess the 
attributes of the entities and easily relate 
them to attributes of other entities. The 
diagram also depicts the cardinality between 
the entities. The relationships were 
developed based on discussion with industry 
personnel on the possible cardinality 
between the entities. In cases where the 
researcher had to chose between a zero to 
one relationship as opposed to one to 
multiple relationship, the researcher choose 
the zero to one relationship because it was 
the trivial option of the two. 
 
The questionnaire included items that validated the relationships and attributes of the identification and 
authentication entity of this model.  Questionnaire items for the Access Control, Audit and Systems and 
Communications Entities were developed and are provided in Appendix B. These items were excluded from the 
scope of the research to ensure the number of items in the questionnaire did not exceed 100 or else it would 




3.3 Information Systems Breakdown Structure 
In project management, we observe the use of several breakdown structures.  These 
include the work breakdown structure, the risk breakdown structure and the 
organizational breakdown structure. These breakdown structures have one very 
important function: decomposing project tasks, risks or roles into smaller manageable 
portions that can be tracked, controlled and measured to improve communications 
and efficiency, as well as assign responsibility & authority for the different sub-
entities.  
 
Mantel et al 2005 maintains, “Inadequate up-front planning, especially failing to 
identify all important tasks, is a primary contributor to the failure of a project to 
achieve its cost and time objectives.”i  The work breakdown structure is the 
cornerstone of project management and it consistently adds value to the process of 
managing projects through its efficient use. Can a similar model for the information 
system breakdown structure help us identify information system risk for a project or 
an organization? 
 
Kerzner (2006) observes, “The first major step in the planning process after project 
requirements definition is the development of the work breakdown structure (WBS). 
A WBS is a product-oriented family tree subdivision of hardware, services and data 
required to produce the end product.”  
 
The WBS pictorial is developed to include all the required tasks to produce a product, 
deliver a service or deliver a project. The finished product, delivered service or 
deliverables of the project are listed at the top of the tree and decomposed into 
smaller manageable and measurable tasks. The WBS tasks are then transformed into a 
sequenced diagram like the Gantt chart or a bar chart that can be used to track project 
metrics.   
 
The ‘100% rule’ for a WBS indicates that the summation of the entire child work 




component. In addition, the WBS should include all the work defined by the project 
scope and identify all the project deliverables. The WBS should capture all the work 
to be performed to successfully complete the project.  
The tasks to be delivered by the WBS should be mutually exclusive. The WBS should 
not contain duplicate tasks or the risks for assigning responsibility to multiple people 
increases thereby resulting in communication challenges and the likelihood of having 
duplicate charges that will result in errors in the cost estimates. When the WBS 
elements names are ambiguous, then a WBS dictionary must be developed to address 
the definition of the WBS elements. 
 
I am proposing the Information System Breakdown Structure depicted in Figure 3.2, 
with a goal to identify all the information systems required to support a project and 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of data while maintaining the 
non-repudiation of tasks during the course of the project. With the information system 
breakdown structure (ISBS), we can use the concept of “divide and conquer” wherein 
we decompose the architecture, design, process, procedures, and implementation of 
information systems so that we can better understand and manage the risks associated 
with the different components. 
 
In the current practice of project management, we assess the risk posed to the project 
due to cost, time, quality and ensuring customer satisfaction. In many cases, we forget 
that an equally important area of project management is composed of the information 
systems that make the managing of complex projects feasible. We also tend to neglect 
that fact that without sufficient security imposed on the information system 
component of the project, the risks of a project failing increases.  
 
Project managers should start identifying, assessing and managing the risks posed to 
the project due to their choice of information systems used on a project. In that light 
the research presents Figure 3.2 as the first iteration of the information system 
breakdown structure. This is a living model that should be customized for a project or 




landscape of project. It can then be used to assign responsibility for performing 
security assessment for the different security teams and highlight the relationships 
between the different systems.   
 
The goal in the development of an information system breakdown structure is to 
decompose the category of information systems into its sub-categories, components 
and sub-components that are typically used on most projects, most of the time to 
access, share, support and manage project information. The sub-categories are 
decomposed into the main components that make up the information system 
breakdown structure. Further decomposition of the components into sub-components 
highlights the sub-components that are assembled to make the main component.  
 
Threats to information systems used on a project can come from any sub-category, 
component or sub-component levels so it is important that we identify these entities 
and their associated source of risks (threats) for the different information systems 
utilized on projects. Park (2009) states “The best defense against Web-based attacks it 
to know where the most vulnerable areas of a system are.” Part of the process of 
identifying the most vulnerable areas of the system involves understanding the 
components that makes up the system and their inherent vulnerabilities.  
 
Some of the sub-components like protocols, and applications have a tendency to 
appear in other components. As a result, these sub-components have been assigned a 
generic outline level containing an X to indicate that it may take component level 
numbers. The information system category is decomposed into the following sub-
categories: 
1.1 Computers 
1.2 Network infrastructure 
1.3 Personal digital assistants 
1.4 Imaging devices 





The following sections shall further discuss each of the sub-categories and their 
corresponding components and sub-components as detail in Figure 3.2.  
 
Computers 
The sub-category of computers for the information systems breakdown structure is 
used to refer to any system that has a central processing unit and a human-computer 
interface that includes a mouse, keyboard and a display screen. The term computer is 
used very loosely and it is not to be confused with the term ‘personal computer’. The 
computers section is typically made up of the following hierarchy: 
1.1.1 Personal Computer 
1.1.X.1 Hardware 
         1.1.X.2 Operating System 
         1.1.X.3 Applications 
         1.1.X.4 Protocols 
         1.1.X.5 Firmware 
1.1.2 File & Print Server 
1.1.3 Application Server 
1.1.4 Database Server 
1.1.5 Web Server 
1.1.6 Directory Server 
1.1.7 Mainframes 
1.1.8 Virtual Machines 
 
Within the Personal Computer component are the hardware, operating system, 
applications, protocols and firmware sub-components that go towards making the 
personal computer. All of the sub-components of the personal computer exist in the 
component for File & Print Server, Application Server, Database Server, Directory 
server, Mainframes and Virtual Machines.  To avoid the need for duplication of these 
sub-components they are listed with the component of Personal Computers as 1.1.X.1 









The sub-component of Hardware can be further decomposed into the different 
modules and sub-modules that make up the Personal Computer. There are risks 
associated with the module and sub-module levels. These modules typically include 
the CPU, hard drive, motherboard, etc but the purpose of this research, we have 
chosen to stop at the hardware sub-components level so that we can concentrate on 
the goal of mitigating risk to the project. Risks posed by the hardware sub-component 
are usually addressed in the contingency and disaster recovery plan for the various 
systems and incorporated into the business continuity plan for the organization. 
 
Network Infrastructure 
The sub-category of network infrastructure for the information system’s breakdown 
structure is used to refer to local area network (LAN), metropolitan area network 
(MAN)  or wide area network (WAN) that the computers are connected to so that 
they can communicate with each other and with other systems outside of the 
enterprise. Some of the components typically found in the network infrastructure for 
most projects include: 
1.2.1 Router 
1.2.X.1 Hardware 





1.2.4 Intrusion Detection System/Intrusion Protection System 
1.2.5 Telephony 
1.2.6 Storage Area Networks (SANs) 
1.2.7 Tape backup 
1.2.8 Virtual Private Networks (VPN) 
 
Routers are typically made up of hardware, an Internet Operating System (IOS), 




(hardware, IOS, protocols & firmware) exist in the components of switches, firewall, 
storage area networks, IP telephones, intrusion detection system (IDS) and intrusion 
protection systems (IPS). Hubs are the only components that do not have an IOS but 
it has all of the remaining sub-components. Switches have replaced hubs in most 
organizational information system infrastructure due to their design, which creates 
single broadcast and collusion domains, often resulting in heavy network congestion. 
Hubs are only included for completion but they are typically not found on projects or 
organizational networks.  
 
Personal Digital Assistants (PDA) 
The line dividing computers from personal digital assistants (PDAs) is becoming 
blurred with the development of mobile computing operating systems that fully 
integrate with the network infrastructure.  However, they are still a different line of 
components because of their smaller size and limited functionality compared to what 
can be accomplished on a computer. PDAs may come in the form of Blackberry, cell 
phones, i-Devices and other devices. Others include items that have a similar 
functionality but may be marketed under different brand names. The components for 
the sub-category of PDAs include: 
1.3.1 Blackberry 
1.3.X.1 Hardware 




1.3.2 Cell phones 
1.3.3 i-Devices 
 
PDAs come in different forms, shapes and with varying functionality but their goal of 
keeping the user organized with reminders has not changed. Most of them now 
include applications that allow a user to make online purchases for airline tickets, 




etc. Examples of i-Devices include iPods, iPad and iPod Touch. Examples of other 
devices include the Kindle, which is an Internet enabled device with a similar 
functionality to i-Devices, in that they are both capable of making online purchases. 
 
Imaging Devices 
The sub-category of imaging devices in the information systems breakdown structure 
is used to refer to the category of systems that produce or can be used to input or 
transfer images to the sub-category of computers. It is primarily made up of 
peripheral devices that are typically neglected in most security assessments yet they 
are systems that can easily be hacked because no security protocols are being 
developed for these devices, which are not required to authenticate to the network. 









For most information systems networks, these devices are configured as network 
devices and in some cases, they are configured as wireless devices and may act as 
major sources of threat to the network. In addition, when it comes to management of 
network devices, the firmware running on these are rarely upgraded, either due to 
lack of knowledge of the threats these systems may pose or because of limited 
maintenance and management policies for these systems that extend beyond replacing 
paper/ink or break-fix repairs.  
 
Cameras and videos were added based on feedback received during the pilot testing 




incoming calls and for ease of use. This has the effect of them being used a readily 
available bug for meetings. 
 
3.4 Entity Descriptions 
This section presents the descriptions of the entities and their attributes identified in 
Figure 3.3. It also shows how the information system breakdown structure may be 




People that access the information system either locally or remotely are referred to as 
users for this research. They may include contractors, vendors and the public. The 
interaction of users with the system is restricted to the input, output and 
transformation of data and information. They have no rights to manage the system. 
This definition of users excludes system maintainers that may require a different set 
of access control to the information system.  
 
Processes for this research are batch or scheduled jobs that need an identifier to 
validate their authenticity so that they can run on the information system. The users 
may come from the organizational chart that can be used to assign groups and roles 
for the information system. Project Management currently utilizes the organizational 
breakdown structure to assign responsibility for tasks on the work breakdown 
structure. The organizational breakdown structure can also be used to assign the 
controls that apply for the different users within and outside the organization.  
 
System/Devices Entity 
System and devices include computer, network devices, PDA, imaging devices and 
other devices from the information system breakdown structure that may have a 
media access card, wireless access card or connection that can access the information 





Identification & Authentication (IA) Entity 
The identification and authentication entity is responsible for capturing the attributes 
for identification and authentication between the information system and users, 
processes, devices or other system. The primary attribute of the identification and 
authentication entity is to establish and manage unique identifiers of users, processes, 
devices or other systems that may access the information system.  
 
Other attributes of this entity include multi-factor authentication management, 
obscuring of feedback, encrypting of the passwords in transit and identification and 
authentication of non-organizational users. Figure 3.3 contains a detailed list of the 
attributes of this entity. For a discussion of the different controls and enhancements 
for this attribute see the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3. 
 
Access Control (AC) Entity 
The access control entity is responsible for capturing the attributes that regulate 
access to components of the ISBS, after they have been identified and authenticated. 
The primary role of the access control entity is for managing (granting/denying) 
access to entities that may want to access/utilize the information system and its 
components.  
 
Additional attributes for this entity include the management and enforcement of 
accounts, managing of information flow between secure and non-secure areas of the 
information system, ensuring separation of duties for personnel, defining how 
unsuccessful login attempts should be handled, providing system use notification, 
presenting previous logon information to the user prior to granting access to the 
information system. Managing of session lock, identifying actions that do not require 
authentication to the information system, specifying how remote and wireless access 





Access control also covers the requirements for the use of mobile devices on the 
network, specifications for the use of external information system and public access 
to information. Figure 3.3 contains a detailed list of the attributes of this entity. 
 
Audit & Accountability (AU) Entity 
The audit and accountability entity is responsible for monitoring the access granted or 
denied by the access control entity for entities that have completed the identification 
and authentication process with the information system and its components.  
 
Attributes for the audit and accountability entity include auditing events, establishing 
the content of audit records, and ensuring there is sufficient space on the system to 
store audit records and their corresponding storage duration. It also includes ensuring 
that a process is in place for reviewing, analyzing and reporting on audits, 
establishing time stamps, protecting all audit information, ensuring that the audit 
records can meet the requirements for non-repudiations, monitoring of information 
disclosure and monitoring of audit sessions. Figure 3.3 contains a detailed list of the 
attributes of this entity. 
 
System & Communications Protection (SC) Entity 
This entity is responsible for tracking of auditing records and is based on a set of 
criteria or rules, performing actions to maintain the security posture of the 
information system. This entity is capable of artificial intelligence since it is based on 
the audit records, which are analyzed to identify patterns and develop rules for 
information system. It can also support decision support systems for decision making 
for the other entities due to its ability to synthesize extensive audit records. 
 
Attributes of this entity include ensuring that secure and non-secure applications are 
appropriately partitioned, implementing security function isolations, preventing 
denial of service, identifying resource priority, and establishing trusted paths for data 
communications. Additional attributes include managing of cryptography, public key 




availability of data during communications and in-situ. Figure 3.3 contains a detailed 
list of the attributes of this entity. The System & Communication Protection entity 
also has the greatest potential to utilize artificial intelligence and manage the 
interactions between the other entities. 
 
3.5 E-R Diagram for the E-Government Technical Controls 
Table 3.2 presents the relationships between the different entities of the e-
Government Relational Technical Controls Model. It also discusses the cardinality 
between the entities. 
 
Table 3.2 From Entity – To Entity Relationships 





A user/process must have (and be restricted to) a unique 




Users/Processes  The IA Entity can identify and authenticate only 
systems/devices (i.e. no users/processes) or many 
users/processes. 
System/Devices Identification & 
Authentication  
A system/device must have (and be restricted to) a unique 
identifier that is use to authenticate to the information system.  
Identification & 
Authentication 
System/Devices The IA Entity can identify and authenticate only 




Access Control  An authenticated identifier may be granted access to one or 
many information systems 
Access Control Identification & 
Authentication 




Access Control Audit & Accountability tracks the access of one or many 
authenticated identifiers. 
Access Control Audit & 
Accountability 
The access control entity logs to the audit & accountability 







Tracks the one or many audit & accountability logs and raises 
alerts, or makes information systems configuration changes 











Monitors and logs one or many system and communication 
protection changes for the information system. 
 
3.6 Identification & Authentication Risk Management Strategies 
The NIST SP 8-53 Rev 3 controls for the Identification and Authentication control 
family was used to identify best practices for the identification and authentication risk 
management strategies. Questionnaire items were developed to validate the 
identification and authentication best practices for risk management. Interview items 
were also developed for the Access Control, Audit and Systems and Communications 
Protection Entities but they were excluded from the interview process to prevent the 
questionnaire items from exceeding a hundred items. The questionnaire for this 
research is included in Appendix A and the excluded questions are documented in 
Appendix B.  
 
The questionnaire items were preceded with the associated NIST control ID that 
generated the risk strategy. The questions included issues related to identifier 
generators and management, single-sign on, one-time passwords, periods of 
inactivity, characteristics for user passwords and cryptography. Information security 
contractors with extensive expertise in identification and authentication were asked to 
select whether they strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the 
position presented for identification and authentication risk management. The 
identification and authentication control family items that were used to identify risk 
mitigation and management strategies are documented in Section 3 of the 
questionnaire documented in Appendix A. 
 
 
A list of effective identification and authentication risk management strategies that 
were significantly based on the analysis of the questionnaire are presented in Chapter 









3.7 Identification & Authentication Security Assessment Costs  
This section discusses the development of the model for determining the cost of 
performing security assessment for the identification and authentication control 
family and its attributes.   The researcher discussed with industry experts to identify 
the typical tasks and durations used to perform security assessment tasks for the 
identification and authentication control family. This guided the selection of the tasks 
and the duration ranges for the hours specified in the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
also included items to determine the hourly rates paid by Federal Government 
Agencies for security assessment of their information systems. 
 
Ng R. (2009) states that “Before we can effectively deal with the design and 
deployment of security solutions, we need to understand the value of the underlying 
information assets that need to be protected.” Gordon (2002) developed an economic 
model to determine the optimal amount that organization should invest in information 
security. This work is not directly applicable to the research as the research is 
interested in process costs for performing security assessments as opposed to 
information technology assets cost.   
 
Ng R. (2009) maintains that “the cost of security protection should never exceed the 
sum total of the value of the information.” This means that after implementation of 
the security controls, the Information Assurance systems should audit the 
Deployment Ratio (DR) to ensure that the implementation follows the policy 
guidelines and specifications. The deployment ratio ensures that the company 
resources are judiciously utilized so without overspending on protection and 
exceeding the value of the information. It is all well that we may want to limit our 
spending on protecting our information system but we should also be aware of the 
risks, litigations and compensation costs that the organization may be exposed to if 
we are found to be negligent.  
 
The questionnaire items that were developed to establish an agreed-upon duration for 




controls are documented in Appendix A. The tasks for which the durations were 
collected were based on the NIST guidelines for the risk management framework 
documented in the NIST SP 800-37.   The questionnaire items include questions 
related to the duration for reviewing and assessing documentation, developing and 
administering security tests, performing interviews and developing reports for the 
identification and authentication control family. The respondents were asked to 
respond to the questions based on the last security assessments they performed, which 
included the identification and authentication control family. Analysis of the 
responses obtained from the questionnaire collection is documented in Section 5 of 
this document. 
 
3.8 Hierarchical e-Government Model Vs Relational e-Government 
Model 
Table C62 (in Appendix C) compares the current hierarchical e-Government model 
against the relational e-Government Model. It highlights the advantages and 
disadvantages of using a hierarchical e-Government model against a relational e-








Chapter 4 Information Assurance Data Collection 
 
This chapter discusses the development and data collection process of the 
questionnaire that included:  
 Validating the information system breakdown structure model 
 Validating the e-Government Technical Security Controls Taxonomy 
 Validating the Identification and Authentication Control risk management 
strategies 
 Identifying the duration for the tasks and associated costs for performing security 
assessments using the current methodology 
 
This section discusses the architecture of the questionnaire, the targeted respondents, 
questionnaire distribution, responses received, problems encountered, validity and 
reliability of the data collection questionnaire. The researcher pre-screen the 
questionnaire respondents to ensure they are have the skills and expertise to 
understand the questions, diagrams and statements used in the questionnaire. 
Responses that were incomplete and did not meet the minimum requirements for 
inclusion in the questionnaire were excluded from the research analysis. A copy of 
the questionnaire used for this research is included in Appendix A of this document. 
Questions in Appendix B were not included in the questionnaire to reduce the length 
of the questionnaire. These questions are included in this document for future 
research.  
 
4.0 Design of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
Following the development and refinement of the information system breakdown 
structure and the e-Government relational model, a project-level data collection 
questionnaire was develop and pilot tested before being used in the data collection 
process. Several methods for administration of the data collection effort are available 
but a self-administered questionnaire was deemed most efficient for the availability 




implementation. The data collection questionnaire is shown in Appendix A of this 
document.  
 
4.1 Structure of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
The data collection questionnaire commenced with an introductory statement on why 
the respondent was selected for this voluntary data collection effort and how the data 
collected will be used. It also provided the contact information for the project 
supervisor. Following the introduction page, the data collection questionnaire was 
separated into the following four sections: 
 Section 1 consisted of eighteen questions (Items 1 – 17) and collected personal 
information of the respondents. The data collected in this section included:  the 
date, location, name, title and contact information of the respondent, as well as 
their experience with interpreting entity-relationship diagrams. The remainder of 
this section collected years of experience data from the respondents: as network 
administrators, network security, FISMA, performing security assessment and 
their past information assurance projects. The questionnaire also collected 
information on industry-recognized security certificates and level of education, 
and had an option for the respondent to provide additional information on their 
expertise in applying security to information assurance related projects. This 
information forms the basis for comparing the responses to the other sections of 
the questionnaire. It was also used to assess the significance of the different 
experience of the respondents. 
 Section 2 collected information to establish the value of using the ISBS model 
shown in Figure 4.1, to identify and classify the organizational information 
system resources that may be utilized on a project. The section consisted of eight 
questions (Items 18 – 26) based on a 4-point (force-choice) Likert scale. The 
section asked respondents to determine whether they strongly disagree, disagree, 
agree or strongly agree with statements based on the ISBS.  An example of the 4-






Table 4.1 Four-Point Forced Choice Likert Scale 







The access control entity must create an audit 
event record. 
   
 
The 4-point forced choice approach was used to divert respondents from taking 
the path of least resistance by choosing a middle category. It also allowed the 
responses to be dichotomized into two groups of agree or disagree. Respondents 
were provided an option to provide feedback on their responses to ensure that 
they have an opportunity to express views that were not capture using the Likert 
4-point (force-choice) scale. This ability to clarify their responses allowed the 
respondents to focus to the next set of items while providing valuable information 
to the research on the choices of the respondents.  
 Section 2 of the questionnaire was used to validate the relationships for the e-
Government Relational Technical controls model. The section consisted of an 
entity relationship diagram of the e-Government Relational Technical Controls 
and the items in the data collection were developed to validate the relationships 
between the users/processes, system/devices, identification and authentication 
(IA), access control (AC), audit & accountability (AU) and the system & 
communication protection (SC) entities. The section consisted of twenty-five 4-
point forced choice questions and feedback (items 27 to 51). The questions were 
developed so that can be answered independent of the respondents’ knowledge of 
how to interpret the entity-relationship diagram shown in Figure 4.2. The 
relationships validated in this section of the questionnaire included: 
o Users/Process and IA Entity Relationships 
o System/Devices and IA Entity Relationships 
o IA and AC Entity Relationships 
o AC and AU Entity Relationships 





The section asked respondents to determine whether they strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements that establish the 
relationships between two related entities for the e-Government Relational 
Technical Controls.  A forced-choice approach was used to prevent respondents 
from taking the path of least resistance by choosing a middle category. 
Respondents were provided an option to provide feedback on their responses to 
each set of relationship statements they disagreed with.  
 Section 3 was used to validate the existing risk management strategies are used as 
attributes of the Identification and Authentication Entity of the e-Government 
Relational Technical Controls. The thirty-seven questions in this section cover 
item 52 to item 88. Respondents were provided an option to provide feedback for 
statements they strongly disagree or disagreed with for the identification and 
authentication risk mitigation and management strategies. 
 Section 4 contained questions that will help develop a cost model for establishing 
the cost of performing security assessment for the identification and 
authentication control family. The six questions (item 89 to item 94) asked 
questions about the duration to: 
o Examine and assess documents related to the identification authentication 
control family 
o Interview organizational stakeholders on the requirements for 
identification and authentication control family 
o Test the control requirements for the identification and authentication 
control family 
o Develop report for the identification and authentication control family 
o Identify the last organization that the respondent performed a security 
assessment for that involved the identification and authentication control 
family 
o Identify the fee their organization charged for the last security assessment 
































AC for Mobile Devices
Use of External Information Systems






















Audit & Accountability (AU)
Policy & Procedures
Auditable Events
Content of Audit Records
Audit Storage Capacity
Audit & Accountability
Audit Review, Analysis & Reporting
Audit Reduction & Report Generation
Time Stamps




Monitoring for Information Disclosure
Session Audit
Identification & Authentication (IA)
Policy and Procedures
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Transmission of Security Attributes
Public Key Infrastructure
Mobile Code
Voice Over Internet Protocol
Secure Name/Address Resolution Services Authoritative Souce
Secure Name/Address Resolutions Service Recursive/Caching Resolver
Architecture & Provisionong for Name/Address Resolution Service
Session Authenticity
Fail In Known State
Thin Nodes
Honey Pots
Operating System Independent Applications

















4.2 Initial Review of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
Industry practitioners and academicians initially reviewed the data collection 
questionnaire. Detailed discussions about the questionnaire were made over virtual 
meeting sites like Skype and via email. The initial review helped to ensured the 
following: 
1. The structure, wording, format and measurement scale of the questionnaire were 
clear, understandable and analyzable 
2. The data required for the research could be obtained 
3. The questions to validate the relationships between the entities did not require 
knowledge of entity-relationship diagrams 
4. The technical content of the questions did not extend beyond the knowledge and 
expertise of the respondents 
5. The questions were comprehensive and complete for the goals and objectives of 
the research 
6. The format of the questions were clear and the answer choices did not lead to 
recording of wrong answers by the respondents 
7. It was possible to provide a pictorial of the entity-relationship diagram for the e-
Government Relational Technical Controls and the Information System 
Breakdown Structure 
8. The likelihood of a web session timing out during the answering of the 
questionnaire online was minimized or responses being lost because they had not 
been recorded in the online database 
9. Minimize the likelihood of receiving incomplete responses to the data collection 
questionnaires 
10. Potential errors in recording were identified and resolved to minimize the effect of 
data errors 
 
4.3 Email-based data collection questionnaire 
Based on the comments and suggestions obtained from the initial review, it was 
decided to administer the data collection questionnaire via email. This limited the 




their sessions will timeout after thirty minutes of inactivity. A measure that is 
controlled by the application service provider and that the researcher has no control 
over. In addition, it ensured that the contact information for the respondents was 
readily available and that the respondents do not have to complete the questionnaire 
in one sitting.  
 
Over eighty percent of the questionnaires were self-administered; the respondents 
choose the best time to complete the questionnaire without having to factor in the 
availability of the researcher. With the widespread use of email and Internet 
technologies, distribution of the data collection questionnaire to the respondents was 
easy and inexpensive. Some of the advantages of using email and the Internet to 
distribute the questionnaire include low cost, quick turnaround time, prompt 
correspondence between the respondents and the researcher, unlimited geographic 
boundaries and user convenience. 
 
4.4 Architecture of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
The data collection questionnaire was developed using Microsoft Office InfoPath 
2007 and its design controls that included check boxes, option buttons, text box, 
banners, pictures, tables, mail to and hyperlinks. The check boxes and option buttons 
were grouped and linked under the same categories for the different questions. This 
prevented the likelihood of a respondent selecting multiple answers for a single 
answer question while allowing them to select multiple answers for a multiple answer 
question. The forms that were developed in Microsoft Office InfoPath 2007 was then 
copied over to Microsoft Office Word 2007 and saved as a Word 2007 version (with 
.docx extension) and a Word 97 - 2003 version (with .doc extension).  
 
The tables ensured that the responses were maintained in line with the responses and 
this limited the confusion over which responses went with which comments. The use 
of check boxes also limited the likelihood of the questions having random answer 




the questionnaires and breakup the monotony of using just black on white for the 
entire questionnaire.  Figure 4.3 is a screen shot of the first page of the questionnaire. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.3, the first page of the questionnaire explained the data 
collection objective, benefits, targeted respondents, and the contact information for 
the project supervisor. We also expressed appreciation to respondents for 
participating in the survey. 
 
The rest of the data collection questionnaire flowed logically through the four 
sections of the questionnaire. Section 1 collected information on the respondents that 
would be used as a basis for analysis of the responses. Section 2 asked questions to 
validate the Information System Breakdown Structure. Section 3 asked questions to 
validate the relationships for the e-Government Relational Technical Controls model. 
Section 4 asked questions to determine the value of the current risk mitigation and 
management strategies for the Identification and Authentication Control family. 
There was ninety-five items in the questionnaire.  
 
Questions were developed for the other three technical control families namely access 
control, auditing, and system and communications protection. These questions are 
included in Appendix B. Including the three control families in the questionnaire 
would have brought the total number of questionnaire items to over three hundred and 
it would have been impossible to find knowledgeable and willing respondents for the 
research. This happens to be one of the limitations of the research. 
 
Except for two respondents that returned an incomplete questionnaire and a pencil-
improperly marked questionnaire, all the respondents were included in the research 
because their work experience and expertise in information assurance had been pre-
screened for their expertise in information assurance prior to them being invited to 











The respondents held a minimum of a Masters Degree or PhD with extensive industry 
or research experience for security assessments. Respondents with a Bachelors degree 
needed to have over four years of experience performing security assessments to be 
included in the research. Some of the respondents held the industry-recognized 
security certificate of CISSP. Pre-screening the respondents ensured that they had 
performed security assessment and have a common understanding of the information 
assurance terminology and processes. 
 
4.5 Pilot Testing of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
The data collection questionnaire was pilot-tested with a sample of five respondents 
and the following modifications were made to the questionnaire to make it more user-
friendly and to incorporate the multiple answers observed for some questions. Table 
C-61 (in Appendix C) depicts the changes that were made to the questionnaire. The 
‘Ques #’ column identifies the item number that the change was made to, the 
‘Previous’ column depicts how the question was formatted in the pilot and the 
‘Change To’ depicts the changes that were made to the final questionnaire. These 
changes were reviewed and approved by the project manager. All subsequent 
questionnaires were based on the final questionnaire. Additionally, there were no 
drastic changes made to the content of the pilot questionnaire, responses in the pilot 
were modified to the updated questionnaire format and included in the analysis for 
the research. 
 
4.6 Research Respondents 
The target respondents were information assurance Federal Government Contractors 
and Employees. The respondents selected for inclusion in the research had the 
following characteristics: 





 A Bachelors Degree and over three years of experience performing security 
assessments using the NIST Security Controls 
 
Pre-screening of the respondents ensured that they were familiar with Network 
Administration and security assessments using the NIST Security Control, prior to 
their inclusion in the data collection effort. Respondents were asked to answer project 
related questions based on the most recent information assurance project in which 
they participated.  
 
Respondents were identified through the: 
 Information Assurance experts that gave talks at conferences and seminars 
 Inter Sec site at https://isc2intersec.leveragesoftware.com/login.aspx 
 Information Assurance experts that the researcher was familiar with their work 
 
The primary method for contacting respondents and inviting them to participate in the 
data collection effort was via the Inter Sec bulletin board, telephone or email. After a 
respondent agreed to participate in the data collection effort, they were sent a copy of 
the questionnaire in either Microsoft Office Word 2007 (extension .docx) and/or 
Microsoft Office Word 97-2003 formats (extension .doc). They were instructed that 
they only needed to complete one of the forms and the forms were to be returned back 
to the researcher by 9/3/2010. The diversity of the respondents from the different 
government departments and agencies, the random composition of information 
assurance projects and the requirement that they answer the questions based on the 
last project they worked on prevented respondents from being bias with their 
responses. 
 
4.7 Questionnaire Distribution 
Twenty-two of the respondents selected to participate in the data collection effort 
have performed security assessments on projects with the following Federal 
Government Agencies and organizations: 




- Department of Homeland Security 
- Department of Education 
- United States Patent and Trademark Office 
- Federal Aviation Administration 
- Drug Enforcement Agency 
- Department of Health and Human Services 
- Department of Treasury 
- Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
- State of Florida 
- Environmental Protection Agency 
- Department of Labor 
- National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
- General Service Administration 
- NASA 
- Executive Office of the President 
- US Capitol Police 
- Department of Interior (US Geological Survey) 
- US Department of Agriculture 
- Bank Of America 
 
Respondents were emailed with a brief description and objectives of the research to 
enquire if they were available to participate in the research. Respondents who replied 
expressing an interest to participate in the research were emailed the two formats of 
the questionnaires with instructions for completing the questionnaire. The National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Computer Division was invited to 
participate in the research via multiple emails but we did not receive responses from 
them. Other organizations invited to participate in the research include The Project 
Management Institute (PMI) and the International Information Systems Security 
Certification Consortium, Inc. (ISC)2 The questionnaire was also uploaded at the 





4.8 Data Collection Questionnaire Responses 
The pilot testing and data collection was conducted between August 7 2010 and 
September 3 2010. Twenty-four responses were received but two of the responses 
were rejected. The first response was rejected because the respondent had insufficient 
experience with the NIST Security Control Families to be included in the survey and 
the second response was rejected because the respondent had pencil marked the 
questionnaire with multiple answers that was confusing and some pages were missing 
from the final survey. In addition, responses received after 5:00 pm EST of 
September 3rd, 2010 were excluded from the research. The title that the respondents 
reported for the questionnaire included the following: 
 CIO & Director/CEO (2) 
 Computer Systems Analyst 
 Systems Project Analyst 
 Facilities Administrator IV 
 Sr. Programmer Analyst 
 Security Engineer/Auditor (3) 
 Business Intelligence Consultant 
 Sr. Systems Programmer/Engineer 
 Sr. Enterprise Architect 
 Contract Security Office for Department of Home Land Security 
 VP Of Technology Operations 
 WAN Engineer 
 IT Specialist 
 Information Systems Security Manager (ISSM) 
 Information Systems Architect/Information Assurance SETA 
 Information Assurance Analyst 
 Sr. Network Security Engineer 
 
Figure 4.4 depicts the distribution of the respondents based on the questionnaire 




(this included the network administrator classification), and other categories. Sixteen 
respondents classified themselves as information security contractors, three of them 
classified themselves as network engineers, while the remaining three were classified 
as other. 
 
Figure 4.4 Classification of the respondents 
 
The respondents that classified themselves are other were a programmer, a systems 
project analyst and a physical security officer. All of whom play very important roles 
in information assurance. The difference in responses between those that classify 
themselves as “Other” and those that classify themselves as “Information Security 
Contractors” was not significant for exclusion of the other responses from the 
research. The diversity of the expertise of the respondents resulted in very interesting 
feedback. Figure 4.5 shows a crosstab distribution of the different categories and their 





Figure 4.5 Entity-Relationship Diagram Expertise vs Categories 
 
Each of the three groups had a respondent without expertise interpreting E-R 
diagrams. In addition, a Chi-square test of the significant of those with and without E-
R diagram experience gave (chi-square (1) = 9.80, p =.002). This means that we have 
99% confidence that the respondents with E-R diagram experience are significant.  
 
Respondent experience information for network administration, network security, 
FISMA and security assessment was assessed next and the modal mark for all 






Figure 4.6 Network Administration Experience Figure 4.7 Network Security Experience 
  




Figures 4.6 to 4.9 show the years of experience of the respondents for network 
administration, network security, FISMA/e-Government and network security 
assessment. We observe from the four graphs that the modal mark lies in the 
information security contractors’ category with expertise of four to eight years. We 
also observe that the graphs for the information security category appear to be 
positively skewed distribution with the peak (highest frequency) on the left-hand side. 
In order to have exactly 50 percent of the distribution on each side, we can deduce 
that the median must be located to the right of the mode. In addition, the mean will be 
located to the right of the median because it is influenced by the extreme scores and 
will be displaced further to the right by the scores in the tail. This means we can 
expect to find the median of our responses to be from information security contractor 
with 9 years or more expertise in the four different areas.   
  
The degrees, industry recognized certification and years of experience performing 
security assessment distribution for the respondents is shown in Table 4.2 The CISSP 
certification is the modal certificate for the respondents. The total of industry 






Table 4.2 Respondent Degree 
Degree and Certificates Count 





CISSP, PMP 1 
Other 1 
Masters Degree 14 
<=3 5 
CISSP, PMP, ITIL V2 1 





CISSP, MCSE 1 
CISSP, Security +, ITIL Foundations 1 




CISSP, PMP, NSA-IAM 1 
MCSE 1 





Other - Not specified 1 





4.9 Problems Encountered During the Research  
Some of the problems encountered during the research include: 
 The Microsoft Word 2007 document took long to load/open because it had radio 
buttons, check boxes and text fields. This happened to be the problem most 
reported by the respondent. The questionnaire was saved in Microsoft Word 2003 
format that was easier to load. 
 An incomplete questionnaire was received from one of the respondents so their 
responses were rejected 
 A poorly pencil marked questionnaire with missing pages was received from 
another respondent  so their responses were rejected 
 Another respondent had problems marking the responses using Microsoft Office 
Word 2007 because macros was disabled on their system, so they printed the 
questionnaire and properly marked the answers on the paper, scanned and emailed 
a pdf version of the questionnaire to the researcher 
 Experience several failed attempts to create the questionnaire online with the 
following specific problems: 
o Free sites like Google docs did not allow pictures to be uploaded to their 
site and the recommended workaround did not work and would have 
required the respondent to have multiple windows open at the same time 
o The online sites had session timeout configured so several questions were 
created that did not post to the website and had to be recreated. This 
resulted in a loss of time and lots of frustration for the researcher, as well 
as in the questionnaire being created on the local computer of the 
researcher using Microsoft Office InfoPath 2007. In most cases, it 
appeared as if information technology was part of the problem instead of a 
catalyst to the research 
o The online fee for services sites were cost prohibitive to provide the same 
functionality provided using Microsoft Office InfoPath. 
 Respondents were not too keen to provide the hourly rate their organizations 




provided by select respondents and validated the information against GSA 
Schedule rates for information security contractors. 
 
4.10 Reliability and Validity of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
The two key characteristics of a questionnaire are its reliability and validity. 
Psychometrics was performed on the questionnaire to assess its reliability and validity 
prior to its use for data collection.  
 
4.11 Validity of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
Validity is a measure of whether a test is measuring what it is intended to measure 
and it is affected by reliability. Reliability is a necessary but insufficient condition for 
validity.  Fink (2009) maintains that ‘A valid survey is a reliable one, but a reliable 
one is not always valid.’  A survey is valid if the information it provides is an 
accurate representation of the respondent’s knowledge, attitudes, values and behavior. 
Some characteristics of surveys include: 
 predictive validity (ability to predict future performance) 
 concurrent validity (shows a strong correlation to existing validated surveys for 
the same group or validating the scores against experts’ judgments of 
respondents’ attitudes) 
 content validity (by proving that its items accurately represent the metrics they 
intend to measure) 
 construct validity (by testing the survey on respondents with known 
characteristics based on expert recommendations, to validate the survey)  
 
Blerkom (2009) states that a good test should evenly sample the domain and that such 
a test would display content-related evidence of validity. An even distribution of 
questions within the domains for the information systems breakdown structure, the 
entity-relationship diagrams and the risk mitigation and management strategies for the 





“The four types of validity are construct validity, content validity, concurrent validity 
and predictive validity.” (Christmann 2009)  Construct validity is based on how 
closely a test measures a theoretical construction and the degree of accuracy between 
a test and the construct it is designed to measure.  Christmann states, “A simple way 
of determining construct validity is to correlates tests’ results with the results of 
reputable tests that have established construct validity.”  (Christmann 2009). 
Construct validity is the most valuable and difficult to assess and it is often 
determined after years of experience with a survey. 
 
Content validity is a subjective measure of how the questions seem to a set of 
reviewers who have knowledge of the subject matter. Two common tests of content 
validity are face validity and sampling validity. Face validity is based on the 
investigator’s and industry experts’ subjective evaluations. Sampling validity ensures 
the population is adequately sampled by a questionnaire and it is commonly used 
when investigators attempt to construct and utilize a questionnaire for the first time. 
 
Empirical validity decomposes into concurrent validity and predictive validity. It 
assesses the relationship between a questionnaire and its outcomes. Concurrent 
validity assesses the validity of a questionnaire against an existing ‘proven’ 
questionnaire for measuring the same subject. Predictive validity assesses the 
correlation coefficient between the results of a questionnaire and an external criterion 
and it is used to forecast future outcomes. 
 
The pilot test included procedures to assess the questionnaires validity and reliability 
prior to its use. The questionnaire was assessed using content validity, as no golden 
standard questionnaire exists to perform a concurrent or construct validity tests. 
Predictive validity is not applicable for this type of research due to the dynamic 
characteristic of information assurance. What may be considered a secure mode today 
could be an unstable/unsecure mode six months later. The two tests of content 
validity performed include face validity and sampling validity, which shall be 





Face validity for the data collection questionnaire was established by performing the 
following: 
1. A comprehensive literature review and unstructured interview of industry 
practitioners was conducted to ensure the information system breakdown 
structure develop was comprehensive, the entity-relationship diagram for the 
NIST Technical security controls were comprehensive and included all the 
current attributes and the risk mitigation and management strategies assessed are 
proven and established in the information assurance industry. To establish the 
baseline cost model for the tasks and durations based on security assessment of 
the identification and authentication control family. 
2. Feedback and comments collected through the expert discussions and 
unstructured interviews were used to refine the research model and a pilot test of 
the questionnaire was performed. The results of the pilot test resulted in minor 
modifications to the questionnaire format to improve consistency in responses, 
formatting and clarity of the questions. 
 
Sampling validity for the data collection questionnaire was established by 
performing the following: 
1. Ensuring that the respondents to the questionnaire worked in the information 
assurance or related industry and had experience with performing security 
assessment using the NIST special publications guidelines. 
2. The questionnaire asked questions of the number of years of experience 
respondents had with network administration, network security, FISMA, security 
assessments and the corresponding number of projects completed. This was done 
to validate the sample of the population and the analysis was performed on their 
responses to ensure that their years of experience was significant and showed 
alpha less than 0.05. 






4.12 Reliability of the Data Collection Questionnaire 
Reliability is synonymous with consistency. It indicates the ability to repeatedly 
measure the same variable and get the same results. Fink (2009) states that, ‘A 
reliable survey provides a consistent measure of important characteristics despite 
background fluctuations.’ Variance in samples is explained by reliability. The 
observed variance (for our sample) is equal to the true variance plus the error 
variance. The error variance is a measurement of the error and causes an observed 
score to differ from a true score. 
 
Variance observe = Variance true + Variance error 
 
Reliability = (Variance True) / (Variance Observed) 
 
Reliability can range from zero to one. When measuring human psychological 
characteristics, such as knowledge or ability, it is extremely difficult to develop tests 
with reliabilities above 0.90. (Blerkom 2009) It is quite difficult to measure the 
Variance True of any sample.  Reliability can be measured by several methods 
depending on how frequently the questionnaire is administered. If the questionnaire is 
administered more than once, a test-retest method can be used to assess the 
correlation between the sets of scores. In addition, multiple questionnaires for the 
same criteria but worded differently, can be developed to measure the same criteria 
and an alternate-form method can be used to assess the correlation between the two 
forms of the questionnaire. The final method to assess the reliability of the 
questionnaire is the split-half method that splits the responses into two halves and 
assessing their correlation.   
 
The split-half method results in measures given by the Spearman-Brown metric were 
used to measure the correlation between nominal variables for this research. 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is a revision to the Spearman-Brown formula to estimate 
the reliability of a questionnaire using the split-half method. To assess the reliability 




given once to respondents and the scale of measurement was ordinal. The values 
obtained and depicted in Table 4.3 are high for sections two, three and four with the 
questions in section one in the acceptable range of 0.50 – 0.60 suggested by Kaplan 
and Saccuzzo (1993). The values indicate that the questions utilized have a very high 
reliability to be reproduced or can be included in the questionnaire. Cronbach’s alpha 





Table 4.3 Cronbach’s Alpha Coefficients for the Data Collection Questionnaire 





Section 1       
Questions related to the years of experience with network 
administration, network security, FISMA and security assessment for 
the respondents 
22 4 0.519 
        
Section 2        
Questions related to validating the information system breakdown 
structure. 
22 8 0.911 
Questions related to the Entity-Relationship Diagram for the NIST 
Technical Controls 
22 20 0.914 
        
Section 3       
Questions related to the Risk Mitigation and Management Strategies for 
the Identification and Authentication Control Family 
22 37 0.913 
        
Section 4       





Chapter 5 Data Analysis and Results 
This chapter discusses the results obtained from the analyses of the data collected 
during the data collection effort. The chapter begins with descriptive statistics of the 
respondents, their expertise in network administration, network security, security 
assessments and FISMA. The descriptive analysis includes highlights the different 
organizations for which the respondents have performed security assessments in the 
past.   
 
This chapter also reviews factor analysis, and correlations for the information systems 
breakdown structure, the e-Government Relational Technical Control and salient risk 
mitigation and management practices gleamed during the data collection exercise. 
The results obtained from factor analysis, which were performed in order to 
determine the components that improve an information system security posture, the 
associations and correlations are highlighted.  
 
5.0 General Characteristics of Respondents 
The general information on the respondents, collected during the data collection effort 
include their current job title, job classification, expertise with Entity-Relationship 
diagrams, education, number of information assurance projects completed and years 
of experience with network administration, network security, FISMA and security 
assessment.  
 
Twenty-five responses were received for this data collection effort. One of them was 
rejected for having several incomplete sections for the questionnaire. Another 
response was rejected for improper markings (multiple answers to the same question 
that were pencil marked) and the third was rejected because it was received after the 
deadline for receipt of responses. The remaining twenty-two respondents were 





5.1 Job Classification and Education of the Respondents 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the highest level of education achieved by the respondents. Of 
the twenty-two respondents, one had a PhD degree, sixteen had Master of Science 
degrees and five had Bachelor of Science degrees. We observe that over 75% of the 




Figure 5.1 Highest Education Level of the Respondents 
 
The respondents were asked in the data collection questionnaire to select all the 
classifications that apply to their job title, from a list of project manager, information 
security contractor, network engineer, network administrator and other. Figure 5.2 
shows the rankings for the different job classifications selected by the respondents as: 




 Three Others – This was comprised of respondents with job titles of 
Programmer, Systems Project Analyst and Contract Security Officer (14%) 
 Two Network Engineers (9%) 
 Two Project Managers/Information Security Contractors/ Network 
Engineers/Network Administrators (9%) 
 A Project Manager (5%) 
 A Network Administrator (5%) 
 A Project Manager/Information Security Contractor (5%) 
 
We observe that fifty percent of the respondents classified themselves as exclusive 
Information Security Contractors. We also note that approximately seventy percent of 









Further decomposition of Figure 5.2 to see the educational composition of the 
different job classifications is shown in Figure 5.3. We observe that all the Bachelors 
Degree respondents have the exclusive job classification of Information Security 
Contractor. The remaining respondents had a Masters Degree or a PhD. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Respondent education and job function 
 
5.2 Re-Classification of the Respondents  
Figure 5.3 indicates that some respondents selected multiple job function 
classifications but for the analysis, the respondent job functions were reclassified 
from seven to the following four predominant groups: Information Security 
Contractor, Project Manager, Network Engineer/Administrator and Other. The 
priority for assignment of respondents that had multiple job classification was for 
them to be assigned in the following order: Information Security Contractor followed 
by Project Manager, Network Engineer/Administrator and then Other. The groups 




titled Network Engineer/Administrator. The reduced group of four job function 
classifications ensured that the expected frequency value for the twenty-two 
respondents would not be less than five, as this provides erratic results for SPSS.  
 
Four groups were selected as opposed to three or two groups because reviewing of the 
responses indicated the respondents could be categorized into one of the following 
four groups:  
- Information Security Contractor 
- Network Engineer/Administrator 
- Project Manager  
- Other 
 
It is important to note that Network Engineers and Network Administrators perform 
all the tasks of Information Security Contractors but on a smaller scale (typically for 
just one organization or a subset of the enterprise). This relationship is discussed in 
Chapter 2 of the literature review. In Federal agencies and Federal Government 
contractors, Network Engineers and Network Administrators managing systems have 
to meet the annual security assessment requirements of FISMA.  
 
Three of the respondents that classified themselves as ‘Other’ have job titles of 
Programmer, Systems Project Analyst and Contract Security Officer. The roles 
associated with these job titles are critical to the effective management of information 
assurance projects. Thus, the researcher could not justify excluding them from the 
research. 
 
The responses were analyzed to determine if there is a statistical significance in the 
number of respondents for the four groups. The chi square test for the null hypothesis 
(H0; the distribution of Information Security Contractors in the respondents for the 
data collection occurs with equal frequency) provided a (chi-square (3) = 22.364, 
p<.01). This means that the occurrence of the Information Security job function was 





For the responses to the question of the respondent’s expertise with entity relationship 
diagrams, a null hypothesis was developed stating “H0: the distribution of respondents 
with expertise interpreting entity-relationship diagrams occurs with equal frequency”. 
A significant deviation from the hypothesized values was found (chi-square (1) = 9.8, 
p<.01). The respondents were most likely to have expertise interpreting entity 
relationship diagrams.  
 
Questions of the field questionnaire asked respondents to indicate their years of 
experience with Network Administration, Network Security, FISMA and Security 
Assessment. Figure 5.4 indicates that 81% of the respondents have four or more years 
of experience with Network Administration. Figure 5.5 indicates that the respondents 
that have four or more years of experience with Network Security were 81%. Figures 
5.6 and 5.7 show that 59% of the respondents indicated that they had four or more 
years of experience with FISMA and Security Assessment. Next, we will examine the 
variation of the expertise of the respondents. 
 






Figure 5.5 Job Classifications vs. Network Security Experience 
 





Figure 5.7 Job Classifications vs. Security Assessment Experience 
 
Each of the four variables: Network Administration, Network Security, FISMA and 
Security Assessment were dichotomized into four dummy variables containing two 
groups. One group had three or less years of experience while the other group had 
four or more years of experience. Bivariate correlation was performed for the four 
dichotomized groups and a summary of the results is shown in Table 5.1. We note 
that there is a highly significant (p<.01) and a high correlations between the variables 
Dummy FISMA Experience and the Dummy Security Assessment Experience 
(0.812). The Dummy Security Assessment Variable and the Dummy FISMA 
Experience showed equal correlation (0.478) and significance (p<0.05) with the 
Dummy Network Security Experience. We also observed that the Dummy Network 




















Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .478* .156 .478* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .025 .488 .025 
N 22 22 22 22 
Dummy Sec. 
Ass. Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient .478* 1.000 -.153 .812** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 . .498 .000 
N 22 22 22 22 
Dummy Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient .156 -.153 1.000 .087 
Sig. (2-tailed) .488 .498 . .700 
N 22 22 22 22 
Dummy 
FISMA Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient .478* .812** .087 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .000 .700 . 
N 22 22 22 22 
       
 
How do we explain all these correlations or lack thereof between the four levels of 
expertise of the respondents?  
1. Network administrators do not typically perform the job functions of network 
security, FISMA and security assessments.  This is the case because network 
administrators usually resolve problems related to computers and their 
associated users whereas network security job functions usually includes 
administration of the network infrastructure, that consists of switches, routers, 
Cisco PIX firewalls etc. 
2. Experts who had job assignments related to implementation and management of 
FISMA requirements were also typically responsible for performing security 
assessments. 
3. Network security experts sometimes had job assignments that involved FISMA 
and security assessment.  
 
Table 5.2 shows the null hypothesis test results to determine if the respondents’ years 




assessments were significant. Based on the results we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis for the network administration and network security years of experience 
for the respondents. The FISMA and security assessments years of experience for the 
respondents reject the null hypothesis with four to eight years of experience being 
significant (p<0.01). 
 
Table 5.2 Hypothesis Test for the Experience of the Respondents 
 
5.3 Job function and Entity-Relationship Diagram Expertise 
Of the twenty-two responses received only 20 answered the question on whether they 
had expertise with entity-relationship (E-R) diagrams. Figure 5.8 show three 
respondents (one from each job function category) had no experience with Entity 






Figure 5.8 Respondent Experience with Entity-Relationship Diagrams 
 
Statistically the respondents for the different job categories should balance out for the 
different categories of Information Security Contractor, Network Engineer and Other. 
A statistical comparison of responses for experience with E-R diagrams is depicted in 
Table 5.3. We observe that we can reject the null hypothesis and accept that the 
number of respondents with expertise interpreting E-R diagrams as significant at 
p<0.01.  To alleviate the issue of respondents not having expertise with E-R 
diagrams, the interview items were worded so that respondents did not need to have 
any experience with E-R Diagrams to decide if they agree or disagree with a 






Table 5.3 Null Hypothesis Test for Experience with E-R Diagrams 
 
5.4 Surveyed Information Assurance Projects 
This section discusses the characteristics of the information assurance projects 
completed by the respondents. Of the twenty-two respondents surveyed, two 
respondents did not answer the question on the number of information assurance 
projects completed. The total projects completed by the respondents is 432 with a 
mean of 21.6 projects and a standard deviation of 31.0. Three modes occurred at three 
projects, six projects and ten project points for the respondents.   
 
There appears to be a discrepancy in the predominant number of years they have 
performed security assessment (3-8 years) and the number of projects for which the 
respondents have performed security assessment. Discussion with the respondents 
revealed that even though some of them have performed multiple security 
assessments, it was always for the same agency, so they counted the number of 
projects as one. I realized that given that my respondents had multiple years of 
experience with the same agency. A better question to ask would have been ‘How 
many times have the respondents performed security assessments?’ Given the 
confusion associated with this question, the metric of number of years performing 






Some of the Federal Government Agencies and organizations for which the 
respondents have performed security assessment include: 
1. Department of Defense 
2. Department of Homeland Security 
3. Department of Education 
4. United States Patent and Trademark Office 
5. Federal Aviation Administration 
6. Drug Enforcement Agency 
7. Department of Health and Human Services 
8. Department of Treasury 
9. Center for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
10. State of Florida 
11. Environmental Protection Agency 
12. Department of Labor 
13. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
14. General Service Administration 
15. NASA 
16. Executive Office of the President 
17. US Capitol Police 
18. Department of Interior (US Geological Survey) 
19. US Department of Agriculture 
20. Bank Of America 
 
5.5 Analysis of Respondent Certifications 
Of the twenty-two respondents, thirteen had industry-recognized certificates for 
information security or a related field. Eleven of the thirteen respondents holding 
industry recognized certificate also had Masters Degrees and the remaining two had 
Bachelor Degrees.  
 
Table 5.4 shows the number and types of certificates held by the thirteen 




We must note that over half of the respondents had a Degree and an industry-
recognized security certificate.  
 
The biggest groups (50%) of respondents with industry-recognized certificates are 
Masters Degree holders with four to eight years of experience in the information 
assurance industry. This is reflected in the excellent feedback they provided on the 
survey questions and the models being validated.  
 
Table 5.4 Respondent Certificate for the different degrees held. 
 
Education of the Respondents 


















CISSP 1 1 2 
CISSP, MCSE 1 0 1 
CISSP, PMP 0 1 1 
CISSP, PMP, GSNA, NASA-IAM 1 0 1 
CISSP, PMP, ITIL 1 0 1 
CISSP, PMP, NSA-IAM 1 0 1 
CISSP, Security+, ITIL 1 0 1 
MCSE 2 0 2 
MCSE, PMP, CCNA, CCNP 1 0 1 
MCSE, Security + 1 0 1 
PMP 1 0 1 






5.6 Information System Breakdown Structure Analysis 
This section analyses the responses to questions from Section 2.0 of the data 
collection questionnaire that were intended to assess the value of the information 
systems breakdown structure that was developed as part of this research. The question 
assessed the following eight characteristics of the ISBS: 
1. The sub-categories for the information system breakdown structure (Item 18) 
2. The components for the computers sub-category (Item 19) 
3. The components for the network infrastructure sub-category (Item 20) 
4. The components for the personal digital assistant sub-category (Item 21) 
5. The components for the imaging devices sub-category (Item 22) 
6. The components for the other devices sub-category (Item 23) 
7. The generic sub-components for the different components (Item 24) 
8. The value of using the ISBS to identify organizational system assets (Item 25) 
 
Eight positive summary statements were listed for the different characteristics and 
respondents were requested to indicate to what degree they agree with each statement 
using a four-point Likert scale that ranged from strongly disagree, disagree, agree and 
strongly agree. Scale ranking, recoding, chi-square test and nonparametric tests were 
performed on the responses. The procedure, findings and relevant discussions of the 
analyses follows. 
 
5.7 Information System Breakdown Structure Scale Ranking 
Table C17 in Appendix C shows the mean, mode and median values of the responses 
to Section 2.0 that contains items 18 to 25 of the data collection questionnaire. The 
mean ranges from 3.14 to 3.36 with a median and modal score of 3. The PDA Sub-
Category had two sets of modes being 3 and 4. The values of using the ISBS had the 
highest score of 3.36 while the other sub-category had a value of 3.14. This implies 
that on average the respondents did agree with the statements provided in the 
questionnaire and believe that using an ISBS when performing security assessment is 




respondents strongly agree with, we can say that a majority of the respondent strongly 
agree with the following statements for the ISBS: 
1. The components identified for the personal digital assistants sub-category are 
sufficient to identify information systems for this sub-category  
2. The components identified for the imaging devices sub-category are sufficient to 
identify information systems for this sub-category  
 
The ‘Other’ sub-category had the lowest score of 3.14. This may be because it is the 
catchall for components that do not fit into the computers, network infrastructure, 
PDA or imaging devices sub-categories.  
 
5.8 Information System Breakdown Structure Factor Analysis  
The four categories of strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree were 
dichotomized into two groups named agree and disagree and a null hypothesis was 
develop for each of the statements and tested using Chi-square analysis to determine 
if there was significant difference between those who agreed and those who 
disagreed in the responses. The results of the Chi-square analysis are shown in Table 
C26 and the summary null Hypothesis table of the results is shown in Table 5.6. 
Based on the summary results, we can reject the null hypothesis at 99%  (p < 0.01) 
confidence level and state that the number of respondents that agree with the positive 
statements of the information system breakdown structure are statistically significant 
compared to those that disagree. 
 
Table 5.5 displays respondent feedback for the ISBS and the researcher’s comments 






Table 5.5 Respondent Feedback and Researchers’ Comments 
# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
1. “I think the breakdown structure 
could cause confusion to some, but, if 
trained on properly, could be very 
useful. One of the biggest advantages 
I see is the assignment of 
responsibility. Determining system 
boundaries and ownership of data, 
system components, etc., is one of the 
most critical aspects of IT Security 
and C&A to me. So, I think a 
breakdown structure like this would 
greatly aid in defining those 
boundaries.” 
The use of a breakdown structure is not as 
common in the information security industry 
as it is in project management. Also the 
organizational breakdown structure can be 
matrix with the ISBS to assign responsibility 
for the different system boundaries. 
 
C&A stands for certification and 
accreditation, which is an internal process 
that organizations may perform to attest to 
the security posture of their systems. The 
CIO of the organization usually signs the 
C&A statement. 
2. “a fantastic representation that I could 
use as part of an assessment project. 
Very clever.” 
The purpose for developing the model for the 
ISBS. 
3. “Perhaps recognition of data (type of 
data) would be useful throughout that 
recognizes what may be stored or 
transmitted by a device.” 
The assessment of data that may be stored on 
the different information systems is outside 
the scope of this research. Other than for the 
network infrastructure, data tends to be 
organization-specific, so a generic 
classification of data will need a different 
assessment tool from that used in this 
research. 
 
From some of the feedback and analysis conducted on the responses, we can see that 
there is a generally-expressed agreement on the usefulness of the ISBS and that 
coupling it with an assignment matrix would prove invaluable to some of the 




organization-specific as it depends on the size of the organization – See chapter 2. 
The use of the organizational breakdown structure is prevalent in project management 
and it is used to assign responsibility for tasks when matrixed with a work breakdown 
structure.  




5.9 e-Government Relational Technical Controls Analysis  
This section analyzes the responses to questions from Section 2.1 and contains items 
27 to 50 of the data collection questionnaire. These items were developed to assess 
the relationships of the e-Government Relational Technical Control model that were 
developed as part of this research. The items assess the relationships between the 
following entities: 
 
1. Users/Processes Entity and the Identification and Authentication (IA) Entity 
(Items 27 – 30) 
2. System/Devices and the IA Entity (Items 32 – 35) 
3. IA and Access Control (AC) Entity (Items 37 – 40) 
4. AC and the Audit (AU) Entity (Items 42 – 45) 
5. AU and the System and Communications Protection Entity (Items 47 – 50) 
 
For each entity set, four statements were made about the relationships between the 
entities and the respondent was asked to indicate by selecting check boxes, to what 
degree they agree or disagree with the statements. A four-point Likert scale of 
strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree was used for the questionnaire. 
The respondents were provided with the option to provide feedback for any 
statements they strongly disagree or disagree with. Scale ranking, recoding, chi-
square test and nonparametric tests were performed on the responses and the 
procedures, findings and relevant discussions of the analyses follows. 
 
5.10 e-Government Relational Technical Controls Scale Ranking 
Table C51 in Appendix C shows the mean, median and mode values of the responses 
to items 27 to 50 of the data collection questionnaire. The mean ranged from 3.05 to 
3.77 with modal scores of 3’s and 4’s and median scores of 3, 3.5 and 4. Items 39, 43 
and 45 were multi-modal with modes of 3 and 4. The relationship for item 27 that 
specifies that each user should have a unique identifier for authentication in an 
information system had the highest mean score of 3.77. The item with the least mean 




authenticate users/processes (i.e. it authenticates only systems and devices). These 
two items are opposing and appear to be on alternate sides of the mean. Using a 4.0 
mode to identify statements that the majority of the respondents strongly agree with, 
we can say that the majority of the respondents strongly agree with the following 
statements for the e-Government Relational Technical Control E-R diagram: 
1. Each User/Process should have a unique identifier for authentication in an 
information system 
2. Users/Processes should be restricted to a single user/process id.  
3. An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of multiple 
users/processes. 
4. A system/device should have a unique identifier for authentication in an 
information system 
5. An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of multiple 
systems/devices 
6. Authenticated identifiers must be granted access to an information system 
7. The access control entity should control the access of at least one 
authenticated identifier 
8. The access control entity should be capable of managing the access of 
multiple authentication identifiers 
9. The access control entity must create an audit event record 
10. The access control entity may create multiple audit events 
11. The audit and accountability entity must audit an access control entity 
12. The audit and accountability entity may audit multiple access control entities 
13. The audit and accountability entity should feed to a system and 
communications protection entity 
14. The system and communications protection entity must monitor an audit 
entity 
 
Another relationship that may be of interest to explore is that users may have 
multiple identifiers for the same information system. This was not performed in the 




assessment can be performed in future research. Based on the mean, mode and 
median scores for all items on this section of the questionnaire being three or higher, 
we can say that on average the respondents were in agreement with the relationships 
expressed in the model. 
 
5.11 e-Government Relational Technical Controls Factor Analysis 
The four categories of strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree were 
dichotomized into two groups named agree and disagree and a null hypothesis was 
developed for each of the relationships between the entities and tested using Chi-
square analysis to determine if there was significant difference between those who 
agreed and those who disagreed with the statements. The results of the Chi-square 
analysis are shown in Table C52. A summary null hypothesis table of the results is 
shown in Table C62 (in Appendix C). Based on the summary results we can reject the 
null hypothesis at 95%  (p < 0.05) confidence level and state that the number of 
respondents that agree with the positive statements of the e-Government Relational 
Technical Control Model are statisitically significant. 
           
Some of the dichotomized items converged on respondents’ agreement with the 
statements and yielded a constant for which Chi-Square could not be calculated. 
Items that displayed a convergence for the responses include the following 
statements: 
1. Each User/Process should have a unique identifier for authentication in an 
information system. 
2. An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of 
multiple users/processes. 
3. A System/Device should have a unique identifier for authentication in an 
information system. 
4. An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of 
multiple systems/devices.  
5. The access control entity should be capable of managing the access of 




6. The access control entity must create an audit event record. 
7. The access control entity may create multiple audit events. 
8. The audit and accountability entity may audit multiple access control entities. 
 
Table C64 (in Appendix C) displays respondent feedback for the relationships 
between the entities and the researcher’s comments on the concerns/statements made 
by the respondent.  
 
From the feedback, we see recommendations that explore the option for users to have 
multiple IDs based on their roles within the organization based on the different job 
functions they have to support. This item appears to be one of the issues that provided 
some of the most interesting feedback for the research. 
 
5.12 Identification and Authentication Risk Management Analysis 
This section analyses the responses to questions from Section 3 of the data collection 
questionnaire to assess the value of existing risk mitigation strategies that are based 
on the attributes of the identification and authentication entity. This analysis will 
identify those attributes that respondents believe are most effective in mitigating risks 
associated with the identification and authentication entity. The items in Section 3 
analyzed the risk controls for the following seven identification and authentication 
attributes to determine which are effective and which should be discarded, modified 
or reconfigured for inclusion in the e-Government Relational Technical Controls E-R 
Diagram: 
1. Identification and authentication of organizational users (IA-2) 
2. Device identification and authentication (IA-3) 
3. Identifier management (IA-4) 
4. Authenticator management (IA-5) 
5. Authenticator feedback (IA-6) 
6. Cryptographic module authentication (IA-7) 





The first twenty-four items in the data collection covered statements related to the IA-
2 to IA-5 security controls and asked the respondents to indicate to what degree they 
disagree or agree with each of the statements using a four-point Likert scale that 
ranged from strongly disagree, disagree, agree and strongly agree. The next two items 
were related to identifying durations for disabling user account and changing user 
passwords for IA-4 and IA-5 controls respectively. These were followed by five 
questions specific to the IA-5 control. The section closes with three items related to 
the IA-6, IA-7 and IA-8 families. All the questions were interspersed with the option 
for respondents to provide feedback on statements or questions they strongly disagree 
and disagree with. 
 
Scale ranking, recoding, chi-square test and nonparametric tests were performed on 
the responses and the procedures, findings and relevant discussion of the analyses 
follows. 
 
5.13 IA Risk Management Scale Ranking 
The identification and authentication control family were analyzed for scale ranking 
and the detailed results are available in Tables C53 to C57 of Appendix C. A 
summary of those calculations is shows in Table 5.7. Questions on the Four-point 
Likert Scale had an average range of 3.05 to 3.68 for respondents that agreed with the 
statements provided. The lowest score of 3.05 was on the issues of using MAC 
addresses for identification and authentication of systems and devices while the 
highest score of 3.68 was on the need to uniquely identify users, processes, system 
and devices.  
 
The lowest score for using MAC address for identification and authentication of 
system and devices is expected because hackers can spoof MAC addresses. The 
option of having systems and devices uniquely identified using other means is 
preferred over using the MAC address of the system. In addition, the requirement for 
users and processes having unique identifiers have been around in the information 




modal mark was three with select items showing multi-modal characteristics with 3 
and 4 as the multi-modal marks. 
 
Using a 4.0 mode to identify statements with which the majority of the respondents 
strongly agree. We can say that the majority of the respondents strongly agree with 
the following statements for the identification and authentication risk management 
strategy: 
1. The identifier management and access control entities should be 
integrated for managing access to applications residing on the 
information system as well as  the information system 
2. The use of multi-factor authentication increases the security posture of 
information systems 
3. Having one of the factors of multi-factor authentication provided by a 
device separate from the information system accessed improves the 
security posture of the information system 
4. Users, processes, systems and devices must be uniquely identified to an 
information system 
5. Limiting the reuse of authenticators for users/processes improves the 
security posture of information systems 
6. The used of automated tools to determine the strength of authenticators 
to resist attacks improves the security posture of information systems 
7. Employing the use of single sign-on improves the security posture of 
information systems 
8. The use of cryptographic modules during authentication improves the 
security posture of information systems 
9. The period of inactivity before a user account is disabled should be 61 to 
90 days 
10. Authenticators (or passwords) should be changed/refreshed every 61 to 
90 days 





12. The minimum password characters should be between eight and ten 
characters 
13. Security authenticators should be capable of the following 
characteristics 
a. Ensuring passwords are case sensitive 
b. Exceed a certain number of characters 
c. Including both upper and lower case letters 
d. Requiring the use of numbers 
e. Requiring the use of special characters 
f. Having a minimum requirement set for passwords 
 
Table 5.7 Summary of the IA Risk Management Scale Ranking Results 
# Control ID Question Type Range of Means Modes 
1. IA-2 Four-point Likert Scale (Items 52-58) 3.36 – 3.5 3 
2. IA-3 Four-point Likert Scale (Items 60 – 63) 3.05 – 3.45 3 
3. IA-4 Four-point Likert Scale (Items 65 – 68) 3.23 – 3.68 3 & 4 
4. IA-5 Four-point Likert Scale (Items 70 – 78) 3.05 – 3.55 3 & 4 
5. IA – 4/5 Five-point Ordinal Scale (Items 79 & 80) 2.64 – 2.68 
(different scale) 
3 
6. IA-5 Four-point & Five-point Ordinal Scale 
(Items 81 & 82) 
2.23 – 2.27 
(different scale) 
2 
7. IA-5 Yes/No Nominal Scale (Item 83) 0.68 – 1 
(different scale) 
1 
8. IA-6 Four-point Likert Scale (Item 85) 3.41 3 
9. IA-7 Four-point Likert Scale (Item 86) 3.64 4 






5.14 IA Risk Management Factor Analysis 
The items that used a four point Likert scale were dichotomized into two groups of 
agree and disagree. A null hypothesis was developed for the dichotomized variables 
and then tested using Chi-square and Binomial tests to determine if there was 
significant difference between those who agree and disagree in the responses. The 
results of the tests are shown in Table C58. The following risk management strategies 
for the identification and authentication control family received the approval of all 
respondents and indicated a convergence of knowledge for the following industry 
best practices: 
- The identification and authentication control family should be used to manage 
identifier generators for an information system. 
- The identifier management and the access control entities should be integrated for 
managing access to applications (residing on the information system) and the 
information system 
- Authenticators should make use of time synchronous or challenge-response one-time 
authenticators  
- Authenticators should use bidirectional authentication between devices  
- Users, processes, systems and devices must be uniquely identified to an information 
system 
- User identifiers should be disabled for an organization-defined period of inactivity  
(the range was 61 – 90 days) 
- Identifier generators should limit the reuse of authenticators for users & processes  
- Organizations must establish and implement a maximum period before requiring a 
password change  (the recommended period was found to be 61 to 90 days) 
- When logging on to the information system, feedback during authentication should be 
obscured 
 
The dichotomized questionnaire item 76 that relates to the use of single sign-on is not 
significant at the 95% (p < 0.05) confidence level. Table C65 (in Appendix C) depicts 





Based on the results of the Chi-Square and Binomial Tests we can state that at the 
99% confidence level we can make the following statements for the identification and 
authentication control risk management strategies that effectively improve the 
security posture of information systems: 
1. Authenticated user/process IDs should be granted access to the information 
system 
2. Use of multi-factor authentication for information systems  
3. Identifier generators should be capable of multi-factor authentication 
4. Have one of the factors of multi-factor authentication provided by a device 
separate from the information system being accessed  
5. System/device IDs should be centrally managed by an information system 
6. Use IP addresses for identification and authentication of devices and systems  
7. Prevent the reuse of user, process, system or device identifiers  
8. Employ user identifiers that do not match the email address of users  
9. Limit the reuse of authenticators for users and processes  
10. Establish a minimum period before requiring a password change  
11. Use automated tools to determine the strength of authenticators to resist 
attacks  
12. Use unique authenticators (or passwords) for different information systems  
13. Use one-time passwords  
14. Restrict the number of accounts individuals have on multiple information 
systems  
15. The duration before authenticators are changed should be in the range of 
sixty one to ninety days. 
16. The minimum number of characters for passwords should be between eight 
and ten characters 
17. Password authenticators should be case sensitive 
18. Passwords should consist of upper and lower case letters 
19. Passwords should consist of special characters 




21. Non organizational users of the system should be authenticated to 
information systems 
 
At the 95% confidence level, we can make the following statement about factors that 
improve the security posture of information systems for the identification and 
authentication control risk management: 
1. Use MAC address for identification and authentication of devices and systems 
 
Some of the salient feedback received from the respondents for this section of the 
questionnaire is discussed in Table C66. 
 
5.15 User/Process Entity & IA Attributes Association/Correlation 
The user/process entity and the identification and authentication risk management 
strategies were assessed to identify any association or correlation. The results of the 
association and correlation tests for the variables are documented in the cross cells for 
the two variables of Table C67 (in Appendix C). The Somers’d and Gamma values 
and their corresponding significance were calculated to establish associations where 
as the Spearman rho was calculated to establish a correlation between the variables. 
The cells highlighted in yellow cells show the variables that were significantly 
associated and correlated, while the pink cells show those that are significantly 
associated without any significant correlations. These values further validated the 
relationships between the user/process entity and its corresponding risk management 
strategies. 
 
5.16 System/Device Entity & IA Attributes Association/Correlation 
The system/device entity and the identification and authentication risk management 
strategies were assessed to identify any association or correlation. The results of the 
association and correlations tests for the variables are documented in the cross cells 
for the two variables of Table C68. The Somers’d and Gamma values and their 




Spearman rho was calculated to establish a correlation between the variables. The 
cells highlighted in yellow cells show the variables that were significantly associated 
and correlated, while the pink cells show those that are significantly associated but 
without any significant correlations. These values further validated the relationships 
between the system/devices entity and its corresponding risk management strategies. 
 
5.17 IA Security Assessment Cost Calculations Assumptions  
The following assumptions were made for the development of the cost model for the 
security assessment of the identification and authentication control family: 
1. The maximum duration for performing the different tasks for the assessments 
is eight hours.  
2. When calculating the duration for performing the different tasks, we will use 
the upper limits for the tasks to get conservative estimates. 
3. The probabilities for the contributions of the different tasks shall be based on 
the frequency they were selected by the respondents. 
4. The organization allows invoicing in tenths of an hour. 
The duration for performing these tasks and their corresponding probabilities 
are shown in tables 5.8, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11. 
 
5.18 IA Security Assessment Cost Model Analysis 
In this section, we will determine how much to bid on a project to assess the 
identification and authentication control, given that the tasks involved include: 
1. Assessment of identification and authentication documents 
2. Interviews of the pertinent IA organizational stakeholders 
3. Testing of the identification and authentication controls in place 







Table 5.8 Duration & Probabilities for Assessing the IA Security Documents 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <=1 1 5.0 5.0 
2-3 7 35.0 40.0 
4-5 4 20.0 60.0 
6-7 3 15.0 75.0 
>=8 5 25.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0  
Table 5.9 Duration & probability for conducting interviews of IA personnel 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <=1 3 15.0 15.0 
2-3 6 30.0 45.0 
4-5 4 20.0 65.0 
6-7 7 35.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0  
 
Table 5.10 Duration and probabilities for testing of the IA security controls 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <=1 3 15.0 15.0 
2-3 7 35.0 50.0 
4-5 4 20.0 70.0 
6-7 5 25.0 95.0 
>=8 1 5.0 100.0 






Table 5.11 Duration and probabilities for developing the IA security reports 
 
Frequency Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid <=1 1 5.0 5.0 
2-3 4 20.0 25.0 
4-5 5 25.0 50.0 
6-7 6 30.0 80.0 
>=8 4 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0  
 







We want to determine if the respondents who answered eight hours or greater is 
significant, so we dichotomize the ranges into two groups consisting of the following: 
- Group 1 (<=1, 2-3, 4-5 an 6-7) 
- Group 2 (>=9) 
 
A test of the null hypothesis shows that the Group 1 items are significant at the 95% 
confidence to reject the null hypothesis. The calculations for the Chi-Square test and 






Table 5.12 Chi-Square Test for a different between Group 1 and Group 2 
 
D89 Duration to 
assess IA 
documents 
D91 Duration to 
test IA controls 
D92 Duration to 
develop IA 
report 
Chi-square 5.000a 16.200a 6.368b 
df 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. .025 .000 .012 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 
expected cell frequency is 10.0. 
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum 






Table 5.13 Hypothesis Tests for significance between Groups 1 & 2 
 
Table C60 shows a Bayesian probability calculation based for the duration of the 
different tasks for a maximum, minimum and median is with the maximum durations 
as follows: 
 
- IA Document assessments (5.2 hrs) 
- IA Interview of the stakeholders (4.5 hrs) 
- IA Control Tests (4.4 hrs) 
- IA Report Development (5.6) 
 
Most of the respondents chose not to provide this data and those that did provide this 
data provided an hourly rates range of $35/hr to $250/hr. We observe the large 
variation because the pilot test was not worded properly so some respondents were 
providing their individual pay rate instead of the rate their organizations charge for 





The hourly rates charge by organizations is approximately $125/hr. This was obtained 
from speaking with industry experts and looking up the GSA schedule rate for hourly 
billing of information security contractors.  The rate could range from $125/hr to 
$250/hr depending on the level of expertise, credentials and skill set of the 
information security contractor. 
 
The consensus from respondents was that the average is somewhere around 
$125/hour. We note that the median cost of performing security assessment for the 
identification and authentication control family is: 
 
Sum of the hours for all tasks * hourly rate = (5.2 + 4.5 + 4.4 + 5.6) * 125 = 





Chapter 6: Baldrige National Quality Program Case 
Study 
 
6.1 Data Collection and Reliability of the Case Study 
The data collection for the case study addressed the issue of reliability by 
triangulation. The researcher reviewed the case study documentation, conducted an 
informal interview with pertinent personnel and then developed a report that was 
discussed with pertinent personnel to validate the contents of the report.  
 
6.2 Baldrige National Quality Program Case Study 
Background 
The Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award is one of the highest recognition that 
a US organization may achieve. The goal of this award is to increase US businesses 
competitiveness in the global market place and ensure the economic security of US 
organizations. Traditionally, the award is presented annually by the President of the 
United States to organizations that have excelled in the quality of their products or 
services.  
 
President Ronald Reagan made this comment about the award program: “America’s 
economic strength depends on industry’s ability to improve productivity and quality 
and to remain on the cutting edge of technology, and that’s why the Malcolm 
Baldrige National Quality Award is so important.” Other presidents, including 
George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton and George W. Bush have shared similar 
sentiments. The typical areas that the award covers include business, education, 
health care and nonprofit organizations. It is important that we note that these 
organizations cannot have economic security without having secure information 
systems.  
 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology manages the Baldrige National 




successful performance and quality strategies with other US organizations at the 
annual Quest for Excellence Conference. The rigorous process of applying for the 
award helps organizations align their processes and resources with their 
organizational goals and objectives. It also helps organizations engage their 
workforce and customers in continuous improvement dialogue. At the end of the 
assessment, organizations that apply for the award are provided with a detailed 
feedback report based on evaluation of their organization by specially trained experts. 
 
The seven categories against which organizations are assessed include the following: 
 Leadership 
 Strategic Planning 
 Customer Focus 
 Measurement, Analysis and Knowledge Management 
 Workforce Focus 
 Process Management 
 Results 
 
Of the seven categories, the Measurement, Analysis and Knowledge Management 
category is of the most interest to this research. The category of Measurement, 
Analysis and Knowledge Management contains the sub-category of Management of 
Information, Knowledge and Information Technology, which is the subject of this 
case study. The sub-category has 45 points of the total 1000 points for the entire 
assessment. This sub-category assesses how organizations manage information, 
organizational knowledge and information technology.  
 
Management of Information, Knowledge and Information Technology 
The primary task for the Management of Information, Knowledge and Information 




1. Describe HOW your organizations ensure the quality and availability of 
needed data, information, software, and hardware for your WORKFORCE, 
suppliers, PARTNERS, COLLABORATORS, and CUSTOMERS 
2. Describe HOW your organization builds and manages its KNOWLEDGE 
ASSETS. 
 
Guidelines for answering these two questions call for applicants to provide evidence 
that relates to these areas: 
a. Data, Information, and Knowledge Management and; 
b. Management of Information Resources and Technology 
 
Data, Information and Knowledge Management 
This area requires applicants to delineate how they ensure their organizational data, 
information and knowledge is accurate, timely, available and accessible to their 
stakeholders while meeting the requirements for integrity, reliability, security and 
confidentiality. It also calls for organizations to highlight how they collect and 
transfer knowledge to pertinent stakeholders, rapidly identify, share and implement 
best practices that support the organization’s strategic goals.  
 
Management of Information Resources and Technology 
This area calls for organizations to explain how they ensure that hardware and 
software are reliable, secure and user-friendly. It also looks at the business continuity 
plans of organizations and their strategic plans for maintaining a competitive 
advantage on information technology.   
 
6.3 Baldrige National Quality Program - Research Application 
The Management of Information, Knowledge and Technology sub-category calls for 
organizations to delineate how they ensure the confidentiality, availability and 
integrity of their data, information and information technology resources. This call is 




documents. We can argue that this convergence in requirements is partly due to NIST 
being responsible for the successful implementation of both programs for 
organizations. The two programs may be affected by a concentration of knowledge. 
 
The e-Government Relational Technical Controls Taxonomy that is comprises of the 
ISBS model and the e-Government Relational Technical Controls Model could help 
organizations meet the requirements of the Baldrige National Quality Program by 
helping them: 
 Identify hardware and their related software resources by documenting them 
in the ISBS 
 Depict how hardware and software are managed by developing a 
responsibility assignment that consists of a matrix between the organizational 
breakdown structure and the ISBS  
 Depict the source and destination of data/information that is shared between 
the organization and its pertinent stakeholders  
 Utilize the ISBS to identify the location of data and information stored on the 
resources and their corresponding security classifications 
 Utilize the ISBS to show the partitioning and mappings of their  operations 
environment to their backup site and how the organization ensures business 
continuity 
 Manage the confidentiality, availability and integrity risk of their data, 
information and information systems 
 
The Management of Information, Knowledge and Information Technology has direct 
relevance to the e-Government Relational Technical Controls Taxonomy. This 
taxonomy can help organizations better understand their information technology 





Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in formulating the research, summarizes 
the key findings and addresses the research limitations and recommendations for 
future work. 
 
7.0 Research Summary 
This section discusses the summary of the findings of the research. FISMA and the 
use of the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3, has improved the way organizations practice 
information assurance. The NIST SP 800-53 has limitations that result in the 
following issues: 
1. Fifteen security controls were withdrawn from the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 
released in August 2009 
2. The security controls are documented in a generic format that is not specific to 
any particular information systems. This often results in security assessment 
teams addressing controls that only apply to email servers to routers when 
performing security assessments. The controls have not been customized for the 
information system landscape. 
3. There is a waste of resources (time and money) associated with performing 
security assessments using the hierarchical structure of the NIST SP 800-53, 
which is not specific to an information system 
4. There is no real-time tool that can be used to identify information systems and 
map the assignment of responsibility to the associated information systems and 
data stored on the systems 
5. There is no documented evidence that the knowledge base of information security 
contractors has been surveyed to assess the value of the identification and 
authentication security controls in mitigating risks to an organizational 
information system. 
 
Often when project managers consider risks to a project, they only consider risks 




they consider risks associated with information systems. The literature review 
indicates that these risks are real and can significantly affect the success of a project. 
Project environments are pervaded with information systems that facilitate 
communication, reporting and collaboration between teams. The literature indicates 
that risks associated with the use of information systems should be addressed, or else 
their likelihood of derailing a project increases. 
 
The research was conducted to answer the following questions: 
1. Can we develop an e-Government Technical Controls Relational taxonomy for 
Federal Government Information Assurance Contractors? 
2. What are some effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
Identification and Authentication Security Control Family? 
3. What are the associated cost calculations for performing security assessment of 
the Identification and Authentication Security Control Family?  
 
This research developed a ISBS model that can be used for identification of 
information system resources for a project or organization while providing a 
relational approach to security assessments. e-Government Relational Technical 
Security Controls model entity-relationship and positive risk management statements 
for the identification and authentication control family were developed. The e-
Government Relational Technical Controls model is an entity relationship diagram 
that is comprised of entities, their attributes and the relationships between them. To 
alleviate the likelihood of “garbage-in garbage-out”, there was a need to validate the 
attributes of the identification and authentication control family to identify effective 
risk mitigation and management strategies. 
 
The researcher also developed a cost model for establishing the baseline cost of 
performing security assessment for the identification and authentication control 
family. This results in reduced time and cost savings when performing security 




be addressed. In addition, risk mitigation and management strategies for the 
identification and authentication control family are assessed. 
 
7.1 Information System Breakdown Structure Model Conclusion 
A comprehensive literature review was performed coupled with several unstructured 
interviews of information security contractors to identify some of the challenges 
plaguing Federal information assurance contractors. Based on the information 
obtained, a model for an information system breakdown structure (ISBS) model.  
 
The ISBS model is hierarchical and composed of a category, sub-categories, 
components and sub-components. The ISBS can be further decomposed to the 
module and the sub-module levels but this level or decomposition is outside the scope 
of the research. 
 
The models and statements developed were documented in a questionnaire that 
resulted in twenty-two responses from information security experts and other security 
practitioners. The research findings recommend that the ISBS should be considered a 
living tool and should be customized for a project or organization with the goal of 
identifying and managing sources of project information system risks.   
 
The ISBS can be matrixed with the project WBS to identify which information 
systems are required for successfully completing the tasks.  This is especially 
important for managing risks associated with tasks that are on the critical path and 
heavily dependent on information systems. After identifying the most critical 
information system resources and those that are required for tasks on the critical path, 
the ISBS should be used as a collaborative tool to identify suitable risk management 
strategies for the affected information system.   
 
The risk mitigation and management strategies can be used to develop a backup plan, 




organizational level. Information system resources that do not have a backup plan and 
are not included in the business continuity plan or the disaster recovery plan should, 
have information system risk mitigation and management plan develop at the project 
level. 
 
Feedback received during the validation of the ISBS model stated, “One of the 
biggest advantages I see is the assignment of responsibility. Determining system 
boundaries and ownership of data, system components, etc is one of the most critical 
aspects of IT Security and C&A to me. So, I think a breakdown structure like this 
would greatly aid in defining those boundaries.” This feedback indicates that the 
ISBS could also be used for assigning project responsibility when performing security 
assessments. This is accomplished by creating a matrix of the ISBS and the project 
organizational breakdown structure. Organizations may choose to use the ISBS to 
assign responsibility for organizational information systems. Depending on the level 
of criticality of the project, a scorecard could be developed to track the health of 
critical project and organizational information systems. 
 
One of the first steps when performing security categorizations is to determine the 
Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199 security categorization of the 
systems. The FIPS 199 security categorization involves classifying the security of the 
information system into a high, moderate or low category. This determines the type 
and amount of security controls that must be applied to a system. The ISBS can be 
used to perform FIPS 199 security classification of information systems and to 
evaluate how the categorization of one system may affect other systems and the best 
way to partition systems based on their security categorizations. Different ISBSs can 
be developed based on the security categorizations of the systems.  
 
Another feedback that leads to the identification of an alternative use of the ISBS is 
“Perhaps recognition of data (type of data) would be useful throughout that 
recognizes what may be stored or transmitted by a device.” The ISBS can be used as 




systems in use on a project or by an organization with the goal of determining not 
only their security categorization but also for the development of business continuity 
and backup plans. Another option would be to develop a data breakdown structure 
that maps to the ISBS and depicts data in situ.  
 
The research analysis and results supported the development of this model and 
validated its usefulness to information security contractors. A final feedback that 
emphasized the value of the ISBS model includes “a fantastic representation that I 





7.2 e – Government Relational Technical Controls Model Conclusion 
The information system breakdown structure (ISBS) was incorporated into the e-
Government Relational Technical Controls. The e-Government Technical Controls 
Model is an entity relationship diagram developed using the security controls of the 
NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 Technical controls and entities for users/process and 
system/devices. The relationship between the entities is represented by the 
cardinalities of one-to-many and zero-to-many. The e-Government Relational 
Technical Controls provide the opportunity to map security controls to their 
applicable user, process or information system.  
 
Items in the questionnaire addressed the five relationships between the entities. Based 
on the analysis of the results of the questionnaire, the relationships developed 
appeared to be sufficient for the e-Government Technical Controls. Some of the 
feedback received from the respondents suggests that the relationship between the IA 
Entity and the Users/Processes and the Systems/Devices should be represented by a 
one-to-many relationship instead of a one-to-one relationship.  
 
A one-to-one relationship means that a user should have only a single user identifier, 
as is typically implemented with single-sign-on. Single-sign-on allows a user to sign 
on once and track/manage their access to all resources on the network. This reduces 
administrative overhead and the likelihood of users writing down their passwords and 
keeping them around their work area.  
 
The use of multiple passwords for multiple information systems improves logical 
security but the need for users to remember multiple passwords may result in them 
writing the passwords on sticky notes around their work area.  Another options 
proposed is the used of one-time password tokens for the different information 
systems while the user maintains a single identifier and password. This method will 
provide the benefit of having multiple passwords for multiple systems but the user 





Another major improvement in using the e-Government Relational Technical 
Controls is that the likelihood of having duplicate controls will be reduced as the 
different attributes for the entities can be related to each other. This model also 
presents a more integrated approach to the handling of security as opposed to the 
hierarchical approach.    
 
7.3 Identification and Authentication Risk Management Conclusion 
The attributes for the identification and authentication control family were assessed 
for their ability to mitigate and manage risks to entities identified in the information 
systems breakdown structure.  The risk management strategy that was ranked the 
lowest was the use of MAC addresses for identification of information systems. 
Respondent feedback, and the information security body of knowledge indicates that 
MAC addresses can be spoofed, supported this ranking. 
 
The risk mitigation strategy with the highest ranking is that each user should be 
uniquely identified to the information system. This improves the non-repudiation of 
user actions and improves the chances of their actions to be admissible in court, 
though it is still considered hearsay.  Some other pertinent risk mitigation and 
management strategies identified for information systems include: 
 
1. Using multi-factor authentication for information systems  
2. IA entities generators should be capable of multi-factor authentication 
3. Having one of the factors of multi-factor authentication provided by a device 
separate from the information system being accessed  
4. System/device IDs should be centrally managed by an information system 
5. Using IP and MAC addresses for identification and authentication of devices 
and systems  
6. Preventing the reuse of user, process, system and device identifiers  
7. Employing user identifiers that do not match the email addresses  
8. Restricting the reuse of authenticators for users and processes  




10. Using automated tools to determine the strength of authenticators to resist 
attacks  
11. Using unique authenticators (or passwords) for different information systems  
12. Using tokens that offer one-time passwords  
13. Restricting the number of accounts individuals have on multiple information 
systems  
14. Ensuring that the duration before authenticators are changed is in the range of 
sixty one to ninety days. 
15. Ensuring that the minimum number of characters for passwords should be 
between eight and ten characters 
16. Ensuring that password authenticators are case sensitive 
17. Ensuring that passwords consist of upper and lower case letters 
18. Ensuring that passwords contain of special characters 
19. Protecting users from “shoulder surfing” 
20. Ensuring that non-organizational users be authenticated to the information 
systems 
 
7.4 Recommendations for Future Work 
Although this research has made theoretical and practical contributions to project 
management as it relates to mitigating project risks associated with the use of 
information systems. There is an extensive amount of research available for future 
work that cannot be covered in this research. Some of such research includes: 
 
 Developing a data classification tool that maps to the information system 
breakdown structure 
 Validating the Access Control, Audit, and Systems and Communications 
Protection attributes from the e-Government Relational Technical Control Model 
for risk management. 
 Identifying effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the Access 
Control, Audit, and Systems and Communications Protection 




 Developing and validating a model for the e-Government Operational controls 
 Developing and validating a risk mitigation and management model 
 Investigating the possibility of integrating all three models (technical, operation 
and management) into one so that they provide a fully-integrated approach to 


























   
e-Government Relational Technical Controls Data Collection 
  
Dear Sir/Madam, 
   
Based on your recognized expertise in information systems security you are kindly requested to participate in the University of Maryland research 
requiring data collection related to e-Government Relational Technical Controls. In our data collection effort, we ask information security industry 
experts such as yourself questions about the integration of the Identification and Authentication Control for the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 within 
information system(s) and assess the value of a relational model and an information system breakdown structure for performing security 
assessments. This data collection will require completion of this questionnaire. 
   
Of course, your participation in this research effort is voluntary and the time taken from your busy schedule will be much appreciated. There are no 
foreseeable risks associated with this project. However, if you feel uncomfortable answering any questions, you can withdraw from the data 
collection exercise at any point. It is very important for us to learn your opinions on this subject. 
   
Your responses will be strictly confidential and data from this research will be reported only in an aggregate form. If you have questions at any time 
about our data collection or the procedures, you may contact the project supervisor at the University of Maryland, College Park, Dr. M. Skibniewski 
at 301-405-9364 or by email (preferred) at mirek@umd.edu. 






Momodu Fofana, PhD C, MIS, B. Eng, PMP, CISSP, CCNA 
Research Associate 
   
Email: mfofana@umd.edu 
Phone: (240) 533-6757 
Section 1 
Section 1.0 Respondent Information 
  
In this section, I will collect your personal information. We are requesting your email address so we can send you a copy of the results of the data 
assessment effort. We shall not include your email in any of our mailing lists or send you any additional information besides that directly related to 
this research. The additional information requested may be use as a basis for comparison of your responses to those of other respondents. 
   
1. Date: 
   
2. Location: 
3. Name: 
   
4. Title: 
5: Telephone #: 
   
6: Email: 
7. Interviewer: 
   
   
8. How would you classify yourself? (Select all that apply)   
Project Manager  
9. Do you have experience interpreting entity relationship diagrams? 




Information Security Contractor  
Network Engineer  
Network Administrator  
Other: 
   
  
10. Years of experience in the network administrator related field (Select one) 
<= 3 
4 - 8 
9 - 13 
>= 14 
 11. Years experience in the network security related field (Select one) 
<= 3 
4 - 8 









4 - 8 




13. Years experience in performing security assessments using the NIST Control Families (Select one) 
<= 3 
4 -8 









15. How many projects involving security assessments have you worked on?  
   
   
 











16-i. What is your highest level of education? (Select all that apply) 







   
Additional Information Systems Security Information 
17. What is your highest level of education? (Select all that apply)  
  





End of Section 1 
Section 2 
Section 2 marks the start of the research data collection.  
   
Section 2.0Information Systems  
Breakdown Structure Validation  
   
This section establishes the value of using an Information Systems Breakdowns Structure to identify and classify the organizational information 
system resources that may be utilize on a project. Figure 1.0 depicts the category as information system breakdown structure and the following sub-
categories: Computers, network infrastructures, personal digital assistants, imaging devices and other devices. Figure 1 also highlights the 
components and sub-components for each sub-category. The following interview items assess the importance of using an information system 








Figure 1.0 Information System Breakdown Structure 
  
For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
  







The sub-categories (computers, network infrastructure, personal digital assistants, 
imaging device and other devices) identified in Figure 1.0 are sufficient to categorize all 
information systems. 
    
19. 
The components identified for the computers sub-category are sufficient to identify 
information systems for this sub-category.     
20. 
The components identified for the network infrastructure sub-category are sufficient to 
identify information systems for this sub-category.     
21. 
The components identified for the personal digital assistants sub-category are sufficient to 
identify information systems for this sub-category.     
22. 
The components identified for the imaging devices sub-category are sufficient to identify 
information systems for this sub-category.     
23. 
The components identified for the other devices sub-category are a sufficient catchall for 
information systems not identified in the computers, network infrastructure, personal 
digital assistants and imaging devices sub-categories. 
    
24. 
The generic sub-components identified for the different components are sufficient to 
assess risks at the sub-component levels.      
25. 
The use of an information system breakdown structure improves the ability of assessors 
to identify organizational information system assets.      




Information System Breakdown Structure Feedback 




Section 2.1 e-Government Relational Technical Control Validation  
  
The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) uses a hierarchical tree structure approach to information security in their development on 
of the different security control families that belong to either the Management, Operational or Technical Control Family. The NIST security 
assessment approach is not a relational approach and this result in duplicate security controls as is evident by fifteen security controls withdrawn 
and merged into other controls for the recently published NIST SP 800-53 Rev 3 of August 2009. The duplicates encountered in the use of current 
NIST methodology are synonymous with the duplicates encountered when saving records in a flat file. Another issue is one of data integrity 
between the controls.   
   
The goal of this research is to develop an e-Government Relational Technical control to address the issue of duplicates in the security control and to 
improve the process of performing security assessment by providing a fully integrated approach to assessing the security controls. The relationships 
develop for the Technical Controls namely; Identification and Authentication (IA) Control, Access (AC) Control, Audit and Accountability (AU) 
Control and System and Communications Protection (SC) Control shall be validated in this section of this document. Figure 1 depicts the entity 
relationships diagram for the Technical Control Family and entities that may access the information system. The diagram also identifies some 
attributes of the different entities. The current attributes for the NIST Technical Control family are base on the NIST 800-53 Rev 3 document. 









Figure 2. e-Government Relational Technical Controls 
  
  
ITEMS 2.1.0: Users/Processes & IA Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the IA entity and the Users/Processes entity. For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. The term 'user' used below include processes acting as users but excludes system 
maintainers. 







Each Users/Processes should have a unique identifier for authentication to an 
information system.     
28. Users/Processes should be restricted to a single user/process id. 
    
29. 
An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of multiple 
users/processes.     
30. 
An IA entity can exist that does not identify and authenticate users/process. (They 
may identify and authenticate only systems/devices)     
  
Users/Processes & IA Relationship Feedback 






ITEMS 2.1.1: System/Devices & IA Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the IA entity and the System/Devices entity. For each of the questions below, please select whether 
you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  







A System/Device should have a unique identifier for authentication to an 
information system.     
33. A System/Device should be restricted to a single system/device id. 
    
34. 
An IA entity should be capable of identification and authentication of multiple 
systems/devices.      
35. 
An IA entity can exist that does not identify and authenticate systems/devices 
(They may identify and authenticate only Users/Processes)     
   
System/Devices & IA Relationship Feedback 







ITEMS 2.1.2: IA & AC Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the IA and AC entities. For each of the questions below, please select whether you strongly disagree, 
disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  






37. Authenticated identifiers must be granted access to an information system. 
    
38. 
Authenticated identifiers may be granted access to multiple information 
systems.     
39. 
The access control entity should control the access of at least one authenticated 
identifier.      
40. 
The access control entity should be capable of managing the access of multiple 
authenticated identifiers.     
  
IA & AC Relationship Feedback 







ITEMS 2.1.3: AC & AU Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the AU and AC entities. For each of the questions below, please select whether you strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  






42. The access control entity must create an audit event record. 
    
43. The access control entity may create multiple audit events. 
    
44. The audit and accountability entity must audit an access control entity. 
    
45. 
The audit and accountability entity may audit multiple access control 
entities.     
  
AU & AC Relationship Feedback 







ITEMS 2.1.4: AU & SC Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the AU and SC entities. For each of the questions below, please select whether you strongly 
disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  







The audit and accountability entity should feed to a system and communication 
protection entity.      
48. 
The audit and accountability entity may feed to multiple systems and 
communication protection entities.     
49. The system and communication protection entity must monitor an audit entity. 
    
50. 
The system and communication protection entity may monitor multiple audit 
entities.      
  
AU & SC Relationship Feedback 
51. Kindly provide additional feedback for items you disagree or strongly disagree with. 
  
  
   
   




   
   
   
 
End of Section 2 
Section 3 
Section 3.0 Risk Mitigation and Management Strategies 
   
This section shall ask questions to determine the best practices for risk mitigation and management strategies of the Identification and 
Authentication Family of the NIST Technical Controls for Information Systems. This section aims to identify what security industry practitioners 
perceive as the most effective risk mitigation and management strategies for the Identification and Authentication Control Family.  
   
ITEMS 3.1.0: Identification & Authentication Risk Management Strategies  
To determine the best practices for risk mitigation and management strategies of the Identification and Authentication Control Family for 
Information Systems. For each of the comment below, please select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the 
statements.  










IA-2: Authenticated user/process IDs should be granted access to the information 
system.     
53. 
IA-2: The identification and authentication control family should be use to manage 
identifier generator for an information system.     
54. 
IA-2: The identifier management and the access control entities should be integrated 
for managing access to applications (residing on the information system) and the 
information system.  
    
55. 
IA-2: The use of multi-factor authentication increases the security posture of 
information systems.     
56. IA-2: Identifier generators should be capable of multi-factor authentication. 
    
57. 
IA-2: Having one of the factors of multi-factor authentication provided by a device 
separate from the information system being access, improves the security posture of 
the information system.  
    
58. 
IA-2: The use of time synchronous or challenge-response one-time authenticators 
improves the security posture of information systems.     
   
IA-2 Feedback 




   
   
   




   
For each of the comment below, please select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 






60. IA-3: System/device ids should be centrally managed by an information system. 
    
61. 
IA-3: The use of MAC addresses for the identification and authentication of 
devices/systems improves the security posture of an information system.     
62. 
IA-3: The use of IP addresses for identification and authentication of 
devices/systems improves the security posture of an information system.     
63. 
IA-3: The use of bidirectional authentication between devices improves the security 
posture of an information system.     
  
IA-3 Feedback 
64. Kindly provide additional feedback for items you disagree or strongly disagree with.  
  
   
   
   
   
   






For each of the comment below, please select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  







IA-4: Users, processes, systems and devices must be uniquely identified to an 
information system.     
66. 
IA-4: Preventing the reuse of user, process, system or device identifiers increases 
the security posture of an information system.     
67. 
IA-4: Disabling user identifier after an organization-defined period of inactivity 
improves the security posture of an information system.     
68. 
IA-4: The use of user identifiers that do not match the email address of users 
improves the security posture of an information system.     
  
IA-4 Feedback 
69. Kindly provide additional feedback for items you disagree or strongly disagree with.  
  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   











IA-5: Limiting the reuse of authenticators for users/processes improves the security 
posture of information systems     
71. 
IA-5: Limiting the reuse of authenticators for systems/devices improves the 
security posture of information systems     
72. 
IA-5: Establishing the minimum period before requiring a password change 
improves the security posture of information systems.     
73. 
IA-5: Establishing the maximum period before requiring a password change 
improves the security posture of information systems.     
74. 
IA-5: The use of automated tools to determine the strength of authenticators to 
resist attacks improves the security posture of information system.     
75. 
IA-5: The use of different unique authenticators (or passwords) for different 
information systems improves the security posture of the organization.     
76. 
IA-5: Employing the use of single sign-on improves the security posture of 
information systems.     
77. 
IA-5: Using one-time passwords improves the security posture of information 
systems.     
78. 
IA-5: Restricting the number of accounts individuals have on multiple information 
systems improves their security posture.     
  
   
The ranges below are in days. For each of the questions below select the range (in days) that you believe should be assigned for each question.  




79. IA-4: What should be the period of inactivity before a user account is disabled? 
     
80. IA-5: How often should authenticators (or passwords) be changed/refreshed? 
     
  
   
   
81. IA-5: How many password histories should an information system remembers and prevents users from reusing?  
<=3  
4 - 6  
7 - 9  
10 - 12  
>= 13  
  
  
82. IA-5: What should be the minimum number of characters required for passwords?  
<= 7  
8 - 10  
11 - 13  
Other:  
   
   
   




   
 83. IA-5: Select the options that you believe improves the security of authenticators. (Select all that apply) 
Requiring passwords to be case sensitive  
Requiring that the password exceeds a certain number of characters 
Requiring the use of both upper and lower case letters  
Requiring the use of numbers  
Requiring the use of special characters 
Having a minimum requirement for each of the items listed above  
  
IA-5 Feedback 
84. Kindly provide additional feedback for items you disagree or strongly disagree with.  
  
   
   
   
   
   
   





For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  







IA-6: Obscuring of feedback during authentication improves the security 
posture of information systems.     
86. 
IA-7: The use of cryptographic modules during authentication improves the 
security posture of information systems.     
87. 
IA-8: The identification and authentication of non-organizational users 
improves the security posture of the information system.     
  
IA-6, IA-7, IA-8 Feedback 




   
   
   












Section 4.0 Duration & Fee for Security Assessments 
  
These questions determine shall help to develop a cost model for determining the cost of performing risk assessment for the identification and 
authentication control family. The identification and authentication control family is comprised of eight controls and a total of thirty-one 
enhancements. The questions in this section will cover the duration required to perform security assessments for the identification and 
authentication control family and the fee that information assurance contractors charge for performing security assessments. 
  
SURVEY INSTRUCTIONS: All the ranges below are in hours. For the question below, select the range (in days) that it took you to complete the 
following tasks, for your last security assessment of the identification and authentication control family. 
     <= 1 2 - 3 4 - 5 6 - 7 >=8
89. 
To examine and assess the documents related to the identification and authentication control 
family.      
90. 
To complete an interview of organizational stakeholders on the requirements for the 
identification and authentication control family.      
91. To test the control requirements for the identification and authentication control family. 
     
92. 
To develop reports for the identification and authentication control family based on security 
assessment of its controls.      
  
93. For what organization did you perform the last security assessment?  
  
   
   




   
94. What is the fee (in $/hr) information assurance organizations charge customers for performing security assessments? (Please note that this 
question is not asking for your hourly salary, but rather what an organization may charge customers for your services. 
   
  
   
   
   
  Duration & Fee Feedback 
95. For questions 89 to 92, if you selected a duration greater than or equal to 8 days please specify what you believe the duration should be and 
why. You may also use this space to provide additional feedback for the entire data collection effort. 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
End of Section 4 
   






Appendix B: Excluded Interview Questions 
This section contains interview questions that are excluded from the research because including them would have resulted in 
over 300 interview questions and it would have been impossible to find respondents to answer the questions. By excluding 
questions for the Access Control, Audit and System and Communications Protection Control Families we reduced the 






Information System Risk Management Validation  
  










ITEMS 2.2.0: SDLC Cost & Information System Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the SDLC Cost and the Information System entities. For each of the questions below, please select 
whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
50.
The SDLC cost entity should be used to implement an information 
system.    
51.
The SDLC cost entity may be used to implement multiple 
information systems.    
52. Information Systems cost must belong to an SDLC cost entity    
53.
Information System costs may belong to multiple SDLC cost 
entities    
  
SDLC Cost & Information System Relationship Feedback. 








ITEMS 2.2.1: Information System & Components Relationship 
These items validates the relationships between the Components and the Information System entities. For each of the questions below, please select 
whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
55. An information system entity must contain a component entity.    
56. 
An information system entity may be composed of multiple 
component entities.    
57. 
Component entities may be assembled to form an information 
system entity.    
58. 
Component entities may be assembled to form multiple 
information system entities.    
  
Components & Information System Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.2: Threats & Components Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the Components and the Threats entities. For each of the questions below, please select whether you 
strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
60. A component entity may be affected by a threat entity.    
61. A component entity may be affected by multiple threat entities.    
62. Threat entities must belong to a component entity.    
63. Threat entities may belong to multiple component entities.    
  
Components & Threat Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.3: Component Threats & Vulnerability Relationship 
These items validates the relationships between the Component Threats and Vulnerabilities entities. For each of the questions below, please select 
whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
65. A component threat results in a vulnerability.    
66. A component threat may result in multiple vulnerability entities    
67. A vulnerability entity must belong on a component threat entity.    
68.
A vulnerability entity should map to only one component threat 
entity.    
  
Component Threats & Vulnerability Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.4: Vulnerability & Risk Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the Vulnerability and Risk entities. For each of the questions below, please select whether you 
strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
70. A vulnerability entity results in a risk entity.    
71. A vulnerability entity may result in multiple risks entities.    
72. A risk entity is a result of at least one vulnerability entity.    
73. A risk entity may be a result of multiple vulnerability entities.    
  
Vulnerability & Risk Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.5: Risk & Risk Management Plans Relationship 
These items validate the relationships between the Risk and the Risk Management Plan entities. For each of the questions below, please select 
whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
75. A risk entity must track to a risk management plan.    
76. A risk entity must not track to multiple risk management plans.    
77. A risk management plan must contain a risk entity.    
78. A risk management plan may contain multiple risk entities.    
  
Risk & Risk Management Plan Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.6: Risk Management Plans & SDLC Cost Relationship 
These items validates the relationships between the Risk Management Plan and SDLC cost entities. For each of the questions below, please select 
whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
80. A risk management plan entity increases a SDLC Cost entity.    
81. 
A risk management plan entity may increase multiple SDLC cost 
entities.    
82. A SDLC Cost may include a risk management plan entity.    
83. 
A SDLC Cost may include multiple Risk Management Plan 
entities.    
  
Risk Management Plan & SDLC Cost Relationship Feedback.  








ITEMS 2.2.7: Information System & NIST Technical Controls Relationship 
These items validates the relationships between the Information System and the NIST Technical Control entities. For each of the comment below, 
please select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
85. 
The information system entity may be assess with a NIST 
Technical Control Entity    
86. 
The information system may be assessed with multiple NIST 
Technical Control entitles    
87. 
NIST Technical Control Entities must apply to an information 
system    
88. 
NIST Technical Control entities may apply to multiple information 
systems    
  
Information System & NIST Technical Controls Relationship Feedback.  





ITEMS 3.1.1: Access Control Risk Management Strategies 
To determine the best practices for risk mitigation and management strategies of the Access Control Family. For each of the statements below, 
select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
133.
AC-2: The efficient and timely management of information system 
accounts improves the security posture of the information system.    
134.
AC-2: IA-2 (The information system uniquely identifies and 
authenticates organizational users) should be merged with AC-2 
(The organization manages information system accounts). 
   
135.
AC-2: Restricting access to the information system to specific times 
of the day improves the security posture of the information system.    
136.
AC-2: Auditing for atypical usage of information system accounts 
improves the security posture of information systems.    
137.
AC-2: The information system dynamically manages user accounts 
improves its security posture.    
138.
AC-2: The use of robe-based access control as opposed to dynamic 
account management improves the security posture of the 
information system. 
   
  
  
139. AC-2: What do you believe should be the duration of inactivity before a user is logged out of the information system?  
<= 10 minutes  
11 - 20 minutes  




31 - 40 minutes  
41 - 50 minutes  
51 - 60 minutes  
> 61 minutes  
 AC-2 Feedback.  




For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
141.
AC-3: The use of mandatory access control improves the security 
posture of information systems.    
142.
AC-3: The use of role based access control improves the security 
posture of information systems.    
143.
AC-3: The use of discretionary access control improves the security 
posture of information systems.    
  
AC-3 Feedback.  








For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
145.
AC-4: Keeping export controlled information from being transmitted 
in clear to the Internet improves the security posture of information 
system. 
   
146.
AC-4: The use of a web proxy improves the security posture of the 
information system.    
147.
AC-4: The use of one-way information flow improves the security 
posture of information systems.    
148.
AC-4: The use of information flow control entities improves the 
security posture of information systems.    
  
AC-4 Feedback.  








For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
150.
AC-5: The use of separation of duties improves the security posture 
of the information system.    
151.
AC-5: The use of separation of duties improves the security posture 
of the organization.    
152.
AC-6: The use of least privilege principle improve the security 
posture of information systems.    
153.
AC-6: The use of least privilege principle improves the security 
posture of the organization.    
154.
AC-5: (Separation of duties) should be merged with AC-3 (Access 
Enforcement)    
155.
AC-6: (Least privilege) should be merged with AC-3 (Access 
Enforcement)    
156.
AC-6: The use of multiple accounts by the same user for security and 
non-security functions improves the security posture of the 
information system. 
   
157.
AC-6: Employing virtualization techniques to control user access 
improves the security posture of the information system.    
  
AC-5, AC-6 Feedback.  
158. Please provide any additional feedback in the space below.  
  
For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree
159. 
AC-7: The use of account lockout (until enabled by an administrator) 
for user login attempts that reach the unsuccessful login threshold 
improves the security posture of information systems. 
   
160. 
AC-7: The unsuccessful login attempt delay period should be 
different for all systems within an organization.    
161. 
AC-7: The ability to purge the information on mobile devices when 
the number of unsuccessful login attempts is reached improves the 
security posture of the information system. 
   
162. 
AC-8: System use notification prior to login improves the security 
posture of the information system.    
163. 
AC-9: Previous logon (access) notification improves the security 
posture of the information system.    
164. 
AC-10: The use of concurrent session control improves the security 
posture of the information system.    
165. 
AC-11: The use of session lock improves the security posture of the 
information system.    
 
 
Select a range (in minutes) for each of the questions below. AC-7: Unsuccessful Login Attempts  
   <= 15 mins 16 - 30 mins 31 - 45 mins 46 - 60 mins >= 61 mins
166. 
What should be the duration (in minutes) for account 
lockout due to unsuccessful login attempts?      
167. 
What should be the duration for the delay next login 











168. Unsuccessful login attempts should be restricted to how many attempts? AC-7: Unsuccessful Login Attempts  
1 - 3  
4 - 6  
7 - 9  
10 - 12  
Other:  
  
AC-7, AC-8, AC-9, AC-10, AC-11 Feedback.  




For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
170.
AC-14: No actions should be allowed on the information system without 
identification and authentication.    
171.
AC-14: Access to public information on the web interface of information 
system may be granted without identification and authentication.    
172.
AC-16: The use of security attributes for controlling access to subjects 
and objects improves the security posture of the information system.    
173.
AC-16 (Security Attributes) should be merged with AC-3 (Access 
Enforcement)    




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
the information system. 
175.
AC-17 (Remote Access) should be merged with AC-3 (Access 
Enforcement)    
176.
AC-17: The use of cryptography to ensure the confidentiality and 
integrity of remote access, improves the security posture of the 
information system. 
   
177.
AC-17: Centralized management of remote access improves the security 
posture of the information system.    
  
C-14, AC-16, AC-17 Feedback.  




For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
Mobile devices include portable storage media (e.g. USB memory sticks, external hard disk drives) and portable computing and communications 
devices with information storage capability (e.g. notebook/laptop computers, personal digital assistants, cellular telephones, digital cameras and 
audio recording devices).  
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
179.
AC-18: Prohibiting the use of wireless access improves the security 
posture of the information system.    
180.
AC-18: The use of TEMPEST to control wireless emanations improves 
the security posture of the information system.    
181.
AC-18: The use of point-to-point networking with wireless 




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
182.
AC-19: Restricting the use of organizational mobile devices  improves 
the security posture of the information system.    
183.
AC-19: Prohibiting the use of mobile devices improves the security 
posture of the information system. 




AC-19: Restricting the use of personal (as opposed to organizational) 
mobile devices improves the security posture of the information system.    
185.
AC-19: Prohibiting the use of personal (as opposed to organizational) 
mobile devices improves the security posture of the information system.    
186.
AC-19: Disabling information system functionality that allows automatic 
execution of code on mobile devices without user direction (e.g. 
AutoRun & AutoPlay) improves the security posture of information 
systems. 
   
187.
AC-19: Prohibiting the use of unclassified mobile devices in facilities 
containing information systems processing, storing or transmitting 
classified information improves the securing posture of the information 
system. 
   
188.
AC-20: Restricting the use of external information system improves the 
security posture of the information system.    
189.
AC-21: Restricting the use of user-based collaboration and information 
system improves the security posture of the information system.    
190. 
AC-22: The management of who can post publicly accessible content 
improves the security posture of the information system.    
  
AC-18, AC-19, AC-20, AC-21, AC-22 Feedback.  











ITEMS 3.1.2: Audit Risk Management Strategies 
To determine the best practices for risk mitigation and management strategies of the Audit Control Family for Information Systems. For each of the 
statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  




AU-2: The identification of auditable events for the information 
system improves its security posture.     
193. 
AU-2: The auditing of privileged functions for the information 
system improves its security posture.     
194. 
AU-3: The central management of audit records for an 
information system improves its security posture.     
195. 
AU-4: The allocating and monitoring of audit storage capacity for 
an information system improves its security posture.     
196. 
AU-5: The AU-5 (Response to audit processing failures) should 
belong to the System and Communication Protection Family of 
Controls. 
    
197. 
AU-5: The ability of an information system to shut down due to 
audit processing failures improves its security posture.     
198. 
AU-5: The ability of an information system to overwrite oldest 
audit records due to audit processing failures improves its security 
posture. 








AU-5: The ability of an information system to stop generating 
audit records due to audit processing failures improves its security 
posture. 






AU-2, AU-3, AU-4, AU-5 Feedback.  
200. Please provide any additional feedback in the space below.   
  
201. AU-6: Select the check box below that indicates how often you believe information audit records should be reviewed to provide the most value 







 AU-6 Feedback.  







For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements.  
 




AU-6: The ability to integrate audit records with vulnerability 
scanning information, performance data and network 
monitoring improve the ability to identity 
inappropriate/suspicious/malevolent activity for the information 
system. 
   
204. 
AU-6: The ability to integrate audit records with information 
obtained from monitoring physical access improves the ability 
to identify suspicious, inappropriate, unusual or malevolent 
activity. 
   
205. 
AU-6: The use of automated mechanisms to alert security 
personnel should belong to the System and Communication 
Protection Control Family 
   
206. 
AU-6: The use of automate mechanisms to alert security 
personnel on activities being audited improves the security 
posture of the information system. 
   
207. 
AU-7: The ability of the information system to automatically 
process audit records for selectable events improves its security 
posture. 








AU-8: The proper synchronization of time for the information 
system improves the ability to establish the sequence of audit 
events based on their timestamps and improves its security 
posture. 
   
209. 
AU-9: The AC-9 (Protecting of Audit Information) control 
should fall within the access control family.    
210. 
AU-9: The ability of the information system to effectively 
protect audit information improves its security posture.    
211. 
AU-9: The use of write-once media (like CD-ROMs) to store 
information system audit records improves the security posture 
of the information system. 
   
212. 
AU-9: The ability of the information system to store audit 
records onto a different system or media than the one being 
audited improves its security posture. 
     
213. 
AU-9: The use of cryptographic mechanisms to protect the 
integrity of audit information and audit tools improves the 
security posture of information system. 
   
214. 
AU-9: The ability to limit the number of privilege users who 
have access to audit functions of an information system 
improves its security posture. 





AU-6, AU-7, AU-8, AU-9 Feedback.  
215. Please provide any additional feedback in the space below.  
  








Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
216. 
AU-10: The use of private keys digital signatures for non-
repudiation on information system improves the security 
posture of the information system. 
   
217. 
AU-10: The binding of information at the time of generation to 
its producer's identity ensures that the information generated is 
properly classified for the information system. 
   
218. 
AU-11: The definition of the period for retention of audit 
records should be based on the security categorization of the 
system, Federal and State statutes and the organizational policy 
for the different records. 
   
219. 
AU-12: The ability for designated organizational personnel to 
select auditable events for specific components of an 
information system improves its security posture. 
   
220. 
AU-13: The monitoring of open source information for 
evidence of unauthorized exfiltration or disclosure of 
organizational information improves the security of the 
information system. 
   
221. 
AU-14: The ability of an information system to audit all 







Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
222. 
AU-14: The ability of an information system to remotely 
view/hear all content related to an established session in real 
time improves its security posture. 
   
  
 AU-10, AU-11, AU-12, AU-13, AU-14 Feedback.  







 ITEMS 3.1.3: System and Communications Protection Risk Management Strategies 
To determine the best practices for risk mitigation and management strategies of the System and Communications Protection Control Family for 
Information Systems. For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
224. 
SC-2: The ability of the information system to separate user 
functionality and services from information system 
management functionality improves the security posture of the 
information system. 
   
225. 
SC-3: The ability of the information system to isolate security 
functions from non-security functions improves its security 
posture. 
   
226. 
SC-3: The use of hardware separation mechanisms to facilitate 
security function isolation improves the security posture of the 
information system. 
   
227. 
SC-3: The implementation of security functions as independent 
modules that inhibit interactions between modules improves 
the security posture of the information system. 
   
228. 
SC-4: The ability of an information system to 
partition resources that are used to interface with systems 
operating at different security levels improves its security 
posture. 
   




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree 
service attacks improves its security posture. 
230. 
SC-5: The ability of an information system to prevent users 
from launching a denial of service attack against other systems 
or networks improves the security posture of the organization. 
   
231. 
SC-6: The ability of an information system to limit the use of 
resources by priority improves its security posture.    
  
SC-2, SC-3, SC-4, SC-5, SC-6 Feedback.  




For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
233. 
SC-7: The ability of the information system to monitor and 
control communication at external boundaries improves its 
security posture. 
   
234. 
SC-7: The ability of the information system to monitor and 
control communication at key internal boundaries improves its 
security posture. 
   




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
components to separate sub networks having separate physical 
NIC improves the security posture of an information system. 
236. 
SC-7: The ability of an information to deny all traffic by 
default and allow network traffic by exception improves it 
security posture. 
   
237. 
SC-7: The user of deep packet inspection firewalls and XLM 
gateways (that can screen data at the application layer for 
information system) improves the security posture of 
information system. 
   
238. 
SC-7: The use of host based boundary protection for servers 
improves their security posture    
239. 
SC-7: The use of host based boundary protection 
for workstations improves their security posture    
240. 
SC-7: The use of host based boundary protection for mobile 
devices improves their security posture    
241. 
SC-7 The ability of the information system to prevent 
discovery of its system specific components or devices 
(example network address is not entered in a domain system) 
improves its security posture  
   
  
 SC-7 Feedback.  







For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
243. 
SC-8: The ability of the information system to protect the 
integrity of transmitted information improves its security 
posture. 
   
244. 
SC-8: The ability of the information system to employ 
cryptographic mechanisms to recognize changes to 
information during transmission improves its security posture. 
   
245. 
SC-9: The ability of the information system to protect the 
confidentiality of transmitted information improves its security 
posture. 
   
246. 
SC-10: The ability of an information system to terminate a 
network connection at the end of a session or a period of 
inactivity improves its security posture. 
   
247. 
SC-11:The ability of an information system to establish and 
maintain a trusted communication path between a user and 
security functions improves its security posture. 
   
248. 
SC-12 The ability of an information system to establish, 
maintain and manage cryptographic key improves its security 
posture. 





 SC-8, SC-9, SC-10, SC-11, SC-12 Feedback.  








For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
250. 
SC-13: The use of cryptography that is consistent with the 
security classification of the information system improves the 
security posture of the organization. 
   
251. 
SC-14: The ability of the information system to protect the 
integrity and availability of publicly available information and 
applications improves its security posture. 
   
252. 
SC-15: The ability of an information system to prohibit remote 
activation of collaborative computer devices improves its 
security posture. 
   
253. 
SC-15: The ability of an information system to provide 
indication of use to users physically present at the device 
improves the security posture of the organization. 
   
254. 
SC-15: The ability of an information system to provide 
physical disconnect of a collaborative computing device in a 
manner that support ease of use improves its security posture. 
   
255. 
SC-15: The ability of an information system to block both 
inbound and outbound traffic between instant messaging 
clients configured by end users or external service providers 
improves its security posture. 
   




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
attributes for information exchanged between systems 
improves its security posture. 
  
SC-13, SC-14, SC-15, SC-16 Feedback.  








For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
258. 
SC-17: The use of PKI certificates by the information system 
improves its security posture.     
259. 
SC-18: The ability of an information system to detect, inspect 
and manage mobile code improves its security posture.    
260. 
SC-19: The ability to authorize, monitor and control the use of 
VoIP within an information system improves its security 
posture. 
   
261. 
SC-20: The ability of an information system to provide data 
origin and integrity artifacts along with authoritative data the 
system returns (in response to a name/address resolutions 
query) improves its security posture. 
   
262. 
SC-21: The ability of an information system to perform data 
origin authentication and data integrity verification (on the 
name/address resolution responses the system received from 
authoritative sources when requested by clients) improves it 
security posture. 
   
263. 
SC-22: The use of a primary and secondary, internal and 
external authoritative domain name system (DNS) to ensure 
fault-tolerance improves the security posture of the information 
system. 





SC-17, SC-18, SC-19, SC-20, SC-21, SC-22 Feedback.  








For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
    Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
265. 
SC-23: The ability of an information system to protect the 
authenticity of communications sessions improves it security 
posture. 
   
266. 
SC-23: The ability of an information system to generate 
session identifiers that are unique for each session and system 
specific improves its security posture. 
   
267. 
SC-24: The ability of an information system to fail in a known 
state improves its security posture.    
268. 
SC-25: The use of thin nodes that provide minimal 
functionality and information storage for an information 
system improves its security posture. 
   
269. 
SC-26: The use of honey pots in the infrastructure of the 
information system improves its security posture.     
270. 
SC-27: The use of operating system independent applications 
(that can run on multiple operating systems) promotes the 
portability and availability of the information system. 
   
  
SC-23, SC-24, SC-25, SC-26, SC-27 Feedback.  







For each of the statements below, select whether you strongly disagree, disagree, agree or strongly agree with the statements. 
   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
272. 
SC-28: The ability of an information system to protect 
information at rest improves its security posture.    
273. 
SC-29: The use of diverse information technologies for the 
implementation of an information system improves the 
security posture of the information system. 
   
274. 
SC-30: The use of virtualization techniques to disguise 
information systems and its components improves its security 
posture. 
   
275. 
SC-31: The requirement for information system developers to 
perform covert channel analysis to identify aspects of system 
communications that are potential avenues for covert storage 
and timing channels improves the security posture of an 
information system. 
   
  
SC-28, SC-29, SC-30, SC-31 Feedback.  
276. Please provide any additional feedback in the space below.  
  
   
   




   Strongly disagree Disagree Agree Strongly agree 
277. 
SC-32: The partitioning of an information system into 
components residing in separate physical 
domains/environments improves its security posture. 
   
278. 
SC-33: The ability an information system to protect the 
integrity of information during the process of data aggregation, 
packaging and transformation in preparation for transmission 
improves its security posture. 
   
279. 
SC-34: The ability of an information system to load and 
execute its operating environment from hardware enforced or 
read only media improves its security posture. 
   
280. 
SC-34: The ability of an information system to load and 
execute its applications from hardware enforce or read only 
media improves its security posture.  
   
  
SC-32, SC-33, SC-34 Feedback.  




Appendix C:  Software Results & Analysis Tables 





Sec. Ass. Exp. 
Spearman's rho FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA Exp. Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .878** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 22 22 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. Exp. Correlation Coefficient .878** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 22 22 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 




Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Somers' d Symmetric .872 .091 6.364 .000 
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. Dependent 
.872 .091 6.364 .000 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. 
Ass. Exp. Dependent 
.872 .091 6.364 .000 







Errora Approx. Tb Approx. Sig. 
Ordinal by Ordinal Somers' d Symmetric .872 .091 6.364 .000 
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. Dependent 
.872 .091 6.364 .000 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. 
Ass. Exp. Dependent 
.872 .091 6.364 .000 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 











of FISMAExp to 
3 years or less & 
4 years or more.
DummySecAssE
xp.13 Recode of 
SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 
years or more. 
Spearman's rho DummyFISMAExp.12 
Recode of FISMAExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .812** 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 
N 22 22 
DummySecAssExp.13 
Recode of SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient .812** 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . 
N 22 22 














xp to 3 years or 
less & 4 years or 
more. 
DummyNetSecE
xp.11 Recode of 
NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 
years or more. 
Spearman's rho DummyNetAdminExp.10 
Recode of 
NetworkAdminExp to 3 years 
or less & 4 years or more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .156 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .488 
N 22 22 
DummyNetSecExp.11 
Recode of NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient .156 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .488 . 







Table C5 Dummy of NetSec and FISMA Variables 
 
DummyNetSecE
xp.11 Recode of 
NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 
years or more. 
DummyFISMA
Exp.12 Recode 
of FISMAExp to 
3 years or less & 
4 years or more.
Spearman's rho DummyNetSecExp.11 
Recode of NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .478* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .025 
N 22 22 
DummyFISMAExp.12 
Recode of FISMAExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient .478* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 . 
N 22 22 














Table C6 Bivariate Analysis for FISMA, SecAss, NetAdmin and NetSec Experience 
 FISMAExp.12 
12. FISMA Exp. 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 
13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Net.Admin.Exp.
10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 
11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
Spearman's rho FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .878** -.121 .485* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000 .592 .022 
N 22 22 22 22 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient .878** 1.000 -.188 .485* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 . .403 .022 
N 22 22 22 22 
Net.Admin.Exp.10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient -.121 -.188 1.000 -.051 
Sig. (2-tailed) .592 .403 . .822 
N 22 22 22 22 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
Correlation Coefficient .485* .485* -.051 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .022 .022 .822 . 
N 22 22 22 22 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 












xp to 3 years or 




of FISMAExp to 
3 years or less & 
4 years or more.
Spearman's rho DummyNetAdminExp.10 
Recode of 
NetworkAdminExp to 3 years 
or less & 4 years or more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .087 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .700 
N 22 22 
DummyFISMAExp.12 
Recode of FISMAExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient .087 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .700 . 






Table C8 Dummy of NetSec and SecAss 
 
DummyNetSecE
xp.11 Recode of 
NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 
years or more. 
DummySecAssE
xp.13 Recode of 
SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 
years or more. 
Spearman's rho DummyNetSecExp.11 
Recode of NetSecExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .478* 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .025 
N 22 22 
DummySecAssExp.13 
Recode of SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient .478* 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 . 
N 22 22 












Table C10 Dummy of SecAss and NetAdmin Experience 
 
DummySecAssE
xp.13 Recode of 
SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 





xp to 3 years or 
less & 4 years or 
more. 
Spearman's rho DummySecAssExp.13 
Recode of SecAsseExp to 3 
years or less & 4 years or 
more. 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.153 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .498 
N 22 22 
DummyNetAdminExp.10 
Recode of 
NetworkAdminExp to 3 years 
or less & 4 years or more. 
Correlation Coefficient -.153 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .498 . 






Table C11 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
Net.Admin.Exp.
10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 





13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Net.Admin.Exp.10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
1.000 -.088 -.163 -.216 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
-.088 1.000 .610 .610 
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. 
-.163 .610 1.000 .928 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 






Table C12 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
Net.Admin.Exp.
10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 





13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Net.Admin.Exp.10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
1.206 -.082 -.145 -.193 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
-.082 .719 .420 .420 
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. 
-.145 .420 .660 .613 
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 






Table C13 Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
 
Net.Admin.Exp.
10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 





13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Net.Admin.Exp.10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
1.000 -.088 -.163 -.216
Net.Sec.Exp.11 11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
-.088 1.000 .610 .610
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. 
-.163 .610 1.000 .928
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 






Table C14 Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
 
Net.Admin.Exp.
10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
Net.Sec.Exp.11 





13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 
Net.Admin.Exp.10 10. Net. 
Admin. Exp. 
1.206 -.082 -.145 -.193
Net.Sec.Exp.11 11. Net. Sec. 
Exp. 
-.082 .719 .420 .420
FISMAExp.12 12. FISMA 
Exp. 
-.145 .420 .660 .613
Sec.Ass.Exp.13 13. Sec. Ass. 
Exp. 






Table C15 Cronbach’s Alpha for the Data Collection Questionnaire 
Sect. Description & Item numbers  Valid 
Cases 
# Items Cronbach's α 
Coefficient 
1 Yrs experience & other characteristics of the 
respondents (1 – 17)  
22 4 0.591 
2.1 Validate the information system breakdown 
structure. (18 – 26)  
22 8 0.911 
2.2 Validate the e-Government Technical 
Security Controls E-R Diagram (27 – 51)  
22 20 0.914 
3 Identify effective IA risk mitigation and 
management Strategies (52 – 88)  
22 37 0.913 
4 Duration, costs and security assessed 
organizations (89 – 94)  








Table C17 Scale Ranking for Section 2 of the Questionnaire 















25. Use of 
ISBS 
N Valid 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.23 3.18 3.18 3.23 3.27 3.14 3.23 3.36 
Median 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 
Mode 3 3 3 3a 4 3 3 3 
Std. Deviation .685 .733 .733 .752 .767 .834 .612 .581 
Skewness -.323 -.304 -1.103 -.413 -.529 -.816 -.142 -.212 
Std. Error of Skewness .491 .491 .491 .491 .491 .491 .491 .491 
Kurtosis -.697 -.973 2.628 -1.036 -1.042 .497 -.285 -.621 
Std. Error of Kurtosis .953 .953 .953 .953 .953 .953 .953 .953 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is shown 
 
Table C18. ISBS First Level Cat. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 3 13.6 13.6 13.6 
Agree 11 50.0 50.0 63.6 
Strongly Agree 8 36.4 36.4 100.0 







Table C19. Computers Sub-Cat 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 4 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Agree 10 45.5 45.5 63.6 
Strongly Agree 8 36.4 36.4 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C20. Infrastructure Sub-Cat 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 9.1 
Agree 13 59.1 59.1 68.2 
Strongly Agree 7 31.8 31.8 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C21. PDA Sub-Cat 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 4 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Agree 9 40.9 40.9 59.1 
Strongly Agree 9 40.9 40.9 100.0 





Table C22. Imaging Sub-Cat 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 4 18.2 18.2 18.2 
Agree 8 36.4 36.4 54.5 
Strongly Agree 10 45.5 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C23. Other Sub-Cat 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 3 13.6 13.6 18.2 
Agree 10 45.5 45.5 63.6 
Strongly Agree 8 36.4 36.4 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C24. Generic Components 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 9.1
Agree 13 59.1 59.1 68.2
Strongly Agree 7 31.8 31.8 100.0







Table C25. Use of ISBS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Agree 12 54.5 54.5 59.1 
Strongly Agree 9 40.9 40.9 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 


































Chi-square 11.636a 8.909a 14.727a 8.909a 8.909a 8.909a 14.727a 18.182a 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. .001 .003 .000 .003 .003 .003 .000 .000 







Table C27. User unique ID 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 5 22.7 22.7 22.7 
Strongly Agree 17 77.3 77.3 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C28. User Single ID 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 5 22.7 22.7 22.7 
Agree 8 36.4 36.4 59.1 
Strongly Agree 9 40.9 40.9 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
 
Table C29. IA Multiple Users 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 10 45.5 45.5 45.5 
Strongly Agree 12 54.5 54.5 100.0 






Table C30. IA no Users 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 13.6 
Agree 14 63.6 63.6 77.3 
Strongly Agree 5 22.7 22.7 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C32. A System unique ID 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Agree 9 40.9 40.9 40.9 
Strongly Agree 13 59.1 59.1 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C33. System single ID 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 3 13.6 13.6 13.6 
Agree 12 54.5 54.5 68.2 
Strongly Agree 7 31.8 31.8 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C34. IA multiple systems 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Agree 10 45.5 45.5 45.5 
Strongly Agree 12 54.5 54.5 100.0 




Table C35. IA of no systems  
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 9.1 
Agree 11 50.0 50.0 59.1 
Strongly Agree 9 40.9 40.9 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C37. Authenticated IDs must access IS 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 13.6 
Agree 9 40.9 40.9 54.5 
Strongly Agree 10 45.5 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C38. Authenticated IDs may access IS. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 9.1 
Agree 12 54.5 54.5 63.6 
Strongly Agree 8 36.4 36.4 100.0 






Table C39. AC controls an authenticated ID. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Strongly Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 9.1 
Agree 10 45.5 45.5 54.5 
Strongly Agree 10 45.5 45.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C40. AC multiple authenticated IDs. 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 9 40.9 40.9 40.9 
Strongly Agree 13 59.1 59.1 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C42. AC creates audit record 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 8 36.4 36.4 36.4 
Strongly Agree 14 63.6 63.6 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C43. AC creates multiple audit records. 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Agree 11 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Strongly Agree 11 50.0 50.0 100.0 




Table C44. AU audits an AC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Agree 9 40.9 40.9 45.5 
Strongly Agree 12 54.5 54.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C45. AU audits multiple AC 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Agree 11 50.0 50.0 50.0 
Strongly Agree 11 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C47. AU to a SC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 9.1 
Agree 9 40.9 40.9 50.0 
Strongly Agree 11 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C48. AU to multiple SC 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 2 9.1 9.1 9.1 
Agree 12 54.5 54.5 63.6 
Strongly Agree 8 36.4 36.4 100.0 




Table C49. SC monitors an AU 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative % 
Valid Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Agree 10 45.5 45.5 50.0 
Strongly Agree 11 50.0 50.0 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
Table C50. SC monitor multiple AU 
 
Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Disagree 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Agree 12 54.5 54.5 59.1 
Strongly Agree 9 40.9 40.9 100.0 





























































































































































































































































































Valid 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 22.00 
Missing 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mean 3.77 3.18 3.55 3.05 3.59 3.18 3.55 3.32 3.27 3.23 3.32 3.59 3.64 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.41 3.27 3.45 3.36 
Median 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.50 4.00 3.50 3.50 3.00 3.50 3.00 
Mode 4.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3a 4.00 4.00 3a 4.00 3a 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.43 0.80 0.51 0.72 0.50 0.66 0.51 0.65 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.50 0.49 0.51 0.60 0.51 0.67 0.63 0.60 0.58 
Variance 0.18 0.63 0.26 0.52 0.25 0.44 0.26 0.42 0.68 0.57 0.61 0.25 0.24 0.26 0.36 0.26 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.34 
Skewness -1.40 -0.35 -0.20 -0.90 -0.40 -0.21 -0.20 -0.40 -1.13 -1.15 -1.31 -0.40 -0.61 0.00 -0.74 0.00 -0.70 -0.27 -0.55 -0.21 
Std. Error 
of Skewness 
0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 
Kurtosis -0.06 -1.29 -2.17 2.12 -2.04 -0.55 -2.17 -0.54 1.23 2.43 2.37 -2.04 -1.80 -2.21 -0.31 -2.21 -0.43 -0.46 -0.52 -0.62 
Std. Error 
of Kurtosis 
0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Range 1.00 2.00 1.00 3.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 


























































Chi-square 6.545a 11.636a 11.636a 14.727a 11.636a 14.727a 14.727a 18.182a 14.727a 14.727a 18.182a 18.182a 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. .011 .001 .001 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 






























































































































































































Valid 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.36 3.36 3.5 3.5 3.41 3.5 3.45 
Median 3 3 3.5 4 3 4 3 
Mode 3 3 3a 4 3 4 3 
Std. Deviation 0.581 0.492 0.512 0.598 0.59 0.598 0.51 
Variance 0.338 0.242 0.262 0.357 0.348 0.357 0.26 
Skewness -0.212 0.609 0 -0.736 -0.379 -0.736 0.196 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 
Kurtosis -0.621 -1.802 -2.211 -0.312 -0.626 -0.312 -2.168 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 






























































































































































































































































Valid 22 22 22 22   22 22 22 22 
Missing 0 0 0 0   0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.32 3.05 3.09 3.45   3.68 3.23 3.41 3.27 
Median 3 3 3 3   4 3 3 3 
Mode 3 3 3 3   4 3 3 3 
Std. Deviation 0.646 0.722 0.75 0.51   0.477 0.685 0.503 0.631 
Variance 0.418 0.522 0.563 0.26   0.227 0.47 0.253 0.398 
Skewness -0.404 -0.069 -0.898 0.196   -0.839 -0.323 0.397 -0.269 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491   0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 
Kurtosis -0.54 -0.929 1.733 -2.168   -1.436 -0.697 -2.037 -0.463 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953   0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 
Range 2 2 3 1   1 2 1 2 
a. Multiple modes exist. The 
smallest value is shown 















































































































































































































































































































Valid 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.45 3.41 3.32 3.45 3.55 3.27 3.05 3.18 3.27 
Median 3.5 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 
Mode 4 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 
Std. Deviation 0.596 0.503 0.568 0.51 0.596 0.703 0.844 0.733 0.631 
Variance 0.355 0.253 0.323 0.26 0.355 0.494 0.712 0.537 0.398 
Skewness -0.553 0.397 -0.05 0.196 -0.933 -0.442 -0.091 -0.304 -0.269 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 
Kurtosis -0.524 -2.037 -0.506 -2.168 0.025 -0.762 -1.606 -0.973 -0.463 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 
Range 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 
a. Multiple modes exist. The smallest value is 
shown 















































































































































































































































Valid 22 22   22 22   22 22 22 
Missing 0 0   0 0   0 0 0 
Mean 2.68 2.64   2.27 2.23   3.41 3.64 3.32 
Median 3 3   2 2   3 4 3 
Mode 3 3   2 2   3 4 3 
Std. Deviation 1.129 0.953   1.12 0.813   0.59 0.492 0.568 
Variance 1.275 0.909   1.255 0.66   0.348 0.242 0.323 
Skewness 0.483 0.114   0.521 0.712   -0.379 -0.609 -0.05 
Std. Error of Skewness 0.491 0.491   0.491 0.491   0.491 0.491 0.491 
Kurtosis 0.006 0.908   -1.033 0.595   -0.626 -1.802 -0.506 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.953 0.953   0.953 0.953   0.953 0.953 0.953 
Range 4 4   3 3   2 1 2 


















































































































Valid 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 0.95 1 0.91 1 0.91 0.68 
Median 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mode 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Std. Deviation 0.213 0 0.294 0 0.294 0.477 
Variance 0.045 0 0.087 0 0.087 0.227 
Skewness 






Std. Error of Skewness 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 
Kurtosis 
22   8.085   8.085 -
1.436 
Std. Error of Kurtosis 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 0.953 
Range 1 0 1 0 1 1 










agree and disagree. 
Recode of 55 to 
agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 56 to 
agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 57 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 60 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 61 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 62 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 66 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 
68 to agree 
and disagree. 
Chi-square 18.182a 18.182a 18.182a 18.182a 14.727a 6.545a 11.636a 11.636a 14.727a 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0.001 0.001 0 
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 11.0. 
                    
  Recode of 70 to 
agree and disagree. 
Recode of 72 to 
agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 74 to 
agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 75 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 76 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 77 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 78 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 85 
to agree and 
disagree. 
Recode of 
87 to agree 
and disagree. 
Chi-square 18.182a 18.182a 18.182a 11.636a 2.909a 8.909a 14.727a 18.182a 18.182a 
df 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. 0 0 0 0.001 0.088 0.003 0 0 0 
















18 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The sub-categories (computers, 
network infrastructure, personal digital assistants, imaging device 
and other devices) identified in Figure 1.0 are sufficient to 
categorize all information systems.' 
11.636a 1 0.001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
19 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The components identified for the 
computers sub-category are sufficient to identify information 
systems for this sub-category.' 
8.909a 1 0.003 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.004 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
20 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The components identified for the 
network infrastructure sub-category are sufficient to identify 
information systems for this sub-category.' 
14.727a 1 0 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
21 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The components identified for the 
personal digital assistants sub-category are sufficient to identify 
information systems for this sub-category.' 
8.909a 1 0.003 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.004 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
22 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The components identified for the 
imaging devices sub-category are sufficient to identify 
information systems for this sub-category.' 
8.909a 1 0.003 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















23 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The components identified for the 
other devices sub-category are a sufficient catch-all for 
information systems not identified in the computers, network 
infrastructure, personal digital assistants and imaging devices sub-
categories.' 
8.909a 1 0.003 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.004 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
24 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The generic sub-components 
identified for the different components are sufficient to assess 
risks at the sub-component levels. ' 
14.727a 1 0 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
25 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The use of an information system 
breakdown structure improves the ability of assessors to identify 
organizational information system assets. ' 
18.182a 1 0 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
27 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'Each Users/Processes should have a 
unique identifier for authentication to an information system.' 







28 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'Users/Processes should be restricted 
6.565 1 .011 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 














to a single user/process id.' hypothesis 
29 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'An IA entity should be capable of 
identification and authentication of multiple users/processes.' 







30 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'An IA entity can exist that does not 
identify and authenticate users/process. (They may identify and 
authenticate only systems/devices)' 
11.636 1 .001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
32 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'A System/Device should have a 
unique identifier for authentication to an information system.' 



















33 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'A System/Device should be 
restricted to a single system/device id.' 
11.363 1 .001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
34 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'An IA entity should be capable of 
identification and authentication of multiple systems/devices. ' 







35 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'An IA entity can exist that does not 
identify and authenticate systems/devices (They may identify and 
authenticate only Users/Processes)' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
37 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'Authenticated identifiers must be 
granted access to an information system.' 
11.636 1 .001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
38 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'Authenticated identifiers may be 
granted access to multiple information systems.' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















39 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The access control entity should 
control the access of at least one authenticated identifier. ' 
14.727 1 .001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
40 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The access control entity should be 
capable of managing the access of multiple authenticated 
identifiers.' 







42 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The access control entity must 
create an audit event record.' 



















43 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The access control entity may create 
multiple audit events.' 







44 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The audit and accountability entity 
must audit an access control entity.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis. 
45 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The audit and accountability entity 
may audit multiple access control entities.' 







47 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The audit and accountability entity 
should feed to a system and communication protection entity. ' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















48 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The audit and accountability entity 
may feed to multiple systems and communication protection 
entities.' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis. 
49 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The system and communication 
protection entity must monitor an audit entity.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis. 
50 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'The system and communication 
protection entity may monitor multiple audit entities. ' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
0.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis. 
52 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: Authenticated user/process 
IDs should be granted access to the information system.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
53 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: The identification and 
authentication control family should be use to manage identifier 
generator for an information system.' 



















54 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: The identifier management 
and the access control entities, should be integrated for managing 
access to applications (residing on the information system)and the 
information system. ' 







55 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: The use of multi-factor 
authentication increases the security posture of information 
systems.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
56 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: Identifier generators should 
be capable of multi-factor authentication.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
57 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: Having one of the factors of 
multi-factor authentication provided by a device separate from the 
information system being access, improves the security posture of 
the information system. ' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















58 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-2: The use of time synchronous 
or challenge-response one-time authenticators improves the 
security posture of information systems.' 







60 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-3: System/device ids that should 
be centrally manage by an information system.' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
61 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-3: The use of MAC addresses 
for the identification and authentication of devices/systems 
improves the security posture of an information system.' 
6.545 1 0.011 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.017 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
62 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-3: The use of IP addresses for 
identification and authentication of devices/systems improves the 
security posture of an information system.' 
11.636 1 0.001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















63 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-3: The use of bidirectional 
authentication between devices improves the security posture of 
an information system.' 







65 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-4: Users, processes, systems and 
devices must be uniquely identified to an information system.' 







66 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-4: Preventing the reuse of user, 
process, system or device identifiers increases the security posture 
of an information system.' 
11.636 1 0.001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















67 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-4: Disabling user identifier after 
an organization defined period of inactivity improves the security 
posture of an information system.' 







68 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-4: The use of user identifiers 
that do not match the email address of users improves the security 
posture of an information system.' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
70 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for users/processes improves the security posture of 
information systems' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
71 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for systems/devices improves the security posture 
of information systems' 



















72 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Establishing the minimum 
period before requiring a password change improves the security 
posture of information systems.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
73 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Establishing the maximum 
period before requiring a password change improves the security 
posture of information systems.' 







74 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: The use of automated tools to 
determine the strength of authenticators to resist attacks improves 
the security posture of information system.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
75 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: The use of different unique 
authenticators (or passwords) for different information systems 
improves the security posture of the organization.' 
11.636 1 0.001 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.001 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
76 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Employing the use of single 
sign-on improves the security posture of information systems.' 
2.909 1 0.088 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 















77 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Using one-time passwords 
improves the security posture of information systems.' 
8.909 1 0.003 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.004 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
78 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-5: Restricting the number of 
accounts individuals have on multiple information systems 
improves their security posture.' 
14.727 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
79 The categories of the period of inactivity before a user account is 
disabled occurs with equal probabilities 
7.545 4 0.110 One-Sample 
Chi-Square Test
.110 Retain the 
null 
hypothesis 
80 The categories of the period before authenticators are 
changed/refreshed occur with equal probabilities 
18.909 4 .001 One-Sample 
Chi-Square Test






81 The categories of how many password histories the information 
system should prevent users from reusing occurs with equal 
probabilities 
4.545 3 .208 One-Sample 
Chi-Square Test
.208 Retain the 
null 
hypothesis 
82 The categories for the minimum number of characters for 
passwords occur with equal probabilities. 
14 3 .003 One-Sample 
Chi-Square Test















83i The categories for requiring passwords to be case sensitive occurs 
with equal probabilities 
18.182 1 .000     Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
83ii The categories for requiring that the password exceeds a certain 
number of characters occurs with equal probabilities 







83iii The categories for requiring both upper and lower case letters 
occurs with equal probabilities 
14.727 1 .000     Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
83iv The categories for requiring the use of numbers in passwords 
occurs with equal probabilities 



















83v The categories for requiring the use of special characters in 
passwords occurs with equal probabilities 
14.727 1 .000     Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
83vi The categories for requiring a minimum requirement for each of 
the items in (83) occurs with equal probabilities. 
2.909 1 .088     Retain the 
null 
hypothesis 
85 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-6: Obscuring of feedback during 
authentication improves the security posture of information 
systems.' 
18.182 1 .000 One-Sample 
Binomial Test 
.000 Reject the 
null 
hypothesis 
86 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-7: The use of cryptographic 
modules during authentication improves the security posture of 
information systems.' 







87 There is no significance between the respondents that agree or 
disagree to the statement that 'IA-8: The identification and 
authentication of non-organizational users improves the security 
posture of the information system.' 






Table C60 Bayesian Probability Calculation for the duration of the different tasks 
        Probabilities of Tasks 
Range Max  Min Median Assess Docs. Interviewing Testing Reporting 
<=1 1 0 0.5 5.00% 15.00% 15.00% 5.00% 
2-3 3 2 2.5 35.00% 30.00% 35.00% 20.00% 
4-5 5 4 4.5 20.00% 20.00% 20.00% 25.00% 
6-7 7 6 6.5 15.00% 35.00% 25.00% 30.00% 
>=8 8 8 8 25.00% 0.00% 5.00% 20.00% 
        
    Max Docs. Ass. Max Interview Max Testing Max Reporting 
    0.05 0.15 0.15 0.05 
    1.05 0.9 1.05 0.6 
    1 1 1 1.25 
    1.05 2.45 1.75 2.1 
    2 0 0.4 1.6 
    5.15 4.5 4.35 5.6 
        
    Min Docs. Ass. Min Interview Min Testing Min Reporting 
    0 0 0 0 
    0.7 0.6 0.7 0.4 
    0.8 0.8 0.8 1 
    0.9 2.1 1.5 1.8 
    2 0 0.4 1.6 
    4.4 3.5 3.4 4.8 
        
    Median Docs. Ass. Median Interview Median Testing Median Reporting 
    0.025 0.075 0.075 0.025 
    0.875 0.75 0.875 0.5 
    0.9 0.9 0.9 1.125 
    0.975 2.275 1.625 1.95 
    2 0 0.4 1.6 










Table C61 Pilot Questionnaire Changes  
Ques # Previous Change To 
Que. 8. How would you classify yourself? 
(Select one)   
Project Manager  
Information Security Contractor  
Network Engineer  
Network Administrator  
Other: 
   
8. How would you classify yourself? (Select all 
that apply)   
Project Manager  
Information Security Contractor  
Network Engineer  
Network Administrator  
Other: 
Que. 16-i 16-i. What is your highest level of 
education? 








What is your highest level of education? 
(Select all that apply) 










Please provide any additional feedback 
in the space below. 
Kindly provide additional feedback for items 
you disagree or strongly disagree with. 
Que. 94 Please provide any additional feedback 
in the space below. 
Kindly provide additional feedback for 
durations greater than or equal to 8 days.  
 
Feedback 
for Ques. 89 
– 92 
Maximum duration was >=8 hrs.  For durations greater than 8 hours please 
specify what the duration should be and why. 
Que. 94 What is the fee (in $/hr) information 
assurance organizations charge for 
What is the fee (in $/hr) information assurance 




Ques # Previous Change To 
performing security assessments? security assessment of their systems? 
Formatting Some blank pages exist in the Word 97-
2003 Version of the questionnaire. 
The blank pages have been removed and 
reformatted to be consistent with the Word 
2007 version of the questionnaire. 
 
Que. 10 10. Experience in the information 
technology related field (in years)  
This item was removed from the questionnaire 
as it was a given that the respondents had to 
have extensive experience with information 
assurance for them to be included in the 
research. The remaining questions were 
renumbered. 
Que. 11.  
 
Experience in the network 
administration related field (in years)  
Change to question 10 and a forced response 
with option buttons and duration in ranges. 
 
Years of experience in the network 
administrator related field (Select one) 
<= 3 
4 - 8 
9 - 13 
>= 14 
 
Que. 12  
 
Experience in the network security 
related field (in years)  
Change to question 11 and a forced response 
with option buttons and duration in ranges. 
 
Years experience in the network security 
related field (Select one) 
<= 3 
4 - 8 






Ques # Previous Change To 
Que. 13 Experience with FISMA e-Government 
implementation related field (in years)  
Change to question 12 and a forced response 
with option buttons and duration in ranges. 
 
Years experience in the FISMA e-Government 
implementation related field (years)  
<= 3 
4 - 8 
9 - 13 
>= 14 
 
Que. 60. IA-3: System/device ids that should be 
centrally manage by an information 
system. 
IA-3: System/device ids should be centrally 
managed by an information system. 
Ques 79 & 
80 
<= 30, 30 - 60, 60 - 90, 90 - 120, >=120 <= 30, 31 - 60, 61 - 90, 91 - 120, >=121 
Que. 83. 
IA-5: Select the options that you believe 
improves the security of authenticators. 
 IA-5: Select the options that you believe 
improves the security of authenticators. (Select 
all that apply) 
 
Table C62 Hierarchical e-Government Model vs Relational e-Government Model 
Item Hierarchical e-Government Model Relational e-Government Model 
1. This model takes a hierarchical directory 
approach to identify the security controls  
This model uses a relational approach to identify 
the security control  
2. It does not consider the relationships between 
the controls 
It considers the relationships between the 
controls 
3. It has duplicates in the security controls & 
causes data/information integrity issues. 
It does not permit duplicates for the security 
controls, or their attributes thereby improving 
data integrity 
4. There tends to be a lot of duplicates between 
the controls 
It reduces the likelihood of having duplicate 
controls 
5. It is impossible to automate the workflow The workflow process can be automated 
6. There is no way to track the progress of a 
security assessment 
It can provide real-time tracking of the progress 
of a security assessment 
8. The integration of data/information and 
templates is tightly coupled and it does not 
allow for the reuse or real-time update of 
information and documentation 
The data/information is not restricted to a single 
document template and it allows for the reuse of 
information and the cascading up of updates 
9. The work involved is repetitive and tedious It drastically reduces the drudgery involved in 
performing security assessment 




Item Hierarchical e-Government Model Relational e-Government Model 
tracking of controls that may not be applicable tracking of controls that may not be applicable 
11. The data and information are tightly coupled 
and it does not provide a means for 
development, customization and reusing of 
template for the different types of information 
systems 
The data and information are loosely coupled 
which allows for the development of templates 
that can be customized & reused for the security 
assessment of different information systems 
12. There are higher costs when performing 
security assessments due to the duplication of 
efforts 
This is limited or no task duplication costs when 
performing security assessment 
13. It does not provide a fully-integrated approach 
to security assessment 
It provides a fully-integrated approach to 
security assessment 
14. Tracking of the security assessment to the 
corrective action plan can be tedious and 
fraught with errors 
The security assessment process drives the 
corrective action plan 
15. It does not incorporate artificial intelligence in 
the identification and selection of controls that 
should be assess for different information 
system 
It provides a basis for the development of 
artificial intelligence systems that can assist in 
the identification and selection of the controls 
that apply for different information systems 
16. It is not in a format that is readily available to 
support Business Performance Measure 
Scorecard or Dashboards for assessing and 
highlighting the security posture of information 
systems 
It provides the basis for the development of a 
Business Performance Measures Scorecard and 
Dashboard for assessing and highlighting the 
security posture of information systems 
17. It establishes interconnections between systems 
is a manual ad hoc process that is prone to 
errors and omissions 
It provides a more comprehensive integrated 
approach to establish and track the 
interconnections between systems and 
consequently ensure the proper security 
categorization of the systems 
18. There is no method in place to effectively track 
the responsibility and authority for 
management of the different security controls 
within organization 
It provides a method to effectively track 
responsibility and authority for the different 
security controls that affect a systems within an 
organization 
19. It does not provide a fully integrated inventory 
tracking and mapping for the information 
systems 
It provides a fully integrated inventory tracking 
and mapping for the information systems 
20. It has the ability to track and manage risks 
posed to the information system may be limited 
by human ability to understand their multiple 
complex systems and their corresponding 
interactions and interconnections  
It enhances the limits of human capability to 
track, understand and manage risks posed to 
multiple complex information systems and their 
interactions and interconnections 
21. Its mapping of the security controls to other 
standards is a manual and labor-intensive 
process 
Its mapping of the security controls to other 










Table C63 Hypothesis Test of e-Government Relational Technical Controls 
 











Table C64 Respondent Feedback & Researcher Comments 
# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
1. “Users with administrative privileges 
should have multiple user/process ids: 
for example, one could be used for 
performing administrative functions, 
one for performing non-administrative 
functions therefore limiting exposure to 
sensitive assets, one for testing access 
control for common users, and one for 
remote login with restricted 
permissions.” 
 
We must first note that addressing the 
account requirements for systems 
maintainers is outside the scope of this 
research. Yet in an attempt to address this 
comment, the respondents’ feedback 
suggests that the relationship between the 
user entity and the IA entity should have 
cardinalities of one and multiple user ids 
instead of a maximum and minimum of 
one user id. This is a new school of 
thought that users should have multiple 
identifiers so that if a user’s password for 
one system is hacked, the hacker is 
restricted to a single system associated 
with that identifier instead of having 
access to multiple systems. The drawback 
of this method of assigning multiple 
identifiers to a user is that they tend to 
use the same password for the different 
identifiers or they might choose to write 
down the multiple identifiers and their 
corresponding passwords and position it 
within easy access of computer.  
 
This method of implementing multiple 
identifiers and passwords has the 
likelihood of creating increased risks to 




# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
heavy administrative overhead involved 
in supporting this type of configuration.  
 
The multiple-identifier/password scenario 
does not appear to solve the problem 
associated with having access to multiple 
information systems. An option may be 
to assign users a single identifier and 
multiple tokens (that provide one-time 
asynchronous passwords) for each system 
they need to access. This may be a more 
feasible option from a user and 
administrative perspective though the 
costs associated with providing multiple 
tokens can be substantial. 
2. “Users may have to support multiple 
roles. These roles may need different 
user IDs.” 
 
See feedback #1. 
3.  “I believe unique identification is 
imperative to the auditing function and 
(possible) subsequent legal 
ramifications. If a user is doing 
something they are not supposed to and 
are dragged into court, we must be able 
to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt 
that individual was the one with the 
hands on the keyboard. Group accounts 
make this much more difficult.” 
Group accounts may be used for granting 
assess but auditing should be activated at 
the user level instead of the group level. 
Auditing at the user level will create 
extensive audit logs but it will also 
address the issue of non-repudiation 




# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
 
4.  “The system/device id should be based 
on a combination of hardware 
signatures: for example, for a user’s 
computer workstation on the network, a 
combination of a MAC address, a 
motherboard manufacturing batch code, 
and a hard drive model identification 
would be sufficient to identify the 
computer workstation uniquely.  Yet, a 
system/device id is likely to change over 
time while referring to the same logical 
unit, such as when upgrading the hard 
drive of a user’s computer workstation: 
in such cases, multiple system/device 
ids are necessary; this is where the need 
for a relational information system 
arises and provides a better alternative 
to identify, authenticate, and audit a 
logical system/device across its different 
ids over time (i.e. over its lifecycle).” 
This comment supports the development 
of an e-Government Relational Technical 
Control Model that requires each 
system/device to have a system/device 
identifier associated with it. This 
statement supports the relationship 
between the system/device and the IA 
entities. 
 
5. “Although the possibility of false 
authentications, I think the likelihood is 
low is implemented properly, so I think 
if someone is authenticated, then there is 
no reason NOT to grant them access.” 
This statement further supports the 
relationship between the IA and AC 
entities. 
6. “For strong and robust IA posture in 
compliance with most established 
industry and Federal standards for 
This statement appears to support the 
relationship between the AU and the AC 




# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
C&A, this is a good practice.  Usually 
there will be an audit log or other IA 
security mechanism that will assist in 
tracking auditable events?” 
entities. 
7. “In today’s world, I think it is well 
accepted that the judicial system has not 
caught up with cyber crimes. I think 
proper auditing is a strong step in the 
right direction to minimizing this gap.”     
 
This statement appears to support the 
relationship between the AU and the AC 






































Table C66 IA Respondent Feedback and Research’s Comments 
# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
1. “These items (MAC address or IP 
address) do not directly enhance the 
security of an information system.  It is 
merely a means to categorize and identify 
IT assets. It does help in identifying 
systems that are potentially insecure or 
could have a high risk value within the 
information system.” 
The research agrees with these 
comments and recommends that 
devices and systems be identified using 
identifiers that are specific to them and 
cannot be easily spoofed by a hacker. 
2. “While helpful, I do not believe that 
MAC and IP can be relied on for security, 
but they can indeed improve security 
posture if used in conjunction with other 
measures.” 
See Comment (1).  
3. “Adequate protection must be provided 
for the use of IP addresses to well-known 
attacks to prevent rogue devices/systems 
from acquiring system access and thereby 
causing widespread damage, data and 
system compromise.” 
See Comment (1). 
4. “use of MAC addresses might not be the 
best solution in a virtual environment” 
See Comment (1). 
5. “This is a tough one for me.  Because 
MAC addresses can be spoofed (SANS 
has demonstrated this attack method in 
their Ethical Hacking course) they may 
serve to increase availability, but not 
confidentiality or integrity.  However, an 




# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
attacker spoofing a MAC address must 
first be able to identify an internal MAC 
address to be able to pull this off.  That is 
very difficult and not a preferred method 
of attack (however it has been done 
successfully by some very good hackers)” 
6. “IP’s are easily spoofed and in systems 
that have relied on authenticating IP’s 
those systems are more vulnerable to 
attacks.” 
See Comment (1). 
7. “I understand that using the same name 
gives away the user’s login ID, but that 
could be guessed at most places anyways 
since there are only a few ‘standards’ 
across the industry.”  
The issue of unique identifiers is being 
raised from a different perspective 
indicating that using multiple 
identifiers does not make a system any 
more secure as the identifiers can be 
guessed. 
8. “I disagree with this statement because 
single sign on is just a way to reduce the 
complexity of a user to login into multiple 
systems. I do not believe it increases 
security. Helps in the administration of 
identification and authentication.” 
The researcher agrees with this 
comment, which failed to reject the 
null hypothesis. 
9. “Single sign-on does not increase security 
posture unless it is perhaps reducing the 
occurrence of passwords being written 
down and poorly secured.” 
See comment (8) 
10. “According to Shon Harris, for Single 
Sign On (SSO) technologies, once a user 
is in, he is in.  If an attacker is able to 




# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
uncover one set of credentials, he shall 
have access to every resource within the 
environment that the compromised 
account has access to.” 
11. “Single sign on has the risk where a 
compromised password would have 
access to multiple systems when it is used 
to log on.” 
See comment (8) 
12. “Users should use passphrases instead of 
passwords. It is getting too easy to crack 
the typical 8 character password.” 
The research results indicated that at 95 
percent significance, the use of 
password with eight to ten characters 
coupled with other password 
characteristics improved the security 
posture of information systems. In 
addition, scientific research indicates 
that breaking passwords composed of 
eight to ten characters comprised of 
numbers, upper and lower cases and 
special characters can take a long time 
to hack. 
13. “Requiring the use of different unique 
identifiers for each different information 
system is  
 Counterintuitive to good 
security practice. In my 
experience, users in such 
an environment strongly 
tend to write down their 
unique user ID’s and 





# Respondent Feedback Researcher’s Comments 
passwords and put that 
piece of paper in, on, or 
around their desk.  Have 






Table C67 User/Process Entity and IA Risk Management Strategies Association & Correlations 
Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
52 IA-2: Authenticated 
user/process IDs should be 
granted access to the 
information system. 
Somers’d = 0.495 
Approx. Sig. = .004 
Gamma = 1.000 
Approx. Sig. = .004 
Spearman rho = .515 
Approx. Sig = .014 
Somers’d = .552 
Approx. Sig. = .002 
Gamma = .782 
Approx. Sig. = .002  
Spearman rho = .582 




Somers’d = .434 
Approx. Sig. = .033 
Gamma = .651 
Approx. Sig. = .033  
Spearman rho = .468 
Approx. Sig = .028 
53 IA-2: The identification and 
authentication control family 
should be used to manage 








Somers’d = .500 
Approx. Sig. = .005 
Gamma = .853 
Approx. Sig. = .005  
Spearman rho = .500 







Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
54 IA-2: The identifier 
management and the access 
control entities should be 
integrated for managing access 
to applications (residing on the 
information system) and the 







Somers’d = .548 
Approx. Sig. = .002 
Gamma = .846 
Approx. Sig. = .002  
Spearman rho = .548 




55 IA-2: The use of multi-factor 
authentication increases the 
security posture of 
information systems. 
Somers’d = .607 
Approx. Sig. = .001 
Gamma = 1.000 
Approx. Sig. = .001 
Spearman rho = .633 
Approx. Sig = .002 
Somers’d = .483 
Approx. Sig. = .008 
Gamma = .683 
Approx. Sig. = .008  
Spearman rho = .506 










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
56 IA-2: Identifier generators 








Somers’d = .382 
Approx. Sig. = .056 
Gamma = .600 
Approx. Sig. = .056  
Spearman rho = .390 




57 IA-2: Having one of the factors 
of multi-factor authentication 
provided by a device separate 
from the information system 
being access, improves the 
security posture of the 
information system.  
Somers’d = .607 
Approx. Sig. = .001 
Gamma = 1.000 
Approx. Sig. = .001 
Spearman rho = .633 













Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
58 IA-2: The use of time 
synchronous or challenge-
response one-time 
authenticators improves the 
security posture of 
information systems. 
Somers’d = .488 
Approx. Sig. = .004 
Gamma = 1 
Approx. Sig. = .004  
Spearman rho = .495  
Approx. Sig = .019 
Somers’d = .383 
Approx. Sig. = .051 
Gamma = .570 
Approx. Sig. = .051  
Spearman rho = .408 







60 IA-3: System/device ids that 
should be centrally managed 













61 IA-3: The use of MAC 
addresses for the identification 
and authentication of 
devices/systems improves the 





Somers’d = .695 
Approx. Sig. = .000 
Gamma = .930 
Approx. Sig. = .000  
Spearman rho =  .746 










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
62 IA-3: The use of IP addresses 
for identification and 
authentication of 
devices/systems improves the 





Somers’d = .422 
Approx. Sig. = .021 
Gamma = .633 
Approx. Sig. = .021  
Spearman rho = .459  
Approx. Sig = .031 
Somers’d = .459 
Approx. Sig. = .004 
Gamma = .808 
Approx. Sig. =.004  
Spearman rho = .482 




63 IA-3: The use of bidirectional 
authentication between devices 
improves the security posture 







Somers’d = .650 
Approx. Sig. = .000 
Gamma = .929 
Approx. Sig. =.000  
Spearman rho = .650 







Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
65 IA-4: Users, processes, systems 
and devices must be uniquely 





Somers’d = .412 
Approx. Sig. = .012 
Gamma = .643 
Approx. Sig. = .012  
Spearman rho = .444 
Approx. Sig = .038 
Somers’d = .551 
Approx. Sig. = .003 
Gamma = .886 
Approx. Sig. = .003  
Spearman rho = .552 




66 IA-4: Preventing the reuse of 
user, process, system or device 
identifiers increases the 





Somers’d = .510 
Approx. Sig. =  .004 
Gamma = .720 
Approx. Sig. =.004  
Spearman rho = .540 










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
67 IA-4: Disabling user identifier 
after an organization-defined 
period of inactivity improves 





Somers’d = .387 
Approx. Sig. = .031 
Gamma = .639 
Approx. Sig. =.031  
Spearman rho = .413 







68 IA-4: The use of user 
identifiers that do not match 
the email address of users 
improves the security posture 




Somers’d = .464 
Approx. Sig. = .011 
Gamma = .680 
Approx. Sig. = .011  
Spearman rho = .495  










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
70 IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for 
users/processes improves the 








Somers’d = .462 
Approx. Sig. = .018 
Gamma = .674 
Approx. Sig. = .018  
Spearman rho = .472 




71 IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for 
systems/devices improves the 





Somers’d = .511 
Approx. Sig. = .003 
Gamma = .761 
Approx. Sig. =.003  
Spearman rho = .546 
Approx. Sig = .009 
Somers’d = .388 
Approx. Sig. = .045 
Gamma = .697 
Approx. Sig. = .045  
Spearman rho = .388 
Approx. Sig = .074 
Somers’d = .472 
Approx. Sig. = .027 
Gamma = .690 
Approx. Sig. =.027  
Spearman rho = .494 




Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
72 IA-5: Establishing the 
minimum period before 
requiring a password change 
improves the security posture 







Somers’d = .343 
Approx. Sig. = .070 
Gamma = .636 
Approx. Sig. =.070  
Spearman rho = .350 




73 IA-5: Establishing the 
maximum period before 
requiring a password change 
improves the security posture 




Somers’d = .383 
Approx. Sig. = 051 
Gamma = .570 
Approx. Sig. =.051  
Spearman rho = .408 










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
74 IA-5: The use of automated 
tools to determine the strength 
of authenticators to resist 
attacks improves the security 
posture of an information 
system. 
Somers’d = .457 
Approx. Sig. = .035 
Gamma = .828 
Approx. Sig. = .035  
Spearman rho = .475 
Approx. Sig = .026 
Somers’d = .454 
Approx. Sig. = .012 
Gamma = .681 
Approx. Sig. = .012  
Spearman rho = .479 
Approx. Sig = .024 
Somers’d = .465 
Approx. Sig. = .019 
Gamma = .687 
Approx. Sig. =.019  
Spearman rho = .474 




75 IA-5: The use of different 
unique authenticators (or 
passwords) for different 
information systems improves 





Somers’d = .579 
Approx. Sig. = .001 
Gamma = .772 
Approx. Sig. = .001  
Spearman rho = .611 










Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
76 IA-5: Employing the use of 
single sign-on improves the 








Somers’d = .363 
Approx. Sig. = .045 
Gamma = .560 
Approx. Sig. =.045  
Spearman rho = .389 




77 IA-5: Using one-time 
passwords improves the 








Somers’d = .338 
Approx. Sig. = .063 
Gamma = .575 
Approx. Sig. =.063  
Spearman rho = .358 







Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
78 IA-5: Restricting the number 
of accounts individuals have 
on multiple information 








Somers’d = .422 
Approx. Sig. = .022 
Gamma = .675 
Approx. Sig. = .022  
Spearman rho = .437 




79 IA-4: What should be the 
period of inactivity before a 













80 IA-5: How often should 
authenticators (or passwords) 
be changed/refreshed? 
Somers’d = -.253 
Approx. Sig. = .066 
Gamma = -.600 
Approx. Sig. = .066 
Spearman rho = -.282 













Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
81 IA-5: How many password 
histories should an 
information system remember 





Somers’d = .331 
Approx. Sig. = .036 
Gamma = .474 
Approx. Sig. =.036  
Spearman rho = .391 







82 IA-5: What should be the 
minimum number of 








Somers’d = -.380 
Approx. Sig. = .023 
Gamma = -.676 
Approx. Sig. = .023 
Spearman rho = -.406 




83i Requiring passwords to be 
















Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
83ii Requiring that the password 
exceeds a certain number of 
characters 
This value is a constant This value is a constant This value is a constant This value is a constant 
83iii Requiring the use of both 













83iv Requiring the use of numbers  This value is a constant This value is a constant This value is a constant This value is a constant 














83vi Having a minimum 
requirement for each of the 
















Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
85 IA-6: Obscuring of feedback 
during authentication 
improves the security posture 




Somers’d = .361 
Approx. Sig. = .048 
Gamma = .531 
Approx. Sig. =.048  
Spearman rho = .396 
Approx. Sig = .068 
Somers’d = .478 
Approx. Sig. = .006 
Gamma = .789 
Approx. Sig. =.006  
Spearman rho = .488 
Approx. Sig = .021 
Somers’d = .415 
Approx. Sig. = .027 
Gamma = .659 
Approx. Sig. =.027  
Spearman rho = .448 
Approx. Sig = .037 
86 IA-7: The use of cryptographic 
modules during authentication 
improves the security posture 










Somers’d = .398 
Approx. Sig. = .014 
Gamma = .750 
Approx. Sig. =.014  
Spearman rho = .418 




Item Question 27. Each 
Users/Processes 
should have a unique 
identifier for 
authentication to an 
information system. 
28. Users/Processes 
should be restricted to 
a single user/process 
id. 
29. An IA entity should 





30. An IA entity can 




may identify and 
authenticate only 
systems/devices) 
87 IA-8: The identification and 
authentication of non-
organizational users improves 





Somers’d = .397 
Approx. Sig. = .019 
Gamma = .622 
Approx. Sig. =.019  
Spearman rho = .438 












Table C68 System/Device Entity and IA Risk Management Strategies Association & Correlations 
Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























52  IA-2: Authenticated 
user/process IDs should be 




























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























53  IA-2: The identification and 
authentication control 
family should be use to 
manage identifier 
































Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























54  IA-2: The identifier 
management and the 
access control entities 
should be integrated for 
managing access to 
applications (residing on 
the information system) 




























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























55  IA-2: The use of multi-
factor authentication 
increases the security 





















56  IA-2: Identifier generators 























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 




































57  IA-2: Having one of the 
factors of multi-factor 
authentication provided by 
a device separate from the 
information system being 
access, improves the 
security posture of the 



























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 



























































60 IA-3: System/device ids 
that should be centrally 





















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 


































61 IA-3: The use of MAC 

























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























62 IA-3: The use of IP 
addresses for identification 
and authentication of 
devices/systems improves 














63 IA-3: The use of 
bidirectional authentication 
between devices improves 


























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 































65  IA-4: Users, processes, 
systems and devices must 
























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























66  IA-4: Preventing the reuse 
of user, process, system or 
device identifiers increases 






















67  IA-4: Disabling user 
identifier after an 
organization-defined 
period of inactivity 






















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 




































68  IA-4: The use of user 
identifiers that do not 
match the email address of 
users improves the security 





























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























70 IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for 
users/processes improves 





























71 IA-5: Limiting the reuse of 
authenticators for 
systems/devices improves 























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 


































72 IA-5: Establishing the 
minimum period before 
requiring a password 
change improves the 




























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























73  IA-5: Establishing the 
maximum period before 
requiring a password 
change improves the 





















74  IA-5: The use of automated 
tools to determine the 
strength of authenticators 
to resist attacks improves 




















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 


































75  IA-5: The use of different 
unique authenticators (or 
passwords) for different 
information systems 
improves the security 





















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























76  IA-5: Employing the use of 
single sign-on improves the 

















77  IA-5: Using one-time 
passwords improves the 


























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 































78  IA-5: Restricting the 
number of accounts 
individuals have on 
multiple information 
























Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























79  IA-4: What should be the 
period of inactivity before a 





























81  IA-5: How many password 
histories should an 
information system 
remember and prevent 
















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























82  IA-5: What should be the 
minimum number of 














83i  Requiring passwords to be 













83ii  Requiring that the 
password exceeds a certain 









83iii  Requiring the use of both 












Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























letters  correlations  correlations  correlations  correlations 
























83vi  Having a minimum 
requirement for each of the 
















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 






























85  IA-6: Obscuring of 
feedback during 
authentication improves 






























86  IA-7: The use of 
cryptographic modules 
during authentication 
improves the security 






















Item  Question  32. A 
System/Device 


































87  IA-8: The identification and 
authentication of non-
organizational users 
improves the security 




























Appendix D: Glossary of Terms 
Term Acronym Definition 
Information 
Assurance 
IA Information Assurance (IA) is a risk management tool. It is defined 
by the National Security Agency FAQ #2 as “Information Assurance 
comprises measures that protect and defend information and 
information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, 
authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. These measures 
include providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.” 
Information assurance reduces the probability of security 
vulnerability and minimizes the effects should a security incident 
occurs. IA provides the guiding principles and audit to the 
underlying information security (InfoSec) process across an 
enterprise. IA affirms the stakeholders’ trust, confidence and the 
quality of information in areas of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information being processed. (Ng R. 2009) 
Risk NA The probability of failure, harm, loss, damage, injury or other 
undesirable event occurring 
Risk 
management 
NA Risk management involves identifying, analyzing, mitigating, 
transferring and managing of risks to an organizationally acceptable 
level to ensure that we maximize positive events and minimize the 
consequences of adverse events. A process of using risk assessment 
to make decision about maintaining a desired level of risk 
 
Taxonomy NA The Merriam-Webster online dictionary defines taxonomy as ‘the 
study of the general principles of scientific classification.’ The word 
‘taxonomy’ originates from the ancient Greek word taxis-nomos. 
Taxis mean order or arrangement and nomos means law or science. 
These two words together in taxonomy provide the meaning of the 




Term Acronym Definition 
usually results in a hierarchical structure of classes with supertype – 
subtype relationships. This super-type – sub-type can be in the form 
of parent-child hierarchy, an organization of things in the form of an 
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